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THE JAPANESE FOOD AND FEED GRAIN ECONOMY 1 
PAUL M. KALMBACH, JOHN W. SHARP and FRANCIS E. WALKER2 
Introduction 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Agricultural exports play a vitally important 
role in the economic well-being of the United States. 
Three of the primary reasons for the importance of 
agricultural exports to U. S. farmers, as well as other 
.\mericans, arc the contributions to: 1) the mainten-
ance or expansion of farm incomes, 2) improvement 
of the balance of payments, and 3) the support of 
U. S. political strategy. 
The value of agricultural exports to the U. S. 
economy has been statistically evident in recent years. 
From 1972 to 1977, the agricultural trade balance 
(TB) averaged+ $9.75 billion per year while during 
the same period the non-agricultural TB averaged 
- $16.4 billion per year. In 1977 alone, the non-
agricu!tural TB was in deficit $40.2 billion while the 
agricultural TB was a $10.2 billion surplus. The 
importance to the nation's economy of a continuing 
high level of agricultural exports is intensified e\Tr)' 
month as the U. S. continues to accumulate record 
trade deficits. 
Japan is the single largest customer for American 
agricultural products. Since 1975 Japan has pur-
chased 16'/r of all U. S. agricultural exports. Feed 
grains, soybeans, and wheat accounted for more than 
50~/r of Japan's agricultural imports from the U. S. 
The importance of Japanese imports of U. S. agricul-
tural products is further emphasized by the fact that 
from 1975 to 1977 the U. S. TB with Japan alone 
was in deficit by an average $5 billion per year. In 
light of these statistics which document the impor-
tance of U. S. agricultural exports to Japan and, in 
particular the feed grain, soybean, and wheat exports, 
it is evident that it is to the advantage of the U. S. to 
be as knowledgeable as possible concerning the Japa-
nese feed grain, soybean, and wheat import market~ 
as well as the entire Japanese agricultural and food 
economy. 
Very little is written in English about the Japa-
nese agricultural system.'' This is especially true when 
1This research is a contnbut1ng part of NC-139, the North Cen· 
tral Regional Grain Marketing Project ent1tled Economic Analysis of 
the United States Gra1n Exporting System. 
'Research Assoc1ate, Professor, and Professor, Dept. of Agr cul-
tural Econom1cs and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University and 
Ohio Agncultural Research and Development Center. 
''Major sources of mformation for this report were personal con-
tacts and interv1ews w1th people in government, industry, and aca· 
demia mvolved in the Japanese food economy. A list of people 
who were interviewed or who supplied information is provided in the 
Appendix. 
compared to the volume of literature available from 
other developed nations. The difficulty this presents 
to persons in industry, government, and academia in-
terested in Japanese agriculture is further aggra vatcd 
by the fact that there is considerable evidence that the 
Japan esc agricultural system and consumption of 
agricultural products arc not duplicates of Western 
ccuntries. Therefore, assumptions made about 
Japan's production and consumption of feed grain~, 
soybeans, and wheat in economic modeling based up-
on the experiences of other developed countries arc 
not likely to be appropriate. 
Besides the differences in Japan's consumption 
patterns, there is reason to believe that the consumer, 
via consumer purchasing power, is not as sovereign as 
might be expected in \Vestern economies. This is 
because of institutional characteristics in the agricul-
tural markets. These institutional characteristics in-
volve government agricultural and trade policies a~ 
wdl as private institutional relationships in the food 
sector. There is little question whether or not these 
institutional characteristics affect the agricultural im-
ports and imports of feed grains, soybeans, and 
wheat; the question is-how and to what degree. 
This question has been superficially discussed in nu-
merous articles and publications but has never been 
thoroughly researched. The answer is of great po-
tential importance to U. S. agricultural exporters. 
Although there arc concerns over the future of 
the U. S. market position for feed grains, soybeans, 
and wheat, there appear to he few empirical and/or 
descriptive investigations into this area. This is also 
true with information regarding the obvious percep-
tual, cultural, and informational gap concerning 
Japanese agriculture and imports of feed grains, soy-
beans, and wheat. 
This research is concerned with the quantity of 
feed grains, soybeans, and wheat imported by Japan, 
and the role of the U. S. in these markets. U. S. 
dominance in the past has been unquestioned. How-
ever, since 1966 there has been considerable concern 
from the U.S. side over the future U.S. market posi-
tion in the Japanese market ( 4, 13, 54, 55, 59). 
The extent to which the U. S. can maintain its 
position in these markets, as well as improve its under-
standing of a mutually beneficial trading relationship 
with Japan, is dependent upon the U. S. acquiring a 
greater knowledge and better understanding of the 
Japanese agricultural system. This report is one 
step forward in accumulating the needed descriptive 
and empirical information from which a better un-
derstanding can he reached. 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this study is to investi-
gate the Japanese feed grain, soybean, and wheat 
markets in order to describe these markets. Thi~ 
economic analysis of the Japanese feed grain, soybean, 
and wheat markets places particular emphasis upon 
identifying market aspects which arc affecting and 
will continue to affect Japanese imports of these com-
modi ties and the U. S. market position. 
The sub-objectives are: 
• To identify and describe Japanese govern-
ment policies and programs that affect feed 
grain, soybean, and wheat markets and the 
extent to which these markets arc affected. 
• To describe the operational decision-making 
process within the Japanese feed grain, soy-
bean, and wheat-consuming industries with 
respect to the buying practices and non-price 
criteria used by these companies in selecting 
supply sourecR. 
Introduction and Historical Overview of the Japanese 
Food and Agricultural System 
In order to adequately understand Japan's pre-
sent agricultural system, its programs and policies, it 
is necessary to understand some of the major events 
and phenomena that have shaped Japan's unique sys-
tem of agriculture. Any system such as Japan's with 
diverse segments having different goals is difficult to 
analyze and describe. The Japanese food economy 
is particularly compkx because of societal and poli-
tical considerations (such as consumer food needs, 
farmrr income levels, agricultural diversification, 
food source indeprndcncc, etc.) that arc quite differ-
ent from those in the U. S. Description is even more 
difficult since the many diffcrC'nt sectors of the food 
economy arc interdependent. Therefore, in order to 
adequately explain the soybean, wheat, and fe<'d 
grain markets, it is also necessary to explain th<' rele-
vant aspects of other sectors of agriculture. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE 
AGRICULTURE AND THE INCOME-ENERGY GAP 
Since the time of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan 
has been a food importing country. As a result, the 
government endeavored to increase rice production 
in Korea and Taiwan. Just prior to and during 
World War I, the price of rice fluctuated wildly, a 
situation which culminated in the Rice Riots of 1919. 
The subsequent Rice Law, which gave the govern-
ment the authority to purchase and resell rice as well 
as to stabilize the price by setting ceiling and floor 
prices, marked the beginning of significant govern-
ment intervention in the food marketplace (50). 
From 1919 to just prior to World War II, the gov-
ernment continued to increase it<; authority and con-
trol over food products, primarily rice, in an effort to 
control food prices, stimulate production, and limit 
imports. These continue to be important goals of 
the Japanese food strategy today. 
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Japan's food problem since the mid and lat<' 
1950's has been a consistent two-dimensional food 
'>hortagc that is distinctly different from the more 
dramatic and temporary food shortages immediately 
following World War II. The first problem was a 
nutritional one. Per capita food consumption in 
Japan from 1954 to 1960 was at a level below the 
Food and Agriculture Organization's ( F.A.O.) nu-
tritional reference standard for the country. 4 
The second problem wa.q primarily one of eco-
nomics and has come to be called the "income-energy 
gap"" ( 4). The income-energy gap is basically a 
gap between the consumption of food and the amount 
of food to which the Japanese arc "entitled" on the 
basis of their relatively high level of income. Figure 
1 demonstrates the idea behind the income-energy 
gap. During the period 1954 to 1962, Spanish and 
J apane<;e consumers had about the same level of per-
sonal income (an average of approximately $250/ 
capita/year), yet the Spanish consumed about 2,670 
calories/ capita/ day compared to the Japanese con-
sumption of 2,250 calories during this period. Mea-
sured against Spanish consumption, the income-en-
ergy gap would be 420 calories; mea.'lured against 
Greek consumption, it would be 650 calories. Cer-
tainly there is a large difference between Western 
and Japanese consumption levels. 
It is also important to realize that in spite of the 
relatively higher incomes, the income-energy gap can-
not be attributed to a lack of staple and/ or cereal 
'The F.A.O.'s "Third World Survey" (65) set the short term daily 
food consumption target per person for Eastern Asia (including Japan) 
at 2,350 calories, balanced among food types. During the 1950's, 
Japan's food consumption was significantly below 2,350 calories. 
Presumably this was a sign of nutritional deficiencies for some seg· 
ments ot the populat1on. 
"A more descriptive term would be "income·food energy" to 
d1stingu1sh the term energy from its more common use in reference 
to coal, od, etc. 
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FIG. 1.-Total per capita food consumption and private per capita consumption in selected countries, 1954-1974. 
foods since Japanese consumption of these foods 
matched and exceeded Western levels during this time 
( 66). Rather, the gap is almost totally attributed 
to Japan's relatively low consumption of livestock 
products. This is illustratrd in Table 1 where the 
grams of animal protein arc separated from total pro-
tein per capita per day for selected countries. It has 
generally been noted that, although consumption of 
livestock products from country to country differs, 
the levels for consumption of livestock products in 
\V estern nations are generally comparable at the 
various levels of per capita income. 
This problem of economics was more formidable 
and politically hazardous to the government than the 
nutritional deficiency which could be overcome in a 
few years. (According to the F.A.O. data, the nutri-
tional deficiency was overcome in 1960 ( 66) . ) The 
rconomic problem, however, threatened to deterio-
rate because of the constant strain in Japan between 
increasing food demand (represented by growing in-
comes) and short domestic food supplies. If Japan 
allowed per capita food supplies to stagnate or decline 
in the face of rapidly increasing per capita income, 
food prices would skyrocket, creating political and 
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economic problems, especially among groups whose 
incomes rose less than the average. 
\Vhile Japan's commcrcr and manufacturing sec-
tors were improving their economic image in a dy-
namic fashion, Japan's agriculture remained rather 
stagnant. The productivity of agricultural labor in 
Japan was lower than that of any other developed 
country ( 4, 63). This problem was compounded by 
a lack of cropland and an extremely small scale of 
production (the average size farm in Japan is 2.97 
acres), which limited the economic feasibility of great-
ly increased employment of capital and advanced 
technologies. 
It became obvious to Japan's leaders in the late 
1950's that they would have to develop new agricul-
tural sectors if the income-energy gap was to be 
closed with the least possible disruption to rural 
Japan. However, the question of whether or not to 
close the gap came down to one of whether or not to 
increase agricultural imports in one form or another. 
The Japanese historically have been very much 
opposed to agricultural imports for two primary rca-
sons: 1) imports increase Japanese dependency on 
foreign food supplies, and 2) increased imports of 
food reduced foreign currency availabk for the pur-
chase of imports needed for economic growth-vital 
raw materials, advanced technology, and capital. 
The second reason was especially important to Japan 
in the 1950's and 1960's. 
In the late 1950's, there were a number of agri-
cultural issues that resulted in a great debate. Some 
of the is~ues have already been discussed. However, 
one additional problem should he mentioned. The 
agricultural work force in 1961 had an average in-
come equivalent to 25'/c of the average income of a 
worker employed in the manufacturing sector. This 
is a particularly critical differential in light of the 
low average income of a worker in the manufacturing 
sector in 1961. The problem the govcrnmcnt faced 
was: what policy would economically increase food 
supplies, increase the farmers' income, and do this 
with minimal disruption to the agricultural society:) 
The agricultural debate of the late 1950's cul-
minated in several policy decisions which set the stage 
for a Japanese food strategy. The major outcomes 
of the debate that concern the feed grain, wheat, and 
soybean markets arc: 
TABLE 1.-Total Private per Capita Consumption and per Capita Food Consumption Statistics for Selected 
Countries, 1954-1974. 
Japan 
Year of PrivC~~!e Consumption 
Year of Food Supply 
Pnvate consumption per cop1to per year 
{current U. S. dollars) 
Colones per cap:ta per day 
Protem [grams) per cap1to per day 
An1mol protem {grams} per cap1ta per day 
Fat [grams) per capita per day 
Greece 
Pnvote consumpt1on per cap1ta per year 
[current U. S. dollars) 
Calories per cap1ta per day 
Protem [grams) per cop1ta per day 
An1mol protem [grams) per cop1ta per day 
Fat [grams) per cap1ta per day 
Pakistan 
Private consumpt1on per cap1to per year 
[current U. S. dollars) 
Calories per cap1to per day 
Protem [grams) per cap1ta per day 
An1mal protem [grams} per cop1to per day 
Fat [grams) per cap1ta per day 
Italy 
Private consumpt1on per capita per year 
{current U. S. dollars) 
Calories per cap1ta per day 
Protem [grams) per cap1to per day 
Animal prote1n {grams) per cap1ta per day 
Fat [grams) per cap1to per day 
U.S.A. 
Pnvate consumption per cap1to per year 
[current U. S. dollars) 
Colones per cap1ta per day 
Protein [grams} per cop1ta per day 
Animal protem {grams} per cap1ta per day 
Fat (grams) per cop1to per day 
Spain 
Private consumpt1on per cap1to per year 
1954 
1954-1956 
163 
2070 
65.5 
13.3 
25.8 
219 
2880 
90.7 
24.1 
82.2 
55 
1990 
46.6 
8.1 
24.0 
314.5 
2470 
72.7 
23.6 
62.0 
1451 
3140 
92.2 
64.8 
143.6 
1958 
1957-1959 
214 
2170 
67.9 
13.9 
30.2 
295 
2990 
95.8 
27.4 
85.9 
60 
1980 
46.0 
7.3 
22.0 
407 
2570 
76.4 
26.6 
70.1 
1659 
3100 
91.9 
64.9 
142.0 
1962 
1961-1963 
345 
2517 
72.3 
24.4 
37.9 
372 
2812 
84.7 
29.2 
89.3 
68 
1829 
52.1 
12.5 
30.0 
552 
3027 
83.1 
29.2 
87.8 
1904 
3334 
101.2 
68.0 
153.1 
1966 
1964-1966 
567 
2601 
74.5 
26.9 
46.1 
543 
2959 
90.8 
34.0 
96.2 
86 
1867 
51.9 
12.7 
30.0 
788 
3163 
88.5 
33.6 
94.2 
2372 
3367 
102.6 
70.1 
156.9 
[current U. S. dollars) 212 258 299 521 
Calories per capita per day 2520 2590 2873 2833 
Protem [grams) per cap1to per day 70.2 71.1 81.8 82.3 
An1mal prate1n {grams) per capita per day 19.3 20.1 28.4 33.7 
Fat {grams) per cop1ta per day 74.0 78.2 86.2 90.8 
-------------------------~------ ---------
Sources: (20, 66). 
1970 
1969-1971 
982 
2731 
82.0 
36.2 
60.9 
729 
3072 
97.2 
41.6 
107.6 
114 
2147 
59.0 
12.7 
32.3 
1115 
3460 
96.0 
39.5 
116.8 
3011 
3511 
104.7 
72.2 
167.0 
679 
2857 
83.5 
40.5 
99.7 
1974 
1972-1974 
2202 
2832 
85.5 
40.1 
70.2 
1422 
3242 
101.2 
44.7 
116.2 
101 
2128 
57.2 
12.7 
33.3 
1825 
3519 
98.1 
42.8 
122.3 
4585 
3535 
104.6 
71.8 
167.8 
1705 
3178 
91.1 
44.9 
113.7 
-----------
• The passage of the Agricultural Basic Law 
in 1961 upon which Japan's present agricul-
tural policy is based. This legislation was a 
charter acknowledging that Japanese agri-
culture must he an industry as well as a way 
of life. A number of important principle::; 
put forth in this basic law were: 1) produc-
tivity should he increased through selective 
expansion emphasizing those agricultural 
products with high income elasticities, 2) the 
price of farm products should he stabilized, 
3) farm incomes should he increased to ade-
quate levels, and 4) the agricultural structure 
should he improved. 
• 
• 
Import quotas on soybeans were removed in 
1961. 
The Livestock Products Price Stabilization 
Law was enacted in 1961 in order to prevent 
excessive price fluctuations and also to boost 
production of livestock products. 
The Japanese government's major objectives in 
its new food strategy (particularly as spelled out in 
the Basic Law of 1961) have been interpreted some-
what differently from outside Japan than from within. 
It is agreed that two of the major goals were to in-
crease per capita supply in order to reduce nutritional 
deficiencies and concurrently satisfy demand, and to 
increase production of agricultural products of high 
income elasticities (livestock products, fruits, and 
vegetables) faster than production of products with 
low income elasticities ( Tah1e 2) ( 4, 50, 51, 63). 
The difference is that outside observers such as Barse 
( 4) infer that these two goals are the primary goals 
of the government, while Japanese analysts such as 
Ogura and Tsuchiya ( 14, 50, 51, 63) state unequivo-
cally that the main goal of the Basic Law was to 
equalize the per capita income of agricultural and in-
dustrial workers. This difference, though perhaps 
seemingly minor, illustrates a need for greater un-
derstanding of Japanese agriculture from their per-
spective. 
Regardless of the motives behind the Agricul-
tural Basic Law, the result was a rather dramatic 
increase in domestic food production, especially live-
stock products. This increase in production has re-
quired the importation of more and more raw ma-
terials which in the case of the livestock industry con-
sists primarily of feed grain and soybeans. Although 
the importation system will be explained in much 
o-reater detail later, it should he noted that Japanese t:> 
imports of consumer products are kept low and well-
controlled. Behind this protective trade shield, a 
new industry ( IivC'stock in this case) can establish it-
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TABLE 2.-Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries Estimates of Income and Price Elasticities of 
Demand for Farm Products, Japan, 1970. 
Income Price 
Commodity Elasticity Elasticity 
Cereals 
Rice -0.76 0.34 
Bread 0.43 0.67 
Barley -3.39 3.23 
Vegetables 
Eggplant 0.33 0.78 
Cucumber 0.98 0.00 
Tomato 0.60 0.32 
Livestock Products 
Beef 1.06 1.83 
Pork 2.40 1.91 
Chicken 0.98 3.81 
Milk 1.81 0.97 
Fruits 
Oranges 1.51 0.97 
Pears 1.06 0.14 
Grapes 1.46 0.87 
Source: {30). 
c;clf as an efficient, or otherwise, operation.'' The only 
imports in significant volume which can pass around 
this shield are strategic raw materials, technology, 
and capital. 
It certainly appears that it is the purpose of the 
Japanese government to guarantee that th~ economic 
benefits from processing any raw matcnal for do-
mestic consumption go to the Japanese. This fact 
is not only evidenced in the livestock industry, but 
also in countless other industries. To accomplish 
this, the government uses tariffs, quota", licensing, 
and other effective non-customs' harriers. 
"Theoretically, an 1ndustry would establ,sh 1tself as an efficient 
operation and then the protective trade barriers would be dropped 
and the compan1es would have to compete m the world markets. 
However, the Japanese livestock mdustry has had the time to _be· 
come established and has failed to become an eff1c1ent operat1on, 
and the trade barners still ex1st for that mdustry. 
TABLE 3.-Rice Supply-Demand and Price Statistics, Japan, 1960-1977 
Imports l+l 
Are<1 Producer Per Capita or Surplus 
Year Pl·anted Production Price Consumption Disposal (-) 
1000 ha 1000 MT 1000 yen/MT kg/ person/ yr 1000 MT 
1960 3124 12539 139 114.9 +227 
1961 3134 12138 147 117.4 +154 
1962 3134 12762 162 I I 8.3 +190 
1963 3133 12529 176 117.3 +195 
1964 3126 12362 199 1 I 5.8 +451 
1965 3123 12181 218 I 11.7 +971 
1966 3129 12526 238 105.8 +976 
1967 3149 14257 260 I 03.4 +5o3 
1968 3171 14223 275 I 00.4 +475 
1969 3173 I 3797 275 97.1 -363 
1970 2836 12528 276 95.1 -1079 
1971 2626 10782 284 93.1 -2496 
1972 2581 11766 298 91.5 -1866 
1973 2568 12068 343 90.8 -1158 
1974 2673 12177 454 89.7 -208 
1975 2717 13080 519 88.1 +31 * 
1976 2740 11695 552 86.2 +16* 
1977 2722 13018 574 83.4 +45* 
*Imports since 1975 ore largely imports of special types of rice because during 1975-1977, Iorge 
stocks of rice were ogain built up although no rice was disposed of. 
Source: (31). 
ries consumed hy the Japane~c and 521 calories more 
than wheat. 
For a longer period than most agricultural hi~­
tory hooks cover, rice has been the crop grown in 
Japan almost to the virtual exclusion of everything 
else. This is not unexpected or difficult to under-
stand given the situation prior to World War II. It 
is difficult to understand why Japan, with the world's 
third largest economy, remains resolutely committed 
to rice production and consumption-especially in 
light of the government's stated desire to diversify 
agriculture. 
In reference to the preceding section, it should 
he realized that the actions of the Japan esc govern-
ment are different from many of its public statements. 
As a result of the income-energy gap, the government 
had a choice of: 1) allowing the political and eco-
nomic strains of an unbalanced and short food supply 
to continue to threaten the economy, 2) importing 
food, or 3) diversifying its agriculture. The govern-
ment opted for the third alternative. However, at 
the time that it made its public commitment to di-
versification via the Agriculture Basic Law, it also 
committed itself to the income equalization of farm 
and urban workers. In 1960, strong political pres-
sure from the farm sectors resulted in a government 
rice purchase-price determination formula called thr 
Production Cost and Income Compensation Formula. 
Under this formula, the producer price of rice 
rose very rapidly relative to the price of manufactured 
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items. From 1960 to 1970, the prier of manufac-
tured goods in Japan increased 87<; hut during thr 
same time period, the purchase price of rice inrreailed 
997<. The government's commitment to rice pro-
duction is further illustrated hy the fact that in 1968 
the deficiency from the rice support program was 
463 billion yen ( $1.3 billion) which amounted to 
40% of the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry and 57< of the national budget ( 3). 
After the disposal of 7,200,000 metric tons 
(MT) of surplus rice in 1972 to 1974 at a cost of 1 
trillion yen ( $3.33 billion), the government adopted 
a rice production adjustment plan which requires 
farmers to take out of rice production a certain per-
rentage of thr land they had in rice production the 
previou~ year. The land srt aside can be used to pro-
duce other crops. Even with this program, an addi-
tional 4 million tons of surplus rice has accumulated 
which when disposed of will cost 1.3 trillion yen ( $6.6 
billion). 
Besides giving economic encouragement to pro-
duce rice, the government spends the majority of its 
agricultural research money on ricr and in 1976 in-
stituted a multi-faceted campaign to increase rice 
consumption. Farmers have a number of additional 
reasons for concentrating on rice production. They 
continur to produce rice because they are "geared 
up'' to produce rice, and are most knowledgeable in 
rice production. The climate is very favorable for 
the production of rice and the government's empha-
sis on rice research has resulted in varieties of rice 
that are more productive. 
The important point is that despite the go\'Crn-
ment's stated intention to diversify agriculture, its ac-
tions have encouraged rice production at the expense 
of diversification. Furthermore, given that the net 
revenues per hectare from raising rice, soybeans, and 
wheat arc 877,920 yen, 298,463 yen, and 249,062 yen 
($1777 /acre, $604/acre, and $504/acre), respectively, 
Japanese farmers appear to have made the intelligent 
economic decision not to diversify (and in many cases 
have reduced production of alternative crops), but to 
produce rice at a level which from a societal point of 
view represents a misallocation of resources. This is 
because the rice support program along with declining 
per capita rice consumption produced sizable rice sur-
pluses at a time when Japan was attempting to di-
versify its agriculture and limit agricultural imports. 
If some of the rice land had been used for production 
of other crops, the result would have been a lower tax 
bill for the rice support program and fewer imports. 
JAPANESE PRODUCTION OF SOYBEANS, 
WHEAT, AND FEED GRAINS 
In Japan, domestic production of all crops ex-
cept rice has dropped dramatically in the last 20 years 
(Tables 4 and 5). Rapeseed area planted and pro-
duction are given to illustrate that the main domestic-
ally grown substitute product for soybeans has also 
dropped in production. Barley statistics are listed 
beside those for all feed grains because barley repre-
sents such a large percentage of total feed grain pro-
duction. 
The reason for this "across the hoard" drop in 
production is an economic one. Traditionally, labor 
intensive double-cropping has been used extensively 
as is illustrated by the rate of total area planted 
(Table 4). As the Japanese economy grew, the de-
mand and need for labor was such that many farmers 
took relatively lucrative part-time jobs in construc-
tion and other industries during the off-season or win-
ter months. Also, as rice prices paid farmers rose 
TABLE 4.-Total Planted Area, Soybean and Rapeseed Planted Area, and Production, Japan, 1955-1977. 
Total Area Rate of Soybean Soybean Rapeseed Rapeseed 
Year Planted Utilization* Planted Area Production Planted Area Production 
- - -~~ ---~--- - - ---~---- --- -------- --~----- --·-~- - ~ 
1000 ha percent 1000 ha 
1955 6013 135.7 
1960 6071 133.2 
1965 6004 123.8 
1970 5796 108.9 
1971 5741 104.5 
1972 5683 102.3 
1973 5647 100.3 
1974 5615 102.4 
1975 5572 103.3 
1976 5583 103.5 
1977 5515 
*This refers to the rate of utilizatron of the total area planted. 
Sources: (25, 31). 
385 
307 
184 
96 
100 
89 
88 
93 
87 
83 
79 
1000 MT 1000 ha 1000 MT 
507 208 270 
418 191 264 
230 85 126 
126 19 30 
122 14 23 
127 11 16 
118 8 13 
134 5 9 
126 4 7 
110 4 6 
110 
TABLE 5.-Pianted Area and Production of Feed Grains, Wheat, and Barley, Japan, 1955-1977. 
-- --------- -- ------- ------··- -~ --- _:.____=....;::__::.__ 
Feed Grains, Wheat, Barley, 
Area Feed Grains Area Wheat Area Barley 
Year Planted Production Planted Production Planted Production 
----- --~--- -- - -- - ----- - ----~-- ----~- - --·-- -------·-------~---
1000 ha 1000 MT 1000 ha 1000 MT 1000 ha 1000 MT 
1955 1207 2794 663 1468 995 2408 
1960 1013 2657 612 1531 838 2301 
1965 536 571 476 1287 422 1234 
1970 270 678 229 474 225 573 
1971 211 606 163 503 
1972 162 418 114 284 121 325 
1973 112 286 80 216 
1974 105 294 83 232 78 233 
1975 97 264 90 241 78 221 
1976 96 247 89 222 80 210 
1977 91 236 86 236 78 206 
Sources: (28, 82). 
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rapidly, fanners chose rice as the best production 
alternative. Farmers could afford to be less con-
cerned about double-cropping as a result of their in-
creased incomes from rice production. 
Crops that were previously double-cropped with 
rice included soybeans, wheat, rapeseed, and harley. 
The decrease in double-cropping alone accounted for 
almost a 2,100,000 ha decrease in planted area. This 
decrease can be approximately accounted for hy the 
1,600,000 ha decrease in soybeans, wheat, rapeseed, 
and feed grain production as well as the loss of 
500,000 ha due to urbanization of the land. It is in-
teresting to sec that following the recession of 197 3, 
doubJc.cropping increased slightly, which lends fur-
ther credence to the relationship between farmer in-
come and double-cropping. 
The extent to which future domestic production 
will affect imports is an important subject. In 1975, 
the Japanese government issued a report which pro-
jected consumption and production of the major agri-
cultural commodities in 1985 ( 28). The projection 
for soyheans is 202,000 ha to he planted and 427,000 
MT to be produced (Table 6). 
The general feeling among USDA personnel, and 
even many Japanese government experts ( 68), is that 
the projection is extremely optimistic. This is 1Je-
cause the projections call for a major reversal in the 
trend of decreased plantings and a sizable increase in 
yield-neither of which the government has been able 
to accomplish in the last 20 years. However, should 
the rice production adjustment program work, it 
would be conceivable that the acreage planted projec-
tion could he met for soybeans. It is doubtful that 
a 50ifr increase in yield can be achieved in the next 
8 years in light of the fact that over the last 20 years, 
cnly an 8)1, increase was realized. The same scenar-
io holds true for barley and wheat except that it would 
he doubtful that the 256,000 ha planted area in har-
ley and the 178,000 ha planted area for wheat can 
he achieved even with the rice adjustment program. 
In summary, even if the 1985 government pro-
jections (which it has recently started to call goals) 
for domestic production of soybeans, wheat, and feed 
grains arc met, there will he little effect on imports 
because domestic production would still account for 
only 8)1, of the consumption of soybeans, 9'lc of the 
consumption of wheat, and 4% of feed grains con-· 
sumcd in 1985. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE 
IN DOMESTIC AGRICULTURE 
The Japanese government's role in the domestic 
food economy is very important in determining what 
will be produced and consumed. Until the present, 
most of this control was in the form of government-
controlled prices. However, the government's rice 
production adjustment plan which requires fanners 
to set aside a certain percentage of their past rice 
TABLE 6.-1985 Projections of Domestic Soybean, Barley, and Wheat De-
mand-Supply Situation for Japan. 
1972 1985 1972-1985 
Soyb~ans 
Demand for food 621 707 113.8% 
excluding for oil (1 000 MT) (3,496}. (5,007)* (143.2 %} 
Production (1 000 MT) 122 427 336.2% 
Planted area I 1 000 hal 89 202 227.0% 
Self-sufficiency ratio 20% 60% 
14%) 19% )* 
For food per capita per year 5.7 kg 5.7 kg 100.0% 
Barley 
Total demand I 1000 MT) 1,842 2,502 135.8% 
Production 11 000 MT) 324 890 247.7% 
Planted area (1 000 ha) 121 256 211.6% 
Self-sufficiency ratio 18% 36% 
For food per capita per year 1.3 kg 0.8 kg 61.5% 
Wheat 
Total demand I 1 000 MT) 5,372 5,899 109.8% 
including for feed 11000 MT) (713) (822} (115.31 %) 
Production I 1 000 MT) 284""" 553 194.7% 
Planted area ( 1 000 ha) 114 178 156.1% 
Self-sufficiency ratio 5% 9% 
For food per capita per year 30.9 kg 29.4 kg 95.1% 
*The figures in parentheses are for soybeans including those for crushing. 
Source: (28). 
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Annual Rate 
af Increase 
1.0% 
(2.8 ')',) 
9.8% 
6.5% 
0.0 
2.3 
8.1% 
5.9% 
-3.7% 
0.7% 
(1.1 %) 
5.3% 
3.5% 
0.4% 
acreage is a partial deviation from this pattern' and 
may result in sizable increases in the production of 
soybeans, wheat, and barley. 
Barley marketing is conducted in a manner al-
most identical to that of rice. Under the Food Con-
trol Act of 1942, which was set up to secure a steady 
supply of rice, barley, and other foodstuffs at reason-
able prices in order to meet the food shortage during 
the war, barley was required to he sold to the Food 
Agency of the government. Since 1952, the market-
ing of indigenous harley has been free of government 
price control, although the government has been obli-
gated to buy on request unlimited quantities of bar-
ley from producers. In fact, nearly all the indigen-
ous harley (except barley for malting) has been sold 
to the government because the government buying 
price has been higher than world prices. Therefore, 
the price support system has turned out to be very 
similar to direct government control of marketing. 
The barley is purchased by the government at a pro-
ducer, or purchase, price and is then resold at a lower 
'It is partial deviation because the government pays the farmer 
not to grow rice but the incentive payment is far less than the profit 
would be from growing rice. An example would be that the incentive 
payment to shift the land to a perennial crop was 40,000 yen/ha 
($147 /ha), which is a small payment in light of the profit from rice 
production/he {which was estimated to be approximately $4,290/ha) 
in 1 977. However, the plan is further enforced by the threat that 
the government will not buy rice produced on land that was to be 
set aside. It is this threat which has never been used that puts the 
"teeth" into the rice production adjustment plan {53). The authors 
believe that this type of threat would not be carried out since the 
situation in all probability would not come to that stage. The gov-
ernment and other sectors, including the farm sector, seem to work 
together more and do not take the adversary positions seen between 
government and other sectors in the U. S. 
price to processors. Most of the domestic barley is 
used for food and the majority of the imported harley 
is used for animal feed. Therefore, the domestic bar-
ley and imported barley arc largely in two different 
markets. However, the Food Agency (which con-
trols barley while the other feed grains are under the 
auspices of the Commercial Feed Section of the Live-
stock Bureau) is the sole importer of barley. The 
imported barley used for food is resold at the same 
resale price as domestic harley, resulting in a profit 
for the Food Agency. A short history of the govern-
ment prices for barley, soybeans, wheat, and rapeseed 
is given in Table 7. 
In 1939, wheat was placed under state control 
in order to control the supply and demand for food 
( 5). In 1942, all regulations for various crops were 
consolidated into a single Food Control Law. ThiR 
direct control was continued until 1952 when, with 
the enactment of a second Food Control Law, the 
marketing of domestic wheat was decontrolled. Un-
der this act the government is required to purchase 
all wheat offered for sale. 
Since 1955, nearly all marketable domestic 
wheat has been purchase-d by the government because 
the government purchase price has been set higher 
than the price at which the government resold the 
wheat (Table 8). The relatively high (ha~ed upon 
world standards) government purchase price resulted 
from the purchase being based on an agricultural 
parity index ( 6). The resale price of wheat was 
actually reduced from 1960 to 1972. Under pro-
visions of the Food Control Law, the government pur-
TABLE 7.-Japanese Government Prices for Barley, Wheat, Soybeans, and 
Rapeseed, 1970-1977. 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1977 
Yen/60 kg Yen/60 kg Yen/60 kg Yen/60 kg Yen/60 kg 
($/bu] ($/bu] {$/bu] {$/bu) ($/bu) 
Naked Barley 
Purchasing price 3693 4087 5913 7014 9954 
{4.66] {6.04] {9.22) (1 0.75) {16.92) 
Selling price 1819 1798 2348 3099 3099 
{2.30] (2.66) {3.66) {4.75) {5.27) 
Wheat 
Purchasing price 3552 3931 5685 6745 9666 
(4.48) {5.81) {8.86) (10.34) {16.43) 
Selling price 1940 1895 2589 3297 3297 
{2.45) {2.79) {4.04) {5.05) {5.60) 
Soybeans 
Purchasing price 5010 5800 8850 10433 14846 
{6.33) {8.57) {13.80) (16.00) (25.24) 
Rapeseed 
Purchasing price 4710 5255 7685 9080 12177 
{5.95) {7.76) {11.98) (13.92) {20.70] 
Source: {31). 
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chase price of wheat is supposed to he set at a level 
which will encourage domestic production. In most 
countries these price levels would have encouraged 
sizable production increases. However, as previously 
noted, ther-e artificially high prices for wheat still left 
wheat less profitable than rice and the production of 
wheat continued to decrca<>e. 
The method of determining the purchase price 
is set by the Food Control Law (6), which states in 
Article 402: 
"The Government purchase price shall, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Cabinet Order, 
be set at a level so as to ensure the production of 
harley wheat. These prices shall be calculated 
by multiplying the average Government pur-
chase prices of barley and wheat in 1950-51 by 
the agricultural parity index (i.e., index of all 
prices paid for goods and services by produ-
cers)." 
Since 1974, the Government has been making 
wheat production promotion payments in addition to 
supporting a purchase price. This incentive was in-
cluded in the purchase price after 1977. Also, in 
1976 a subsidy for the promotion of wheat produc-
tion on harvested paddy fields was instituted. In 
addition, farmen; are eligible to collect 450,000 yen/ 
ha if the wheat is farmed cooperatively. 
Government purchase of soybeans is covered un-
der the Soybeans and Rapeseed Deficiency Payments 
Act of 1961 which provides for the difference between 
the standard producer pricc and market prices. 
Large producer organizations such as Zcnnohq regu-
late the marketing of soybeans according to govern-
ment-approved schemes. The program is set up so 
that the producers arc paid the government purchase 
price by the cooperatives and then the cooperatives 
are paid the difference between the purchase price 
and the market price by the government. In addi-
tion to the high support price for soybeans, in 1974, 
1975, and 1976, there were additional incentive pay-
ments of 2500 yen, 3000 yen, and 3500 yen per 60 kg, 
respectively, each year. This means that in addition 
to the ba.~c purchase price in 1976 of 10,433 ycn/60 
'The off1c1ol translotion for Zennoh is: The Notionol Federat1on 
of Agriculture Cooperative Assoc1ations. Zennoh markets 94% of 
the nee, 80% of the barley, and o large proportion of domestic soy-
beans (85). 
TABLE a.-Government Buying and Selling Prices of Domestic Wheat* and 
Operating Costs, Japan, 1960-1978. 
Difference 
Between 
Government Government Government Government Government 
Buying Buying Selling Operating Selling Price 
Price Price:f: Price Expense and Cost Price 
Year ($/MTlt (A) (B) (C) (B)- [(A) + (C)] 
Yen per 60 kg 
1960 99.96 2,264 2,024 264 -504 
1961 105.18 2,404 1,996 258 -666 
1962 111.86 2,525 1,971 240 -794 
1963 113.88 2,594 1,971 158 -781 
1964 120.52 2,712 1,971 340 -1,081 
1965 125.29 2,834 1,971 376 -1,239 
1966 133.44 3,023 1,954 293 -1,362 
1967 139.72 3,155 1,941 335 -1,549 
1966 150.03 3,291 1,941 312 -1,662 
1969 154.51 3,388 1,935 322 -1,775 
1970 163.49 3,552 1,940 338 -1,950 
1971 202.62 3,788 1,944 369 -2,213 
1972 221.31 3,931 1,895 364 -2,400 
1973 270.53 4,466 2,620 430 -2,276 
1974 435.52 5,685 2,589 598 -3,694 
(2,300) 
1975 471.30 6,300 2,979 734 -4,055 
(2,500) 
1976 538.91 6,574 3,297 786 -4,234 
(2,900) 
1977 701.05 9,666 3,297 992 -7,361 
(600) 
1978 780.58 9,863 3,297 1,095 -7,661 
(Preliminary) (600) 
•Prices through 1968 are for Class II, Grode II. 
tThese figures include the purchase pnce plus the incentives. 
:j:The figures In parentheses show the contract production incentiVe and production promotion in-
centives thot farmers rece1ve 1n addition to the purchase pnce of wheat. 
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kg, there was an incentive payment of 3500 yen ~o 
that the actual purchase price of soybeans in 1976 
was 13,933 yen/60 kg or $21.37 /bu. Furthermore, 
the government has just initiated a program to trans-
fer more land from rice to soybean production, using 
two sizable incentives which can total as much as 
1,200,000 ycn/ha or approximately $2,428/ acre. 
The first incentive program pays from 550,000 
to 700,000 yen/ha (52, 79) to farmers switching rice 
fields to soybean production. The second incentive 
program pays up to 500,000 yen/ha ( 4 7) for farmers 
to cooperatively farm the new soybean land. The 
purpose is to encourage a village of farmers to com-
bine all their small parcels of soybean land into one 
more sizable plot and to designate a few of the produ-
cers to farm it. This frees the remaining farmers to 
pursue other employment. The larger plot of land 
also allows for the economical utilization of additional 
capital inputs. It should be noted that both of these 
incentives are available for barley production as well. 
The level of support for the agricultural sector 
by the Japane:;;e government is sizable as evidenced hy 
the incentive payments ( $2,428/ acre just to switch 
production of crops) and price supports. This finan-
cial support is seen in an increasing percentage of the 
total government budget being spent on agriculture. 
In 1973 and 1974, the MAFF budget was 10% of the 
total. The majority of that 1 0/'( is now being allo-
cated to price supports, whereas prior to the middle 
1960's the majority of the agriculture budget was 
allocated to land and production improvement pro-
jects. The government's domestic agricultural policy 
has become a political and economic problem both in-
~ ide and outside Japan. 
THE LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY 
INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 
Trends in Production and Industry Structure 
The primary demand for soybeans and feed 
grains is a result of the production of livestock and 
poultry. Therefore, in studying the demand for feed 
grains and soybeans, it is important to study the as-
pects of the livestock and poultry industries that af-
fect the import demand for these commodities-
namely the trends in production, industry structure, 
and Japan's trade policy on livestock and poultry 
products. 
The production of livestock and poultry products 
in Japan has increased severalfold since 1960 (Table 
9). This increase in production of livestock and 
poultry has resulted in a comparable increase in the 
demand for feed grains and soybeans. 
The increase in production of broilers in Japan 
has been most spectacular. Starting in 1960, from 
essentially no broiler production in Japan, broiler pro-
duction expanded to more than I ,000,000 MT in 
1977. Likewise, production of eggs has been a 
growth industry. Poultry is Japan's only livestock 
industry sector in which the concept of integration 
has been put into effect. This has been primarily due 
to the following factors: 
• Poultry production, in particular that of 
broilers, was started relatively late, after 
Japanese meat consumption had begun its 
\'cry rapid growth. 
• The mechanized requirements of poultry 
production arc more favorable to the highly 
industralizcd operations within Japan's 
physical conditions. 
TABLE 9.-Production and Importation of Livestock and Poultry Products, 
Japan, 1960-1976. 
1960 1965 1970 1974 1975 1976 
1 000 Metnc Tons 
Beef 
Product1on 142 208 278 321 353 298 
Imports 23 76 64 130 
Pork 
Production 147 364 734 1098 1040 1056 
Imports 5 0 17 59 118 203 
Broilers 
Production 0 150 500 833 856 978 
Imports 0 6 11 25 21 37 
Eggs 
Production 512 1037 1734 1799 1788 1859 
Imports 33 28 17 17 
Sources: (9, 24, 25, 69-81 ). 
11 
• Very high degrees of involvement on the part 
. S Sh h " "' t " of the maJor ogo os as· as mtegra ors , 
as they saw the large potential opportunities. 
• A number of joint ventures with U.S. breed-
ing stock companies not only brought to Ja-
pan the world's best breeding stock, but also 
the latest technology in production of poul-
try products. 
Integration in the livestock industry (primarily 
in the broiler industry hut to a smaller extent in the 
swine sector) has taken place at the initiative of the 
powerful Sogo Shoshas which have played the role of 
integrators. They have organized many projects 
through their subsidiaries, affiliated companies, a~1d/ 
or firms with close business relations in the brmlcr-
rclated sectors. These companies include producer 
and sales companies of formulated feed, meat proces-
sors, convenience food manufacturers, supermarket 
chains, restaurants, etc. Sogo Shoshas formed their 
own integrated company (sometimes including inde-
pendent companies) exerting significant control over 
the group companies involved. A number of broiler 
firms and processing plants have been established in 
the past 5 to 10 years and arc operated as joint ven-
tures by Sogo Shosha group companies and indepen-
dents, over which the trading companies keep the ma-
jority control. Examples of these operations arc 
(9): 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Mitsui Group: Daiich Farm produces 4.5 
million day-old chicks per year. 
Daiich Reizo operates 7 5 broiler processing 
plants in Japan. 
Mitsubishi Group: Japan Farms runs four 
farms with an output of 2 million broilers per 
year. 
C. Itoh Group: C. Itoh Prima broiler group 
operates eight processing plants with a total 
capacity of 10 million birds per month. 
Marubcni Group: Runs 18 farms raising 
Chankcy broilers. Operates five processing 
plants with a capacity of 1 million birds per 
month. 
Toshoku Group: Runs 20 farms producing 
2.5 million broilers per year. 
''Sogo Shosha is the present day vers on of the Zaibatsu, which 
ex1sted prior to World War II. The Sago Shosha is a sort of formal, 
extremely large holding company headed by a tradmg company and 
a bank. The Importance of the large Sogo Shosha to Japan's mod-
ern bus1ness and mdustry 1s illustrated by the six largest trading com· 
pan1es owning vot1ng equ•ty interest in a total of 924 firms compns· 
ing more than one·half of the flfms in the stock exchange markets in 
Japan (64). Furthermore, the divisJon of tasks among manufactur-
ers, finonciers, and traders has succeeded in delegating the role of 
"middleman" to the trading company. Mitsui is an example of a 
Sago Shosha The M1tsui group •ncludes a feed manufacturing com-
pany, soybean processing company, flour milling company, and 
gram handling company, as well as many other companies. 
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Toyo Broiler processes 1.5 million birds per 
vcar. 
Thi~ is in contrast to the majority of the most 
successful, large, integrated operations in the U. S. 
which started from the farm level and built up. 
Swine production in Japan has been dynamic in 
the last 20 years. The production of pork has in-
creased hy almost 8001jr since 1960. The facilitie~ 
involved in production of pork represent one of the 
more capital-intensive agricultural ventures in Japan. 
The technology of waste disposal used by some hog 
production operations is superior to that used in U.S. 
swine operations. The structure of the swine indus-
trv is becoming more and more concentrated, with a 
60tjr drop in the number of producers between 1970 
and 1977. Also, there has lwcn some investment l1y 
htro·c Scwo Shosha firms. Two examples of this ver-b b 
tical integration by So go Shoshas are: 1) in 1969, 
Mitsubishi, Nihon Nosan (feed manufacturer and 
member of Mitsuhishi group), and Japan Ham (pro-
cessors) established Japan Farm which was to pro-
duce 0.5 million broilers per month, 100,000 hogs per 
year, and 500 tons of c~·gs per month; 2) C. Itoh (a 
large trading house and head of a Sogo Shosha), Ka-
:mmigaura Livestock Production Co., .\mino Feeds, 
and Prima Ham Co. (processor) built a farrow-to-
finish operation to produce 35,000 hogs per year. 
The cost of producing hogs in Japan is somewhat 
higher than in the U. S., hut relatively much more 
competitive than beef production. 
Beef production has had the smallest growth 
within the livestock sector in the last 20 years. None-
theless, there have been changes in the production of 
beef. Probably the most noticeable change has been 
the decline in the importance of the traditional Wagyu 
breed of beef. The Wagyu cattle require grain feed-
ing for 3 years before they arc ready for market. In 
place of the W agyu cattle, there has been increased 
use of Western breeds of cattle which require less time 
to reach market weight. 
The number of cattle per farm has increased 
while the number of cattle farms has decreased. In 
1970, 901,600 households were raising hccf cattle; 
by 1977 this had declined to 424,200. Also, there 
has been some effort made by large firms and co-
operatives to develop large feedlots. One example 
of this is Japan Beef Corporation which was estab-
lished in 1971 with plans to furnish 1,000 head of 
cattle per year. One problem facing these organiza-
tions has been the difficulty of securing the needed 
land. Another problem is the high cost of inputs and 
small scale of production, which results in per pound 
production costs for beef of approximately 2 to 2.5 
times that of the U. S. Furthermore, Japanese con-
sumers pay 6 times as much for beef as do customers 
in the U. S. because less efficiency in processing and 
marketing adds 2.5 to 3 times greater marketing mar-
gin in Japan than in the U. S. 
Importation of Livestock Products 
The government projections for production and 
consumption of meat products of different types are 
shown in Table 10. The most important figures to 
note are the self-sufficiency figures which represent 
the proportion of domestic production to consump-
tion. Since Japanese self-sufficiency of meat is sup-
posed to increase from 81/{· to 86 7r, the government 
is planning to decrease imports of animal products 
relative to domestic production which is consistent 
with stated objectives ( 33). Given the precedin<T 
discussion on potential domestic grain and soybea~ 
production, this will mean a relative increase in im-
ports of feed grains and soyheam;. It should be noted, 
though, that USDA analysts10 do not expect the pro-
jection for beef production in particular to be rea-
lized. 
1"These opinions were obtained through personal conversations 
w1th USDA economists. 
In order to protect Japane:-;e producer:-;, the gov-
ernment has built a restrictive barricade of import 
controls. The government influence on the livestock 
market is exerted through the Livestock Industry Pro-
motion Corporation ( LIPC) which was established 
under the authorization of the Price Stabilization of 
Livestock Products Law in 1961 and is under the 
guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries ( MAFF) . Floor and ceiling prices are de-
termined by the MAFF in such a way as to cover costs 
of production and insure incentives to increase pro-
duction. Then the LIPC works to maintain whole-
sale prices within the limits set hy the MAFF. It 
does this hy buying and selling meat (adjusting its 
own stocks) at the marketplace. 
A goal for the import quota for beef is set semi-
annually by the MAFF based upon its estimate of 
Japan's beef deficit and current prices of domestic 
beef. The quota can he adjusted during the year. 
The great majority of the quota is allocated to the 
LIPC which handles the importing of the beef. The 
difference between the world or imported price of th<' 
TABLE 10.-1985 Projections of Japanese Meat Consumption and Production 
by Type. 
Annual Rate 
1972-1985 of Increase 
1972 1985 Percent Percent 
Meat Demand 
Total demand (1 000 MTJ 2,147 3,193 148.7 3.1 
Product1on ( 1 000 MT) 1,730 2,747 158.8 3.6 
Self-sufficiency rat1o 81% 86% 
For food per capita per year 14.2 kg 18.6 kg 131.0 2.1 
Beef 
Total demand (1 000 MTI 367 625 170.3 4.2 
Production (1 000 MTI 290 508 175.2 4.4 
Beef cattle ( 1 000 head) 1,776 3,305 186.1 4.9 
Self-suffic1ency ratio 79% 81% 
For food per cap1ta per year 2.4 kg 3.6 kg 150.0 3.2 
Pork 
Total demand (1 000 MT) 883 1,335 151.2 3.2 
Production (1000 MT) 793 1,325 167.1 4.0 
Pigs ( 1 000 head) 7,168 11,790 164.5 3.9 
Self-suffic1ency rat1o 90% 99% 
For food per capita per year 5.6 kg 7.5 kg 133.9 2.3 
Chicken 
Total demand (1 000 MT) 668 915 137.0 2.4 
Production (1 000 MT) 640 914 142.8 2.8 
Number of chicks (1 000 head) 68,650 102,500 149.3 3.1 
Self-sufficiency ratio 96% 100% 
For food per capita per year 4.7 kg 5.7 kg 121.3 1.5 
Other Meat 
Total demand (1 000 MTI 229 318 138.9 2.6 
For food per capita per year 1.5 kg 1.8 kg 120.0 1.4 
Source: (28). 
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bed and Japan's whok~alc price is "profit" to the 
LIPC. 
The imports of pork arc wry tightly controlled 
with a variable tariff rate that is somewhat linked to 
the domestic price level of pork. The principle, of 
course, is to prevent the inflow of lower priced pork 
from abroad, yet keep the price of pork to the consu-
mer from skyrocketing during periods of short domes-
tic supply. 
The imports of poultry products arc controlled 
with tariffs. The tariff on broilers and/ or broiler 
parts is at present 20% of the imported cost. 
JAPANESE TRADE POLICY 
One of Japan's major concerns in connection 
with its food system is that of a stable supply. Since 
Japan will he dependent indefinitely upon foreign 
sources of food, it is reasonable that Japan should he 
concerned about the stability of its sources. This is 
not a new problem, hut one which has troubled Ja-
pan's leaders since rice was first imported after the 
Sino-Japanese War (50, 51). More recently, Ja-
panese leaders have expressed concern and displea-
sure over Japan's dependence on the U.S. as a domi-
nant supplier of many vitally needed agricultural 
products. This concern has surfaced as a come-
qucnce of the recent turmoil in world agricultural 
commodity markets and in particular the U. S. soy-
bean embargo in 1973. In the opinion of Japanese 
leaders, this concern is very real and has not dimin-
ished. 
Japanese concern over a stable food supply and 
the substantial dependence upon the U. S. has pro-
duced a Japanese trade policy of diversification. In 
1966, the stage for diversification of suppliers was set 
when, in an article entitled How to Secure a Stabi-
lized Supply of Food, Ogura ( 4) (who at the time 
was chairman of a council within MAFF in charge 
of technical and economic research programs in agri-
culture) argued the following: 
"We must consider whether it is advisahlc for 
the nation to remain dependent upon imports 
(agricultural) from the United States as at pre-
sent ... It is time for Japan to establish a new 
food supply system from an international point 
of view with consideration to the necessity of 
agricultural development in the friendly coun-
tries (less developed countries or LDC) as well 
as to trade relations, instead of merely trying to 
purchase cheap food in order to meet the short-
age at home." 
Since 1966 a number of programs have been 
started by the Japanese government and commercial 
organizations (private sector projects are discussed 
in the next two sections). These programs are aimed 
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at: 1 ) assuring ample supplie~ of agricultural prod-
ucts and industrial raw materials, 2) diversifying 
~ourcc~ to maintain constant supply, 3) increasing 
~upplics in world trade to secure stable prices, 4) 
providing foreign exchange to LDC's so that they can 
purchase Japanese industrial products, and 5) ob-
taining the good will of host countries. 
The majority of the Japanese programs, whether 
in the form of loans, aid, or commercial investment, 
have been oriented toward the development of pro-
duction-for-export projects. A production-for-export 
project is one in which Japan helps a country to de-
wlap agricultural projects to produce products which 
are needed by and can be exported to Japan. 
Coinciding with this policy of diversification had 
been a call upon and pledge by Japan, in accordance 
with the United Nations Second Developnwnt goal 
for developed countries, to extend to LDC's assistance 
of lj{ of GNP (gross national product) by 1975 (55). 
J apancse assistance is generally part of a larger pack-
age including loans, loan guarantees, commercial in-
vestment, and technical assistance. This system gives 
priority to those countries providing a favorable cli-
mate for Japanese investments. 
According to the Japanese International Co-
operative Corporation (ICC) Annual Report for 
1976 (23), 1.70 billion yen was spent on agricultural 
projects involving 180 specialists in 20 countries. 
Generally, the response in the U. S. to these supplier 
diversification projects has been one of alarm and 
concern with those associated with the operation of 
tlw Japanese market. However, ac; pointed out hy 
a J apancse government official, these projects can 
either be viewed as supplier diversification projects or 
they can he viewed in the same light as thr much 
larger U. S. agricultural aid programs. 
Another Japan esc trade policy which is directed 
toward securing a stable supply of needed agricultural 
products and is not inconsistent with the diversifica-
tion policy is that of trade agreements. The first 
trade agreement with the U. S. came in 1975 after 
the soybean embargo and was called the Ahe-Butz 
agreement. It called for Japan to import and the 
U. S. to supply 3 million tons of both wheat and soy-
beans and 8 million tons of feed grains. This agree-
ment ran out in 1978. According to Japanese gov-
ernment documents, the Minister of MAFF ap-
proached Secretary Bergland during the trade talks 
in September 1978 concerning a new agreement but 
did not receive a positive reply. There is little ques-
tion that if there is to be another trade agreement, the 
U. S. will now have to initiate it. 
Annually, the Japanese sign wheat trade agree-
ments with the Canadians and Australians. These 
agreements generally call for importation of a certain 
amount of wheat + 10% and arc usually for quan-
tities that would in all likelihood have been imported 
without agreements. 
According to Agricultural Attaches' reports, in 
1976 the Brazilian government contacted Japan re-
questing a long term agreement on soybeans ( 68). 
The Brazilians requested that Japan import 300,000 
MT annually (compared with 82,000 MT in 1974, 
70,000 MT in 1975, and 62,000 MT in 1976). Al-
though on a purely economic basis Brazil cannot com-
pete in the Japanese market, it is felt that the offer is 
tempting to Japan because: 
• It would he politically popular as a step to-
ward diversification. 
• It may help Brazil become a better market 
for Japanese exports and capital. 
• Since Brazil has already signed similar agree-
ments with some EEC countries, not going 
along might imply that Japan would suffer 
during a period of tight supply. 
Since 1962 there has been a Japan-China Soy-
bean Agreement. Once again, quantities to be im-
ported were agreed to annually and then designated 
trading companies ( 33 in all) were called upon to 
handle the importation. 
Although not specifically a trade policy, an ac-
knowledged trade preference of the Japanese govern-
ment is not to have low feed grain and soybean prices 
which are inherently unstable. The Japanese govern-
ment would prefer instead to have moderately high 
stable prices. One reason for this is that high price~ 
discourage excess consumption of these imported con-
sumcr (consumer in the sense that they arc not to be 
processed for export) commodities. The Japanese 
prefer ::;tahility for a multitude of political and cul-
tural reasons. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
Summarizing this section, the following points 
have been highlighted regarding feed grain and soy-
bean imports: 
• The Japanese agricultural system is a very 
complex system that has resulted from the 
combination of two very different cultures, 
severely restricted land resources, and a 
democratic but extremely inefficient agricul-
tural structure. 
• Domestic feed grain and soybean production 
possibilities will in no way significantly af-
• 
• 
fect imports of those products. 
There is every indication that in the future 
a larger percentage of the meat consumed in 
Japan will be produced in Japan, thus essen-
tially eliminating the possibility that feed 
grain and soybean imports might be cut as a 
result of increased imports of livestock prod-
ucts. The Japanese are committed to im-
porting raw materials rather than finished 
goods such as livestock. 
The Japanese trade policy with respect to 
feed grain and soybean imports is one of di-
versification. This is being pursued through 
aid programs, investments in potential ex-
porting countries, and trade agreements. 
The Japanese Feed Gra'in Market 
The importance of feed grains has increased as 
modern man's affluency has permitted him to increase 
consumption of livestock products. The economic 
ability of most people in the world to consume live-
stock products is greater than it has ever been in the 
past. Accordingly, the production, processing, mar-
keting, and trade of feed grains has become a very 
important activity in most countries of the world, in-
cluding Japan. This section looks at the various sec-
tors in Japan's food economy which affect feed grain 
imports. 
JAPANESE USES FOR FEED GRAINS 
The Japan esc demand for feed grains arises from 
the consumer demand for livestock products,11 thus 
resulting in a demand for livestock feed and for in-
dustrial products made from feed grains (i.e., starch, 
sweeteners, etc.). For the purpose of this analysis, 
11The term livestock products in this section refers to both live-
stock products and poultry products. 
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feed grains include corn, milo, sorghum, oats, rye, 
and harley. One minor inaccuracy (and a continu-
ally declining one) results from the fact that harley 
is not only a feed grain, hut is also an inferior food 
grain. Thus, as income levels in Japan have con-
tinued to increase, the usc of harlcy as a food grain 
has declined significantly. 
The ratio of domestic demand for feed grains for 
feed use to total feed grain consumption in Japan has 
increased dramatically since 1960 (Table 11 ) . This 
is the result of a number of factors: 1) The increase 
in consumer demand for livestock products has risen 
at a much faster rate than that for most other prod-
ucts, including industrial products from feed grains. 
2) While total livestock production has increased, 
formula feed production has increased more rapidly 
(Table 12). 3) The proportion of formula feeds to 
total concentrated feeds increased from 36jlc in 1960 
to 81 '/{ in 1970. 4) The percent of feed grain use in 
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TABLE 12.-Production Index of Livestock and 
Formula Feeds, Japan, 1960-1976 (1970 = 1 00.0). 
Year 
Total 
Livestock 
------------------
1960 
1965 
1970 
1973 
1976 
Source: (31) . 
36.8 
67.4 
100.0 
108.3 
114.7 
Formula Feeds 
19.1 
54.0 
100.0 
120.6 
121.5 
the formula feeds has been increasing at the expense 
of hran products (Table 13). 
The relative increases in the production of for-
mula feeds reflects a greater recognition hy farmers 
of the value of modern nutrition in increasing the 
turnover rate of livestock. The increased turnover 
was desired in order to meet rising consumer demand 
( 61 ) . Th(' increase in the percentage of feed grain 
use in formula feeds represmts a move to higher en-
ergy feed which alw increases the growth rate (turn-
over) of the livestock. However, whether this was 
the motivating factor or whether a limited domestic 
supply of bran necessitated the increased feed grain 
usc in formula feeds is uncertain ( 21 ) . A perspec-
tive of the production of formula feeds in Japan is 
gained from Table 14. The main industrial use of 
feed grains is for starch production (Table 15). 
FORMULA FEED INDUSTRY 
The formula feed industry is the primary pur-
chaser of feed grains in Japan. While the production 
of formula feeds over the last 20 years has increased 
by eight times, within the total industry the growth of 
the larger companies has been significantly greater 
than that of the smaller companies. This is the re-
sult of better financing, more efficient and larger 
plants, and better products as a result of quicker 
adaptation of new technology and knowledge in the 
nutritional aspects of the product. Table 16 illus-
trates the change in the number of plants and capa-
city. Generally, the larger companies own the larger 
plants, which is consistent with the fact that the larger 
companies have grown faster than the smaller ones. 
Table 17 gives the production capacities })y factory 
size in 1977. An example of the concentration in the 
feed industry is that of the 14 largest feed mills in 
Japan, 7 are controlled hy the largest feed manufac-
turer ( Zennoh) and 6 out of the remaining 7 arc con-
trolled by the 6 next largest feed manufacturers. 
The capacity of the formula feed manufacturing 
plants is based on an 8-hour shift, 25 days per month. 
In 1977, total production was 19,527,000 MT with a 
total capacity of 18,035,000 MT. There IS rela-
tively little double-shift work. This Is surprising 
TABLE 13.-Formula feed Mix Ratio, Japan, 1963-1977. 
Year Corn and Sorghum All Brans Soybean Meal Others 
percent 
1963 53.7 17.6 6.6 22.1 
1965 53.9 16.0 7.6 22.5 
1970 55.7 12.4 9.7 22.2 
1973 56.4 9.1 10.0 25.5 
1976 61.0 8.8 10.4 19.8 
1977 62.0 7.7 11.1 19.2 
Sources: (34, 61 ). 
TABLE 14.-Production of Formula Feed by Type, Japan, 1960-1977. 
1960 1965 1970 
Total 2433 7677 14824 
Poultry 1917 4980 8450 
Swine 1769 3932 
Dairy 289 786 1741 
Beef 5 78 876 
Others 223 63 77 
Sources: (24, 77). 
because the initial plant and equipment require such 
sizable capital inputs that it would be expected that 
the plants would run 2 to 2Y2 shifts per day as is the 
case in the U. S. Although some feed plants do run 
regular double shifts, no reasonable explanation was 
discovered for the industry-wide undrr-utilization of 
formula feed plants. 
The structure of the formula feed industry is 
such that the Zennoh affiliated cooperatives ( 48 co-
operatives arc affiliated with Zennoh) control 40% 
of the total formula feed business. The 1 0 largest 
pri\'ate companies control the next 40% of the mar-
ket, with the remaining 73 companies sharing the last 
20;; of the market. 
As has occurred in most Japanese industries 
since 1946, the larger formula feed companies have 
aligned themselves with Sogo Shoshas (before the war 
1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 
1000 Metnc Tons 
17044 16771 16355 18006 19527 
9163 8777 8838 9383 9743 
4699 4860 4535 5197 5478 
1945 1792 1833 1960 2088 
1453 1665 1544 2004 2139 
85 69 65 74 78 
they were known as Zaibatsu), which can in a very 
general sense be considered holding companies with a 
trading company as the head. Three good examples 
of this are: 1) Nihon Nosan Kogyo (second largest 
feed manufacturer behind Zennoh), which belongs 
to the Mitsubishi group; 2) Nisshin Flour Milling 
TABLE 15.-Starch Production, Japan, 1973-1976. 
Type of Starch 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1000 Metnc Tons 
Corn starch 706 617 701 800 
(food) (376) (373) (433) 1470) 
(non-food) (303) (244) (268) (330) 
Other starches 1061 947 1163 1200 
Total 1761 1564 1864 2000 
Source: (70). 
TABLE 16.-Formula Feed Plant Capacities, Japan, 1960-1976. 
Annual Average 
Production Annual Plant Percent Change 
No. of Total No. Capacity Capacity from Previous 
Year Companies of Plants {1000 MT) (1000 MT} Year G:ven 
1960 118 142 4,008 28.23 
1965 148 194 8,482 43.72 54.9 
1970 140 212 14,157 66.78 52.7 
1973 142 223 16,148 72.41 8.4 
1974 142 221 18,666 84.46 16.6 
1975 135 217 18,438 84.97 0.6 
1976 132 211 18,035 85.47 0.6 
Note: Capacities are based upon an 8-hour shift, 25 days per month. 
Source: (34). 
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Producers in 
Foreign Countries 
TABLE 17.-Number of Japanese Formula Feed Factories by Factory Capacity 
for 1977. 
Monthly Capacity (MT) Factories Monthly 
No. Percent of Total Total 
Less than 1 ,000 8 3.8 3,620 
More than 1 ,000 
Less than 3,000 27 12.8 47,150 
More than 3,000 
Less than 5,000 37 17.5 137,900 
More than 5,000 
Less than 1 0,000 84 39.8 576,750 
More than 1 0,000 
Less than 15,000 41 19.4 453,300 
More than 1 5,000 14 6.6 284,200 
Total 211 100.0 1,502,920 
Note: Capacities are based upon an 8-hour shift, 25 days per monih. 
Source: (34). 
Capacity (MT) 
Percent of Total 
0.2 
3.1 
9.2 
38.4 
30.2 
18.9 
100.0 
TABLE 18.-Total Feed Grain Imports by Type of Grain, Japan, 1955-1977. 
Year Barley Corn Sorghum Rye Oats Total 
1000 Metric Tons 
1955 576 343 103 0 0 1,022 
1960 0 1,355 46 12 2 1,414 
1962 0 2,316 405 7 4 2,732 
1964 471 3,229 1,042 4 10 4,757 
1966 447 3,598 2,279 74 12 6,410 
1968 634 5,145 2,362 66 24 8,231 
1970 768 6,018 3,880 73 135 10,874 
1971 865 5,007 3,879 160 197 10,109 
1972 1,004 6,052 3,586 170 204 11,016 
1973 1,322 7,771 3,843 152 110 13,197 
1974 1,418 7,940 4,564 28 169 14,117 
1975 1,598 7,470 3,895 54 141 13,157 
1976 1 ,762 8,383 4,339 39 150 14,674 
1977 1,735 9,068 5,279 141 169 16,392 
Note: There are a few inconsistencies between Tables 11 and 18 due to the use of two different 
sources. However, the numbers within the tables are consistent and provide meaningful information. 
Source: (67). 
Producers' Organi-
ations Importing 
Companies in 
Importing Countries 
Japanese 
Trading Firms 
Genera 1 
Commercial Firms 
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Agricultural 
Associations 
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STAGES OF IMPORT STAGES OF PRODUCTION STAGES OF DISTRIBUTION REAL DEMAND 
FIG. 2.-The flow of feed grains in Japan. 
18 
(fourth largest), which belongs to the Fuyo group; 
and 3) Nippon Formula Feed Manufacturing (fifth 
largest), which belongs to the Mitsui group. Gener-
ally, when a company belongs to a group, it docs as 
much of its business as possible with other companies 
within the Sogo Shosha. 
The pricing of feeds in Japan is quite different 
from the U. S. The price of formula feeds in Japan 
is set by Zennoh. At the beginning of each quarter 
of the fiscal year, the board members of Zennoh re-
view the overall situation and decide prices for the 
following quarter, taking into consideration the fol-
lowing factors and information ( 60) : 
• Raw ingredient prices 
• The contracted feed orders for the next 3 
months 
• Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
cries ( MAFF) propositions and administra-
tive guidance 
• Sales competition with the Japan Feed 
Manufacturers Association (JFMA) or pri-
vate companies 
Once the feed prices for the next quarter have 
been determined, Zennoh then "feels out" the govern-
ment's attitude toward them. The prices arc then 
agreed to by the government and Zennoh (this usual-
lv does not result in a change from the original prices) 
;~nd are pre-announced to the rest of the industry 
(supposedly a formality) in order to give them a 
chance to object to the prices. 
According to industry sources, none of the com-
mercial feed manufacturers ( CFM) arc willing or 
capable of undercutting Zennoh's prices. :\dditional-
ly, there is a lot of peer pressure not to undercut Zen-
nob's prices. Nevertheless, the seeming lack of price 
competition does not mean that there is a lack of com-
petition. First of all, there is minor price competition 
as a result of rebates on the part of some of the small-
er CFM. Also, some CFM charge higher prices in 
return for higher quality. Furthermore, there is 
competition in the form of services and credit. T~e 
cooperatives give credit to farmers in return for their 
feed business and the larger feed manufacturers also 
give credit, with the money coming from their S?go 
Shosha (group) banks. In this case the coopcrati\'es 
probably have an advantage over CFM in _that they 
administer o-ovcrnment loan programs and It appears 
that often : distinction is not made as to the origin 
of the capital (i.e., government loans to farmers for 
equipment purchase may be loaned with some ex-
pectation that feed should be purchased from the co-
operative). The strong social t~es between the :a-
operatives and producers also gtve the cooperative 
feed manufacturers a competitive advantage. 
19 
FEED GRAIN IMPORTS 
The level of Japanese feed grain imports has in-
creased 1600% over the paRt 20 years (Table 18). 
This increasing flow of feed grains into Japan can 
come through a number of routes (Figure 2). The 
importation of feed grains is typically performed by: 
1) the producer organization's importing company 
( Zennoh is the purchasing organization for all of the 
cooperatives and thus imports the feed grains for co-
operative feed mills); 2) the Japanese trading firms; 
or 3) the general commercial firm, which might he a 
company importing directly. If Zennoh is included 
as a trading firm, then more than 95% of all Japan'~ 
agricultural imports are handled by trading firms, 
with the ten largest handling 75% ( 15). According-
ly, the feed grain imports are largely handled by these 
companies (Table 19). During interviews in Japan, 
an attempt was made to determine why the feed com-
panics did not purchase their feed grains direct from 
the international grain companies and save the com-
mission charged by the trading companies which pur-
chase the grain from the same international grain 
firms. 
In response, thr Japanese traders and feed 
manufacturers gave the following reasons for the 
limited direct purchases: 
• Japanese trading companies are willing to 
give small commercial feed manufacturers 
(even financially shaky one<;) fairly liberal 
credit terms up to 120 days, which the in-
ternational grain companies are unwilling to 
do. Since all of the large trading companies 
are connected with hanks in the Sago Shosha, 
it is assumed that it is the hank, not the trad-
ing company, which is ultimately giving the 
credit. 
TABLE 19.-Corn and Milo Imports by Trading 
Company, Japan, 1975-1978. 
1978 
Company Name 1975 1976 1977 (Jan.-June) 
1000 Metric Tons 
Unicoop IZennoh) 1524 1768 1647 1040 
Morubeni 1235 1403 1898 1005 
Mitsubishi 1226 1705 1913 982 
C. ltoh 641 1359 1655 902 
Mitsui 847 1356 1538 707 
Kanematsu 378 546 545 273 
Toyo Menke 356 586 782 488 
Nichimen 249 716 887 485 
Toshoku 185 340 432 236 
Sumitomo 0 301 351 92 
Nichiryo 144 237 273 154 
Nissho lwei 0 444 267 80 
Source: Japan Feed Trade Assoc. 
• 
• 
• 
At the present time feed manufacturers can 
buy feed grains cheaper from the Japanese 
trading companie~ than from the internation-
al grain firms. The reason is that as a result 
of severe competition in the Japanese market 
(as evidenced by the large number of export 
trading companies in the market), it is very 
typical for the trading companies to he selling 
cargo at a discount in order to sell more. 
The J apanesc argued they were more willing 
to speculate and that due to their market in-
formation system were better informed, and 
thus were more capable of speculating profit-
ably. It was also mentioned that it is the 
J apancse way to trade for many years and 
then to take a profit. 
J apancse trading companies arc more willing 
and flexible in working with feed manufac-
turers with respect to delivery times and par-
tial shipments. 
Many of the top trading companies and 
large commercial feed manufacturers arc 
members of the same Sogo Shosha. These 
feed manufacturers would do all of their 
international trading through the trading 
companies that head their respective Sogo 
Shosha. 
.\ dose look at the abovc reasons is needed. It 
would secm that the last rcason is the dominant rca-
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FIG. 3.-An illustration of a Sogo Shosha. 
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son that the Japanese trading companies have mon-
opolized the imports of feed grains. As has been pre-
viously noted, the top 11 feed manufacturers in J a-
pan produce 80'/c of Japan's formula feeds. There-
fore, sales of feed grains to srnallcr companies repre-
sent a small proportion of the business and this fact 
certainly detract~ from the net importance of the first 
and third reasons. Likewise, given that the last rca-
son is the dominant one, the second reason is certain-
ly suspect, because with a formal relationship as de-
scribed in the last reason, the validity of the second 
reason becomes a much less relevant point. 
Student'l of Japanese industrialization and com-
mercialization arc aware of the importance of the 
Zaibatsu prior to World War II, and of the Sogo 
Shosha since the war. (The primary difference be-
tween the Zaibatsu and Sogo Shosha is ownership-
not functions.) At first, the Western student of J ap-
ancse business and industry might fed the importance 
attributed to the Sogo Shosha is exaggerated. It is 
not. The six largest trading companies own voting 
equity intere~ts in a total of 924 firms comprising 
more than one-half of the firms listed in the stock ex-
change markets in Japan ( 64). Essentially, the divi-
sion of tasks among manufacturers and financing and 
trading firms has succeeded in delegating the role of 
"middle man" to the trading firms. Often loans from 
the Sogo Shosha hank arc even directed through the 
trading company. Figure 3 illustrates the Sogo Sho-
sha. As a result of the Sogo Shosha, it would he ex-
pected that the large feed manufacturers which be-
long to a Sago Shosha would purchase their feed 
grains from the trading company, rather than direct 
from the international grain company. 
However, this does not explain the purchasing 
policy of Zcnnoh. As a result of ideology, Zennoh's 
policy is to purchase one-half of its feed grain from 
producer export organizations, such as Farmers Ex-
port in the U.S. Farmers Export has requested that 
Zennoh huy 100'/c of its U. S. purchases from them, 
but Zennoh will not because of price and it does not 
want to acccpt the risks associated with a single U. S. 
supplier. The other 50'/c of its feed grain needs arc 
purchased from J apanest~ trading firms. The rca-
sons given for this are that Japanese trading company 
prices are lower than those of international grain com-
panies and that the Japanese companies are more 
adaptable to Zcnnoh's needs. 
While it is difficult to do a bid-by-bid analysis 
of price (to the extent that lJids arc relevant-given 
the Sogo Shosha), Table 20 docs illustrate the price 
situation for imported corn from 1970 through 1975. 
The lines labeled "unexplained difference" show the 
difference between Japanese prices and the U.S. price 
TABLE 20.-Corn: Unit Values and Freight Rates at Various Marketing Levels from U.S. Farmers to Japanese 
Importers, Marketing Years 1969-70 to 1974-75. 
-----~ ~ --- ··--
··---- ---------~ -- - -~~--
-
---- ---
·--------
Item 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 
Dol!ars per Metnc Ton 
(1) Unit value received by U. S. farmers* 45.67 52.36 45.52 61.81 100.39 118.89 
(2) Implicit U. S. in land freight +8.21 +8.53 +10.92 +14.07 +16.61 + 21.58 
(3) Total U. S. export unit value of corn 53.88 60.89 53.44 75.88 114.00 140.47 
(4) U. S. export un1t value to Japan 54.04 61.98 54.04 80.48 124.20 136.54 
(5) Ocean freight to Japan 12.17 8.43 5.12 12.99 25.77 12.00 
(6) Japanese import un1t valuet 64.48 72.46 63.63 81.35 137.41 156.74 
(7) Unexplained difference 
-1.73 +2 05 +4.47 -12.12 -12.56 +8.20 
(8) Japanese import unit value, lagged 2 months 66.07 74.21 62.94 89.95 145.15 155.46 
(9) Unexplained difference 
-0.14 +3.80 +3.78 -3.52 -4.82 +6.92 
*Unit value is the weighted season average price. 
tin Japanese yen/metric ton, 1969-70, 23,194; 1970-71, 26,698; 1971-72, 19,899; 1972-73, 22,438; 1973-74, 39,094; 1974-75, 
46,850. 
Note: Lmes 3, 7, and 9 have been developed from the information in the table as follows: 
Source: (7). 
Lme (3) = (1) + (2) 
Line (7) = (6) - [(4) + (5)] 
Line (9) = (8) - [ (4) + (5)] 
plus freight charges to Japan from the Gulf. Inter-
estingly, a similar comparison with shipments to the 
Netherlands showed that the unexplained difference 
in Japan was $3.42 lower than that in the Nether-
lands from 1970 through 1975 (7). If the Japanese 
price is lagged by 2 months, the Japanese unexplained 
difference is still $0.40 lower. This supports the ar-
gument that the import market for feed grains is ex-
tremely competitive in Japan. 
Recently a number of large Japanese trading 
firms have expressed an interest in purchasing U. S. 
grain facilities. The greatest interest has been shown 
by Mitsui, which has already purchased equity inter-
est in 13 facilities and is actively looking for more 
(Table 21). There are a number of reasons for Mit-
sui's decision to move into the U. S. domestic grain 
market, the most motivating of which is the desire to 
become active in the international grain trade. Mit-
sui claims that its market information system gives it 
a competitive edge in the grain trade, hut that in or-
der to compete with the international grain compan-
ies, it must acquire U. S. grain facilities and operate 
them itself. 
U. S. POSITION IN THE JAPANESE 
FEED GRAIN MARKET 
The U. S. is the world's largest exporter of agri-
cultural products and is Japan's primary supplier of 
all agricultural products as well as feed grains. From 
1975 through 1978, the U. S. supplied 62.4'/c of the 
feed grains imported by Japan. Although the macro-
approach to the U. S. market position is appealing, in 
order to understand year-to-year fluctuations in the 
U. S. market share, it is necessary to look at the im-
ports of the individual commodities by country. 
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Corn imports by Japan have increased at a dis-
proportionate rate (compared to other commodities 
in the feed grain classification) as a result of in-
creased use of corn in formula feeds due to its higher 
energy content. Since 1965, the U. S. has supplied 
the majority of the corn to Japan. The main two 
competitors in the market are South Africa and Thai-
land (Table 22). Since 1974, these three countries 
have supplied 95% of Japan's corn import~. The 
corn imported from South Africa is a white corn and 
is used primarily for corn starch production; for that 
use it is of superior quality to either U. S. or Thai 
corn. Generally, South Africa supplies most of this 
market, with the residual being supplied by the U. S. 
However, South Africa has a problem with harvests 
and the supplies available to Japan arc somewhat un-
stable. 
TABLE 21.-Grain Facilities in the U. S. Owned 
by Mitsui, 1977. 
Location Capacity (bu) Function 
Reserve, LA 4,000,000 Export 
Tacoma, WA 4,600,000 Export 
Vancouve1·, WA 5,350,000 Export 
Heloise, TN 500,000 River Terminal 
Henry, IL 200,000 River Term1nal 
Dorena, MO 500,000 R1ver Term1nal 
Chillicothe, IL 100,000 River Terminal 
E. Peoria, IL 20,000 River Terminal 
Fort Benton, MT 315,000 Country 
Wolf Point, MT 315,000 Country 
Denison, lA l ,000,000 Country 
Hartley, lA 600,000 Country 
Farmer City, IL 2,256,000 Country 
Source: Obtamed through interviews with Japanese f1rms. 
TABLE 22.-Corn Imports by Country of Origin, Japan, 1960-1976. 
U,S.A. 
Year South Africa Thailand Mozambique Others U.S.A. Total (percent) 
1000 Meine Tons 
-----· 
1960 254 315 1 599* 184 1,353 14 
1962 868 237 0 180 1,031 2,316 45 
1965 30 576 0 5251" 2,302 3,433 67 
1968 1,341 633 184 445 2,541 5,144 49 
1970 375 535 21 692:~ 4,394 6,017 73 
1972 1 '175 861 261 356 3,398 6,051 56 
1974 361 909 355 146 6,169 7,940 78 
1975 918 778 263 147 5,354 7,471 72 
1976 862 994 61 230 6,236 8,383 74 
*Argent1na exported 427,000 MT to Japan and Cambodia 93,000 MT. 
tch,na exported 243,000 MT to Japan and Mexico 189,000 MT. 
:j:Argenlina exported 497,000 MT to Japan. 
Source, (38). 
Thailand has heen a long-time supplier of corn 
to Japan, the roots of which were formalized in 1961 
when a Thai Corn Importers Cartel was formed in 
Japan. This cartel negotiates annually with the 
Thai government to purchase certain amounts of corn 
which it is then committed to buy. The price of this 
corn is determined by the world market price. The 
amount that the importers' cartel commits itself to 
purchase is usually the maximum that Thai officials 
believe will he available for export. Historically, 
Thailand has not been able to deliver the quantities 
of corn specified in the agreement. In order to ex-
pedite shipping of the corn, three Japanese trading 
companies invested in the Bangkok Drying and Silo 
Company ( Zennoh has 201fc, interest, Mitsui 12ifc, 
and Mitsubishi 12 7c,). Besides these two countries, 
the rest of the corn market essentially hdongs to the 
U. S. and the U. S. share should remain somewhat 
stablc, with fluctuations resulting primarily from the 
sizr of crops in South Africa and Thailand. 
The primary sorghum suppliers to Japan arc Ar-
gentina, Australia, and the U. S. (Table 23). Japan 
usually buys all the sorghum that Argentina and Aus-
tralia have available for export, purchasing the re-
maining needed quantities from the U.S. The avail-
able supply of export sorghum from these two coun-
tries has fluctuated somewhat widely in past years a~ 
a result of weather and other factors. 
Since corn and sorghum arc largely substitut<' 
products, the supply and/ or quality of one or the 
other can affect the demand for the commodity and 
the U.S. market position. For instance, if the sorg-
hum imports from Argentina were low in protein as 
wa<> reported in 1977 ( 73), this might result in an ad-
jmtrnent in feed formulas favoring corn at the ex-
pense of sorghum. It then would he possible for the 
U. S. total market share of feed grains to increase 
since the U.S. market share for corn is larger than for 
sorghum. 
Tht." last major feed grain imported hy Japan is 
harley. In 1965 the U.S. suppli<'d 421jc of Japan's 
barley, hut since then harley exports from the U. S. 
have been minimal ( Tahk 24). The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries' (MAFF) Food 
.\geney is the sole importer of harley and thus has a 
monopoly on both food and feed harley. This is a 
TABLE 23.-Sorghum Imports by Country of Origin, Japan, 1965-1976. 
U.S.A. 
Yeat Argentin•a Australia Others U.S.A. Total (percent) 
~·~------
1000 Metric Tons 
1965 127 0 20 1284 1431 90 
1968 1 36 113 3330 3480 97 
1970 1287 263 51 2188 3789 58 
1972 532 717 207* 2049 3505 58 
1974 796 721 126 2831 4474 63 
1975 833 777 1721" 2012 3794 53 
1976 1072 870 51 2234 4227 53 
*South Africa exported 172,000 MT to Japan. 
i"South Africa exported 11 9,000 MT to Japan. 
Source: (38). 
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TABLE 24.-Barley Imports by Country of Origin, Japan, 1965-1976. 
Year Canada Australia 
1965 204 161 
1968 231 75 
1970 553 113 
1972 666 334 
1974 716 619 
1975 978 620 
1976 964 683 
Source: (38). 
carryover from the time when barley was primarily 
a food grain. Now 84% of the imported barley is for 
feed. The imported feed barley is turned over by 
the Food Agency to the MAFF Livestock Industry 
Bureau which allocates the barley for direct feeding 
(approximately 1 million metric tons per year) in 
cattle and for formula feeds (approximately 300,000 
metric tons per year). The Food Agency purchases 
the imported barley at one price and sells it at an-
other price (Table 25). Since 1972 the Food Agen-
cy's cost of importing barley has exceeded the sales 
revenue from barley by an average of $14.9 million 
per year. Since harley is a substitute product for 
corn and sorghum, the Food Agency import system 
for harley has the effect of subsidizing imports of Ca-
nadian and Australian feed harley at the expense of 
U. S. corn and sorghum imports ( 71). 
Consistent with the government's desire to di-
\'ersify agricultural imports, the trading companies 
endeavor to purchase feed grains from as many sup-
pliers a<; possible. The implicit desire of the govern-
ment is to reduce the U. S. market share and the ef-
fe-ct ha<> been to relegate the U. S. to the position of 
residual supplier. Furthermore, the U. S. has not 
been without critics in Japan. In an interview with 
U.S.A. 
France U.S.A. Total (percent) 
1000 Metnc Tons 
0 269 635 42 
319 9 634 
104 0 770 0 
0 4 1004 0.4 
0 83 1418 6 
0 0 1598 0 
0 109 1756 6 
Milton Hake! ( 13) in 1972, Takeo Maita, President 
of U nicoop (trading division of Zennoh), expressed 
his opinion about Japan's concern over the extreme-
dependence on the U. S. for its food supply. Mr. 
Maita said: 
"Because of strikes ( U. S. longshoremen) once 
in every 2 or 3 years, we in Japan have suffered 
very much in business with the U. S. If this 
situation continues in the future, the U.S. might 
lose a big buyer of grain because of just such a 
problem ... Since the feed we import is intended 
for livestock, we have to feed them every day-
day by day. We cannot have these mishaps and 
uncertainty about supplies continued. We will 
have to find another country which can depend-
ably ship such grain to us. We really hope you 
can manage this problem." 
·whether or not the concern is over longshoremen 
strikes, the same statement citing another problem 
could have hcen made with the change of few words. 
The questions then arc, How realistic are the Japan-
esc concerns? and How good of a supplier is the U. S.? 
First, the Japanese concerns arc certainly realistic hy 
the very nature of the problem. At the time of this 
statement, Japan had little storage capacity and was 
TABLE 25.-Feed Barley Import Price by Source, Budgeted Resale Price, and Net Subsidy to Barley Imports, 
Japan, 1970-1976. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
-~-- ---~---
Feed Barley Import Price by Source, yen/MT 
U.S.A. 0 0 19,546 28,691 56,795 0 41,369 
Canada 19,588 23,401 19,829 29,593 48,731 44,991 42,623 
Australia 20,116 24,598 19,166 26,925 47,315 49,378 43,547 
Feed Barley Budgeted Resale Price 
All sources* 23,270 24,947 23,158 24,929 29,954 34,055 38,018 
Net Subsidy of Barley lmportst 
Million yen 2 0 566 3,778 9,380 5,681 2,815 
{$1,000) {6) {0) {1 ,868) [12,593) (30,855) [19,148) {9,914 
*Taking into consideration price differences, MAF sets annual resale prices of feed barley as a formulo feed ingredient and/or for di~ect 
cattle consumpt1on regardless of sources. Resale is accomplished by auction, but ouction pnces do not differ significantly from budgeted pnce. 
tGross costs {i.e., costs of purchasing and handling) less receipts from sales. 
Source: (71). 
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essentially using the ocean tramport pipeline as a stor-
age facility for grain. The ships must arrive with 
regularity as stated hy Mr. Maita or havoc would 
occur in the livestock sector. When a product is a~ 
important as feed grains arc to Japan, it is always 
more risky to have just one supplier. Because of this 
concern, in 1972 Japan had great visions of increas-
ing grain stocks available for export in the world 
through its production-for-export projects (discussed 
in the next section) in other countries. These new 
grain supplies were predicted to cut into the U. S. 
market share. Statements of this type c<'rtainly 
added jmtification to these Japanese export projects. 
In direct contradiction to Mr. Maita's statement, 
the U. S. is widely recognized as the least vulneralllc 
country to strikes and/ or other shipping difficulties. 
The reason for this is the efficiency of the U. S. trans-
portation system from the farm to the port (which is 
second to none) and the multitude of ports. Even if 
one particular port is closed for some time, the effect 
on grain shipments would be minimal compared to 
many countries because the grain could be shipped 
out of another port. It should he noted that the Jap-
anese minimal storage of feed grains (often 3 weeks' 
supply in 1972) should not be blamed on the U. S., 
and in fact speaks very highly of the U. S. system that 
enabled Japan to work on such a low inventory. It 
appears that the delays Japan has had in getting ship-
ments from the U. S. were negligible compared to 
their other suppliers. 
Furthermore, in discussions with numerom 
people in grain trading, in feed, flour, and crushing 
industries, and in government on both sides of the 
Pacific, it was their unanimous opinion that in all as-
pects of the non-price decision criteria for purchasing 
grains (such as reliahility, quality, shipping, and the 
ability to protect oneself in the market), the U. S. 
excels. 
JAPANESE FEED GRAIN IMPORT AGREEMENTS 
AND PRODUCTION-FOR-EXPORT 
PROJECTS IN LDC'S 
As discussed in the previous section, the official 
Japanese trade policy on the feed grain import mar-
ket is that of diversification to as great an extent as 
possible. The purpose of this section is to look into 
the extent of the private sector's effort toward diversi-
fication. Given that diversification is the govern-
ment's policy, it would seem natural that Japanese 
trading companies, with their dose ties with the gov-
ernment and an ideology which calls for investment 
decisions to he made on the basis of, among other 
things, the good of Japan (64), would be called upon 
to do their part in the diversification effort. 
The best way to illustrate the nature, size, and 
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original expectations of the project~ is to list som(' 
specific examples (54, 55, 64) : 
Indonesia: In southern Sumatra, Mitsui in part-
ner~hip with Kosgoro, an Indonesian agricultural co-
operative, hegan development of a large agri-indus-
trial complex in 1968. As of 1970, only 2,500 acre~ 
were under cultivation, hut plans were for at least 
30,000 acres and exports of 200,000 tons of corn by 
1980. At least three other similar projects were un-
der way in Indonesia in 1972. All totaled, Indonesia, 
with a population of 11 0 million and much potential 
for importing Japanese industrial output, was ex-
pected to he producing for export 500,000 to 
1 ,000,000 tons of corn and 200,000 tons of sorghum 
by 1980. 
Thailand: The primary investment by Japanese 
commercial firms affecting feed grains in Thailand 
was the joint venture involving Bangkok Drying and 
Silo Company with Zennoh, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi 
which doubled that company's capitalization. 
Cambodia: In 1965, a Japanese consortium was 
established to initiate production of corn for export in 
Cambodia. In May 1968, a Cambodian company 
(51 '/r owned by the Cambodian government and 
491/r Japanese) was formed to grow corn, with ex-
pectations of exporting· 200,000 to 300,000 tons hy 
1978. 
Brazil: A Japanese-Brazilian company was 
formed in 1970 in Minas Gerais State on one-half 
million acres to produce corn, cotton, and soybeans. 
Australia: Two projects involved Japanese trad-
ing firms in the production primarily of sorghum and 
corn, with expectations of exporting 70,000 tons by 
1975. 
It should he realized that it was widely written 
and inferred in the U. S. press that unless the U. S. 
aggressively marketed its products to Japan, the U.S. 
market share would drop as a re~ult of these projects. 
However, if the original objectives arc used as cri-
teria, mo~t of these projects have heen complete fail-
ures. The primary exception is the Bangkok Drying 
and Silo Company. It appears that the Japane,;c 
were not able to do in the last 8 years what U. S. agri-
cultural aid programs to LDC's have been attempting 
to do since World War II. 
In addition to the production-for-export projects, 
a number of trade agreements have been made in an 
effort by private Japanese traders to secure supplies 
and diversify sources. Three of the agreements are: 
• The annual agreement between the Thai 
government and the Thai Corn Importers 
Cartel on the quantity of corn to he pur-
chased. 
• A long term agreement between Australia and 
Zennoh for 800,000 tons of sorghum annual-
ly ( 75). 
• An agreement between Zennoh and its Bra-
zilian counterpart on the long-term supply 
of corn and soybean meal. No quantities 
have been announced yet (79). 
Historically, these agreements have meant littk 
since the exporting country has not been able to sup-
ply with regularity the quantity of grain agreed to 
and in all probability the Japanese would have pur-
chased the quantity of grain called for in the agree-
ment even without it. 
GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IN 
FEED GRAIN MARKET 
Formula Feed Plant Expansion Policy 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
cries ( MAFF) control of formula feed factory expan-
sion takes the form of licensing and administrative 
guidance. Prior to the world-wide recession in 1974, 
the government approved almost all expansion re-
quests providing the proposed feed mill had a capa-
city larger than 5,000 MT per month. The MAFF 
has a long-term supply-demand outlook for livestock 
d«:'mands. From these estimates, the MAFF can cal-
culate the formula feed required. This information 
is thm used to determine feed plant expansion re-
quirements. 
At present, with two excc:'ptions, the governmC'nt 
is not allowing any feed mill expansion. The govern-
ment argues that since capacity equals demand, it is 
not necessary to expand. It is further reasoned that 
if feed manufacturers were allowed to expand, they 
would over-expand, resulting in over-investment and 
financial loss to the feed manufacturers. 
The two exceptions to this are Hokaido and 
Kyushu prefectures (states). The government claims 
that since production of dairy and beef in Hokaido 
and swine and broilers in Kyushu is conspicuously in-
creasing, feed plant expansions will and have been 
approved for these two areas. Examples of feed 
plant expansions include Marubeni Livecstock Com-
pany (group company of Marubeni Trading Com-
pany) and Zennoh expanding in K yushu and Hoko-
ren (a cooperative affiliated with Zennoh) expanding 
in Hokaido. 
Industry sources agree that the government has 
given them administrative guidance concerning feed 
plant expansion as described above. However, people 
in industry feel that the licensing and administrative 
guidance is really of little value since the government 
is telling industry to do what it would do regardless 
of government regulations. One noted Japane'!e 
academician ( 16) concurred with this viewpoint but 
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indicated that there were times in the pa.'lt when in-
dustry probably needed administrative guidance. 
As a result of relatively close ties between indus-
try and government, it is probable that requests for 
licensing of new expansions arc rarely turned down. 
This is primarily due to the administrative guidance 
which indicates current government policy and the 
discussionf' that would occur between the company 
and the government before the license request was 
submitted. 
Mixed Feed Supply Stabilization Organization 
Largely as a result of the uncertainty surround-
ing commodity supplies from 1972 through 1975, the 
MAFF formed the quasi-governmental Mixed Feed 
Supply Stabilization Organization ( MFSSO) in 
1975. The purpoRe of thiR organization waR to stock-
pile feed grains in order to guarantee supplie" in the 
event of relatively short-term international supply 
problems. A second purpose was to give the Japan-
ese livestock farmer tangib~e assurance that feed sup-
plies were secure. The original goal of the MFSSO 
was to encourage the feed industry to maintain a 1-
month supply of feed grains for a total supply of 2 
months. In order to realize these goals, the MFSSO 
also had to dcvrlop a program to stimulate silo con-
struction. 
. \!though the original goal of the MFSSO was 
to stockpile a 1-month supply of feed grains by 1978, 
that goal was later changed to a 1-month supply 
based upon 1975 monthly consumption. This would 
have required the stockpiling of 950,000 MT. How-
ever, a" of December 1978, the MFSSO had stock· 
piled 300,000 MT of barley, 195,000 MT of corn, and 
110,000 MT of sorghum for a total of 605,000 MT, 
which amounts to about a 2-week supply at 1979 con-
sumption levels. It shou!d he noted, though, that 
the harley is being stockpiled by the Food Agency, 
not the MFSSO. 
The funding for the stockpiled grain is such that 
corn and sorghum arc purchased with borrowed 
money and the interest on the borrowed money is paid 
hy MAFF. Each company storing grain is paid a 
government storage fee which is alc;;o paid by MAFF. 
In order to guarantee that the stockpiled grain is not 
m:cd by the feed companies to lower their inventory 
requirements of self-purchased grain, the MFSSO 
employs inspectors to check each company's grain 
stocks monthly. In addition to government stock-
piled grain, each company is required to average over 
any 3-month period grain stocks equivalent to full 
rapacity. Full capacity i'l defined as the average of 
the beginning grain stocks for every month for the 
previous 5 years. Penalties arc assessed the compan-
ies that fail to maintain these grain stocks. The penal-
ty is lO}j of the purchase price of the commodity times 
the volume of grain that is short. 
In order to hold the 11tockpiled grain, additional 
storage facilities were needed. To stimulate con-
struction of grain storage, interest on loans to com-
panies building silos was subsidized by 1.95</c. This 
TABLE 26.-Change in Silo Capacity by Year, 
Japan, 1970-1978. 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Capacity 
2,475,401 
4,014,622 
4,360,000 
• Estimated. 
Source: (32). 
Increase 
Metric Tons 
386,949 
436,997 
202,325 
154,284 
160,677 
197,989 
350,000* 
Total Change 
percent 
2,862,350 9.6 
3,299,347 10.9 
3,501,672 5.0 
3,655,956 3.8 
3,816,633 4.0 
4,014,622 4.9 
4,360,000 8.7 
TABLE 27.-Total Silo Capacity by Industry and 
Silo Utilization, Japan, 1978. 
Handl1ng sdo 
Flour mill industry 
Feed m d I industry 
Od tndustry 
Others* 
Tolal 
=== 
Capacity Percent 
(MT) of Total 
2,107' 106 52.5 
776,315 19.3 
581,548 14.5 
485,135 11.4 
91,518 2.3 
4,041,622 100.0 
Number of 
Companies 
85 
85 
159 
16 
31 
Silo Utilization 
Storage (MT) Percent of Total 
Corn and sorghum 
Wheat and barley 
Soybeans 
2,239,058 
1,023,728 
517,372 
55.4 
25.5 
12.8 
*Barley processors, corn starch processors, and Miso-Soy sauce 
producers. 
Source: (32). 
FIG. 4.-Japanese Mixed Feed Price Stabilization 
Fund System for Reserving Monies, 1978. 
JFMA Fund 
Producers pay 400 yen/ton 
Member feed manufacturers 
poy 800 yen/ton 
(1200 yen/ton) (8.2 mill1on 
tons)* = 9.84 billion yent 
Zennoh Fund 
Producers pay 400 yen/ton 
Perfectual Agricultural Cooperat1ve 
pays 200 yen/ton 
Zennoh pays 600 yen/ton 
I 1200 yen/ton) (6.84 million 
tons)* = 8.2 billion yent 
*Contracted tonnage for 1978 is set up on a 3-year basis. 
tTotal reserve fund available in 1978. 
Note: Zenraku fund is s1milar to Zennoh's. Zenraku had con-
tracted tonnage of 720,000 tons. 
Source: (60). 
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interest subsidy was also financed by the government. 
Howe\'er, the effect of the interest subsidy on the con-
struction of silos is debatable ( Tahle 26). From 
1972 through 197 5 (the period during which the 
world recession was the worst), silo capacity increased 
16'/c while feed grain imports increased only 19%. 
From 1975 through 1977, the period during which 
the MFSSO had encouraged silo construction, feed 
grain imports increased 25</c hut silo construction 
wa~ up only 14-}j. Those industries which control 
the silo facilities arc listed in Table 27. 
A primary reason that the MFSSO has not been 
able to meet its goal for 1979 has lwen a lack of 
money. All government budget expenditures arc 
subject to approval hy the Ministry of Finance, and 
apparently given Japan's pref1ent priorities, money 
available, etc., the MFSSO has received a lower prior-
ity and thus inadequate funding to meet its original 
objectives. It would seem that with the return to 
more normal world grain markets, the political and 
economic returns from stockpiling grain do not justify 
the cost. At pre~ent, plans for the MFSSO after 
1980 arc indefinite--providing there isn't a reoccur-
rence of a worldwide grain shortage. 
Mixed Feed Price Stabilization Funds 
The Mixed Feed Price Stabilization Fund 
(MFPSF) was first established in 1974 by three feed 
industry organizations in order to help stabilize the 
then widely fluctuating formula feed prices. The 
three feed industry organizations were the Japan Feed 
Manufacturers Association ( JFMA represents pri-
\'ate feed manufacturers), Zennoh, and Zenraku. 12 
Each organization has its own fund, although they 
each have a similar system for reserving money based 
upon contracted tonnage (Figure 4) ( 60) . 
Soon after the MFPSF was established, it lle-
came apparent that the industry fund alone would 
not be sufficient to stabilize formula ked prices un. 
der prolonged and unusually adverse conditions ( 60). 
Therefore, a quasi-governmental organization was 
formed, entitled the Organization of Mixed Feed 
Stabilization Fund ( OMFSF). At the beginning of 
each fiscal year, the Japanese government allocates a 
certain amount of money to the OMFSF. The three 
privately organized funds are then ohliged to reserve 
an equivalent amount of money in addition to their 
own stabilization fund. For example, in 1978, the 
government subsidy was 10.6 billion yen. The three 
industry funds then reserve their share (based upon 
contracted tonnage) of the 10.6 billion yen. For the 
JFMA, it would be 5.5 billion yen (52o/c of 10.6 bil-
"Zenraku means Notional Agricultural Associate of Dairy Pro· 
ducers, which manufactures feed. In this case, Zenroku is involved 
m the fund separate from Zennoh. Previous discussions concerning 
Zennoh have included Zenraku. 
ion yen) ( 60). As of 197 8, a total of 69.6 billion ym 
had been reserved (Table 28), with a goal of 80.0 
billion yen by 1979. 
If formula feed prices increase by more than 
5~jc,, industry funds will he used to stabilize the price. 
In case of price increases more than 8%, the OMFSF 
reserves will be used. 
The important question to be answered is what 
the effectiveness of these funds would be in stabilizing 
prices. In August 1978, formula feed for broilers 
was selling for 1262 yen/20 kg or $315/MT ( 29). 
Now suppose the U. S. corn crop for 1 year was 20% 
smaller than the previous year's crop. This would 
result in an increase in the world price of feed grains 
that would translate into a 50% price increase for 
formula feeds in Japan, with the increase lasting 1 
year. (There were price increases considerably 
larger than this in the 1973-1974 period.) This 
would result in a price of $4 72.50/MT (using the 
broiler feed price as an example) for formula feeds. 
Further assuming that formula feed production was 
that of 1977 or 19.5 million tons, the MFPSF and the 
OMFSF could reduce the price of feed by ( 80 billion 
+ 18.9 billion ycn1R)/19.5 million tons or 5071 yen/ 
ton or $25/ton. The point is that if the price of feed 
grains increases as it did in 1973 and 1974, which 
prompted the establishment of the MFPSF and 
OMFSF, the ability of these funds to stabilize prices 
would be minimal. 
Sales of Surplus Rice for Formula Feed 
:\s a result of good weather and economic factors 
discussed in the previous chapter, Japan once again 
has a rice surplus problem. Accordingly, the Food 
Agency Director General has indicated that the gov-
ernment is considering a rice disposal plan designed 
to reduce rice stocks to a 2 million ton "normal" level. 
This would require the disposal of 4 million tons of 
rice over the next 5 years and will cost the govern-
ment 2 trillion yen ( $10 billion) to be financed over 
a period of 7 years. The rice would be disposed of 
in animal feed, industrial usc, and as donations 
(Table 29). 
The rice used in formula feeds will cut into feed 
grain imports. The rice will be used in all mixed 
feeds, but greater emphasis is expected to be placed 
on its use in swine and poultry feeds. According to 
the U. S. Attache's Office, rice has a lower feeding 
value than that of corn and sorghum, and therefore 
reductions in corn and sorghum are not expected to 
correspond directly to increases in rice use. Conse-
quently if 500,000 tons of rice arc disposed of in the 
1180 billion yen is the size of the government fund and 18.9 
bd I an yen is the size of the industry. 
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formula feed industry, this would reduce demand for 
corn and sorghum by an expected 460,000 tons. 
However, if supplies and/ or prices of feed grains be-
come unstable in the world market in the near future, 
it would not be surprising if Japan utilized its surplus 
rice to stabilize formula feed prices. This would 
appear to he a more effective method than the present 
fund approach, although no Japanese government 
official has yet suggested this approach. 
TABLE 28.-Japanese Mixed Feed Price Stabiliza-
tion Fund Reserves, 1974-1979. 
Government Cumulative 
Year Subsidy Industry Total 
Billion Yen 
1974 6 6 12 
1975 2 2 16 
1976 6.6 6.6 29.2 
1977 9.6 9.6 48.4 
1978 10.6 10.6 69.6 
1979 ~ Goal = 80.0 
*Not available. 
Source: (60). 
TABLE 29.-MAFF Planned Rice Disposal, 1978-
1982. 
Aid Industrial 
Period Feed Exports Uses Total 
1000 Metric Tons 
1978 290 230 60 580 
1979 500 400 100 1,000 
1980 500 400 100 1,000 
1981 500 400 100 1,000 
1982 210 170 40 420 
Total 2,000 1,600 400 4,000 
Source: {80). 
TABLE 30.-Tariff Quotas and Import Duties for 
Industrial Use Corn, Japan, October 1977 - September 
1978. 
Oct. 1977- April 1978- Import 
Usage March 1978 Sept. 1978 Duty 
1000 Metnc Tons percent 
Corn starch 704.4 664.1 0 
sweetening 485.3 448.0 0 
non -sweetening 219.1 216.1 0 
Alcohol 53.6 52.3 0 
Corn flakes 8.1 6.9 0 
Popcorn 2.4 2.4 0 
Corn gnts, meal, 
and flour 108.4 115.1 10 
Other 13.9 13.7 10 
Total 890.8 854.5 
Source: {78). 
Tariffs and Other Import Controls on Feed Grains 
Barley imports are controlled hy the Food Agen-
cy. All other feed grains for feed use are imported 
free of controls. The importation of fonnula feed~, 
which wa~ fir~t scheduled for liberalization in 1972 
and is not yet liberalized, has a duty of 15 '/r. 
In order to support domestic potato production 
and demand for potato starch, Japan sets quotas on 
industrial use corn. Corn imported within this quota 
ir- either not taxed or it is taxed at 1 0~ ad valorem 
(Table 30). Corn imported in addition to the quota 
is taxed at 15,000 yen per ton which, if based on aver-
age CIF co.;;t-; from January to .June 1978, amounts to 
a 55j{ duty ( 79). 
The Japanese Soybean Market 
Soybeans have become a very important world 
commodity over the la'>t 30 years. Their usc has 
grown from that of a peculiar oriental food bean to a 
multitude of food, industrial, and feed uses. The 
increase in the consumption and uses of soybeans in 
Japan has paralleled ito;; popularity in the rest of the 
world. This o;;cction discus~es the uses for soybeans 
in Japan, the soybean crushing industry, Japanese 
soybean imports, and the government's presence in 
the soybean markets. 
JAPANESE USES FOR SOYBEANS 
Soybean Food Use Demand 
For a long time the Japanese have consumed soy-
beans as a food and soybean-based foods are very 
much a part of the traditional Japanese diet. More 
recently, though, as the Japanese diet has undergone 
changes associated with increasing incomes and a 
changing culture, a continually greater proportion of 
the total soybean consumption has been in the form 
of soybean oil (used for cooking oil, salad dressing, 
etc.) and soybean meal (used primarily for livestock 
feeds) (Table 31). This is primarily a result of 
slower growth in consumption of soybean foods rda-
tive to livestock and other Western-style dishes for 
which younger Japanese have developed preferences. 
Thi<; trend would be expected to continue except that 
consumption of soy protein as an extender in meat 
and fish products is expected to increase in coming 
year~. 
There are hundreds of different traditional soy-
bean food~ in Japan. The con~umption of some of 
the primary soybean foods and the origin of the beans 
for each use i<> given in Table 32. 
Demand for Soybean Meal 
The primary cause for the dramatic increase in 
the u~e of ~oyhean meal ( SBM) has been its increased 
usc in formula feeds (Table 13) (from 6.6 7c of all 
formula feeds in 1963 to 11.1 j{ in 1977) and the in-
creased usc of formula feeds. The reasons for the in .. 
creased usc of formula feeds were explained in the 
previous section. One of the reasons given for the in-
crease in the usc of feed grains as a percentage of total 
formula fee-d production was the need for higher en-
ergy feeds in order to grow out the livestock faster. 
However, in order for the higher energy content of 
the feed to be utilized by the animal, the feed must 
contain more protein which the SBM provides. 
In theory there arc numerous oilseed meals that 
"ubstitutc for SBM. These would include the meals 
obtained from crushing rapeseed, cottonseed, sesame, 
peanuts, safflower, copra, and linseed. However, in 
TABLE 31.-Soybean Consumption by Use, Japan, 1955-1978. 
-
--- ·------- --
- - - --- - -· --- ---- --
Food 
Change Total Use of Feed, Seed, 
Year in Stocks Supply Crushed Use Total and Waste 
1 000 MetriC Tons percent 
1955-1960 (ov] + 2 1338 816 495 37* 27 
1961-1965 (av] +17 1972 1218 556 31 18 
1966-1970 {av] +10 2671 1997 641 24 33 
1971·1972 (ov] +22 3409 2653 716 21 40 
1973-1974 (av] 
-52 3617 2848 723 20 46 
1975 -42 3502 2721 735 21 46 
Actual Stock Level 
1976 360t 3552 2762 746 21 44 
1977 284t 3789 2973 768 20 48 
1978 330 4115 3268 797 19 50 
--~----
*Est•mated 
tlncludes 38,000 MT government stockpile. 
:!:Includes 70,000 MT gove1nment stockpile. 
Sources: (36, 68, 69, 78]. 
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TABLE 32.-Japanese Food Use of Soybeans and Origin. 
Food 
Approximate 
Consumption Traditional Sources 
Miso 
Metric Tons 
200,000 Traditionally, Peoples Republ1c of Chma (PRC) beans have been preferred for th1s market. 
However, PRC has not been able to supply th1s market Therefore, recently, s1zeable 
U. S. sh1pments of Amsoy and Sorsoy beans from lllmo1s, Iowa, and Mmnesoto hove 
moved mto th1s market. 
Tofu Foods 300,000 The sources for these beans are and hove been U. S # 2 beans that hove been cleaned 
and sorted for un1form1ty. 10M (Indiana, Oh1o, and M1ch,gan) beans have been pre· 
ferred m th1s market. 
Others 
60,000 
180,000 
Domestically produced soybeans are preferred for N1amame due to taste and texture. 
The U. S. also has been supply1ng th1s market Th1s IS almost a requ1rement s1nce beans 
are not really avadable anywhere else However, there haven t been any senous com-
plomts on the U S bean quality. 
Source: (83). 
practice and in fact, the use of these meals as a substi-
tute for SBM is limited. Most of these meals have 
nutritional characteristics that limit their usc in for-
mula feeds. 
SBM is the "best" protein supplement available 
for livestock feeding. It is better because it has the 
proper amino acid balance needed by livestock, anct 
because once it is processed it contains no growth in-
hibitors or other biochemical properties that might 
limit its use. In fact, the amino acid balance in SBM 
is especially well suited to usc in livestock feeds he-
cause it complements the amino acid balance of most 
feed grains, especially that of corn. The one oilseed 
meal that can he considered a substitute for SBM is 
rapeseed meal and this has occurred only recently 
since the Canadians have developed new varietie~ 
which do not have nutritional drawbacks. However, 
even the new varieties of rapeseed which have been 
--~- --------------
used in the last few years cannot entirely replace SBM 
in formula feeds (Table 33). 
The single most important suh~titute for SBM 
in Japan is fish meal. In recent yearo; it has repre-
sented about 3 ex of the total formula feed production. 
The Bo-:ton Consulting Group in a study of formula 
feed compo.;,ition in Japan noted that fish meal use 
over the last 15 years exhibited relatively comtan~ 
levels and appeared not to he influenced by price 
movements ( 61). This is primarily the re'mlt of spe-
cifications set by the Japanese law ( 60). Once again, 
the substitutability of fish meal for SBM is not com-
plete". 
Most of the attention i<> not on fish meal replac-
ing SBM in formula feed hut vice versa due to ton-
nage limitations and new restrictive offshore economic 
zones placed on the Japanese fishing fleet. One 
Japanese government official claimed that the 200-
TABLE 33.-Demand and Supply of Soybean Meal, Fish Meal, and Rapeseed Meal, Japan, 1976-1978. 
Beginning Total Compound Other 
Year Stocks* Production Imports Supply Feed Uset Exports 
---- --~- ---------~--~- ------ ~ --~- -------
1000 Metnc Ton> 
------ -----
Soybean Meal 
1976 85 2052 193 2330 1873 347 0 
1977 110 2225 314 2649 2132 419 0 
1978:1: 88 2492 385 2965 2400 450 0 
Fish Meal§ 
1976 46 805 57 908 748 64 49 
1977 47 605 178 830 682 59 37 
1978:j: 52 630 115 797 675 50 27 
Rapeseed Meal 
1976 11 358 14 383 124 237 0 
1977 22 426 24 472 168 284 1 
1978:1: 19 447 30 496 130 345 0 
-- -----------~--- ------- ---- -------·---- ------ ~- -- -------
*Oilseed meal stocks at crushers and feed manufacturers, fish meal stocks at feed manufacturers only. 
tlncludes meal consumed as food, fertilizer, etc. 
:j:1978 1s the estimate of the Agncultural Attache (Japan) as of October 1978. 
§Includes f1sh solubles dry wt baSIS: dry wt = 50% solubles. 
Source: (80). 
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mile limit will not affect fish meal production because 
the type of fish used in fish meal is not caught in those 
waters. Others have argued that this is not the case 
( 78). Thus far it does not appear that the 200-mik 
limit has greatly affected total fish meal supplies, hut 
no onr is suggesting that fish meal usc in formula 
feeds will increase at the expense of SBM. 
According to MAFF statistics, per capita edible 
vegetable oil consumption in 1977 was 11 kg com-
pared to 25 kg in the U. S. Liquid oils, excluding 
castor and linseed oils (which arc used in some indus-
trial processes), arc refined for edible usc as salad and 
cooking oils and this is also the predominant usc for 
soybean oil ( SBO). Palm and coconut oils are pri-
marily used in margarine and shortening manufac-
ture and in industrial processes (Table 34). 
A~. with SBM, in many cases SBO does not have 
an exact substitute. People accustomed to food 
cooked in one oil often develop a preference for that 
oil. However, SBO for cooking purposes is tasteless 
(in contrast to most vegetable oils) and once people 
are accustomed to food cooked in SBO, they havr a 
distinct preference for SBO. Rapeseed oil is the sec-
ond most consumed oilseed oiL Palm oil is the sec-
ond most used oil, hut is not an oilseed oil. Palm oil 
has been quite successful in penetrating the solid vege-
table oil market. Yet, because of refining costs, palm 
oil is expected to remain non-competitive in the larger 
liquid oil market (of which SBO is a part) in ~he 
foreseeable future. 
SOYBEAN CRUSHING INDUSTRY 
Since about 85% of the soybeans imported into 
Japan arc crushed, the soybean crushing industry 
plays a critical role in the soybean market. The dra-
matic increase that was witnessed in the production 
of formula feeds has been seen in the oilseed crushing 
industry (Table 31). Likewise, the changes in the 
number of plants and plant capacities have been ac-
companied hy a trend toward larger and larger plants. 
The soybean processors, capacity locations, and stor-
age capacities arc listed in Table 35. The companies 
that are members of Sogo Shoshas arc listed althouo-h 
' h 
it is likely that others not listed as members arc mem-
bers of Sogo Shoshas. Due to difficultv in ohtaininO" 
..._ • M 
~uch information, this could not be confirmed. A 
large number of smaller plants (which number ap-
proximately 150) that primarily process food soy-
beans arc not included in Tahk 35. In 1976, the 6 
largest processors of soybeans crushed 50% of the 
total soybeans crushed and the 12 largest crushed ap-
proximately 70o/r of the total. This illustrates the 
concentration within the industrv. 
There have been a number ~f reasons for a con-
tinuing trend toward increased concentration. First 
of all, as wa~ the case in the formula feed industry, 
the larger companier-; with better managcmmt and 
access to capital expanded faster by building new, 
larger, more efficient plants when the market in o-cn-n 
eral was expanding rapidly. The trend toward 
building new and larger plants accelerated as the 
companies moved their plants from inland to coastal 
locations to take advantage of transportation efficien-
cies there. This growth in capacity came to a halt 
with thr rccrssion of 1974 and the realization by the 
industry and governmrnt that thr industry was over-
built. 
In the early 1960's, the government instigated a 
pricing policy for SBM such that every 3 months the 
soybean processors and users (primarily feed manu-
facturers) collectively bargained and set the SBM 
TABLE 34.-Demand and Supply of Soybean Oil Rapeseed Oil, and Palm 
Oil, Japan, 1976-1978. ' 
Beginning Total 
Year 
__ s_to_c_ks ____ P_r_od_u_ct_io_n ___ l_m.:.po_:'_'s __ ....:S:.::u:.:pp~l~y __ _::C:.::onsumption Exports 
1 000 Metric Tons 
Soybean Oil 
1976 47 485 12 544 512 2 
1977 30 532 0 562 547 
1978 14 585 0 600 582 2 
Rapeseed Oil 
1976 19 262 14 295 281 I 
1977 13 307 8 328 319 2 
1978 17 330 15 352 337 3 
Palm Oil 
1976 20 0 153 173 153 0 
1977 20 0 147 167 147 0 
1978 20 0 125 145 125 0 
Source: (80). 
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prices for the next 3 months. The soyhean proces-
sors contracted their soybean purchases on the basis 
of expected sales, and therefore knew exactly what 
the ingredient costs would be prior to the meetings. 
Also, a part of the mutual understanding between the 
processors and feed manufacturers was the agreement 
that the feed manufacturers would buy their SBM 
from the processors and the processors would guaran-
tee the feed manufacturers a supply of SBM. 
This system worked well until 1975. In 1973, 
when the prices of soybeans started to escalate the , 
soybean proces..c;;ors' profits climbed as a result of buy-
ing cheaper soybeans (which were purchased 3 
months earlier) and selling them in a higher priced 
meal market. The resulting problem was that in 
1974 and 1975, when the prices of soybeans in the 
world market dropped, the soybean processors wen· 
"stuck'' with very high priced soybeans and a declin·· 
ing meal market. As a result of this situation, the 
soybean processing industry lost $250 million in 1975 
and collective bargaining between the oil processors 
and the feed manufacturers came to an end. The 
losses were aggravated by the fact that, prior to the 
time of the soybean price declines, the government 
was encouraging soyhcan processors to keep full in-
ventories of soybeans in light of uncertain commodity 
markets in order to guarantee an adequate supply. 
Additionally, the recession had hurt demand and price 
for oil products. 
The aftermath of 1975 has been a pricing and 
sales system for SBM very similar to the U.S. system. 
The oil processors are fully hedged in the futures mar-
ket and each feed manufacturer contracts individual-
ly with soybean processors for purchases of soybean 
meal 1 to 2 months in advance. The price of soy-
bean oil is discussed by supply-demand relationships. 
As has been mentioned before, it is Japanese 
trade policy to import only raw materials and to do 
all of the processing in Japan. This policy also ap-
plies to soybeans. Soybeans are imported to he 
crushed in order to meet the lesser of the two de-
mands-either oil or meal. Historically, the lesser 
demand has been for oil. Therefore, soybean crush-
ers import enough soybeans to meet their SBO market 
and then meet the excess demand for SBM through 
import<; of meal. Since this is in fact what is hap-
pening, it i~ possible to conclude that the following 
equation must hold: 
TABLE 35.-Japanese Soybean Crushers: Crushing and Storage Capacities-
1978. 
Daily Soybean 
Crushing Location Storage 
Name of Company Capacity of Capacity Silo 
(Sogo Shosha}* (MT} Plant (MT) Location 
Nisshin Oil Mills, Ltd. 3,900 Yokohama 100,150 Yokohama 
(Mitsubishi) Kobe 5,240 Kobe 
Showa Songyo Co., Ltd. 1,800 Kashima 45,700 Kashima 
Yokohama 55,000 Tsurumi 
Kobe 116,000 Kobe 
Hohnen Oil Co. (Mitsui) 1,500 Shimizu 65,902 Shim1zu 
9,740 Sakoide 
Yoshiharo Oil Mill, Ltd. 1,500 Nishinomiya 18,900 Nishinomiyo 
(Sumitomo} 20,092 Kobe 
N1hon Koyu Co., Ltd. 1,500 Mizushimo 55,000 M1zushimo 
Japan Soya Products 1,500 Kobe 55,000 Kobe 
Co., Ltd.t Kobe 
Nikko Fats & Oil Co., Ltd. 900 Wakamatsu 12,280 Wokamatsu 
Rinoru Oil Mills Co., Ltd. 880 Nagoya 47,820 Nagoya 
Fuii Oil Co., Ltd. (C. Itch) 860 Kobe 4,010 Kobe 
Ajinomoto Co. 840 Yokohama 27,420 Yokohama 
lzumisano 
Toyo Oil Mills Co., Inc. 800 Chiba 59,000 Chiba 
Keto Oil Mill Co., Ltd. 488 Taman a 7,000 Tomano 
Yokkaichi Oil and Fats Co. 230 Yokkaichi 5,060 Yokkaichi 
Asohi Yushi Co., Ltd. 215 Asohikowo 
Totals 16,913 709,314 
*The companies associated with a Sago Shosha are listed as such. However, due to difficulties in 
obtaining such mformotion, other compan1es listed may belong to one but ore not marked. 
tJopon Soya Products is operated jomtly by Yoshihara Oil and Hohnen Od, 
Sources: (2, 15, 62). 
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Japanese Soybean Import Price/Unit = 
Value of SBM from a Unit of Soybeans + 
Value of SBO from a Unit of Soybeans -
Crusher's Margin on that Unit of Soybeans. 
SOYBEAN IMPORTS 
Soyl1ran imports arc more difficult to analyze 
than arc feed grain imports because of the multiple 
primary products obtained from soybeans. Soybeans 
are really a part of three different markets-food, 
SBM, and SBO. The SBM and SBO markets arc a 
part of larger world markets for high protein meals 
and fats and oils, respectively. This being the case, 
a study of the soybean market would normally require 
an analysis of the soybean, SBM, and SBO imports. 
Fortunately, Japan imports soybeans almost exclu-
sively to meet the lesser demand for either SBM or 
SBO. This fairly unique situation makes the study 
of the soybean import market much more simple than 
it might otherwise have been. 
The Japane~e policy of importing soybeans for 
processing is documented in Table 36. In 1978, 
SBM imports rcprc~ented an all-time high 9/'i of the 
total soybean imports. From 1955 through 1978, 
SBM imports averaged 3.2/'i of total soybean im-
ports. As would he expected, SBM has bern the 
product most often in excess demand. Likewise, soy-
beans in most years have been imported to meet the 
SBO demand and SBO supply actually exceeded dr-
mand by an average of 6,000 MT /year since 1955. 
However, in 1975 the opposite was true when 30,000 
MT of SBM were exported and 14,000 MT SBO were· 
imported. These quantities represented about 1% 
of the soybeans imported in that year. 
The rapeseed and palm oil imports have in-
creased considerably (Table%). These two imports 
arc important because palm oil competes only in the 
oil market and rapeseed competes with soybeans to a 
greater extent in the oil market than in the meal mar-
ket. The n'a'Kll1 for this is that the oil extraction 
rate of rapeseed is approximately twice that of soy-
beans. This means that for each ton of rapeseed im-
ported, 2 tons of soybeans are not imported. This 
situation in which there arc more competitive substi-
tute~ in the oil market than in the protein meal mar-
ket (the only real substitute for SBM besides rapeseed 
meal is fish meal and its limitations were discussed in 
the previous section) may he the primary reason for 
increased Japanese SBM imports. This being the 
case, there is every reason to believe that this trend 
will continue in the foreseeable future. 
One additional factor affecting the size of the 
SBM or SBO imports is the crushing rate or extraction 
rate of the oil. In 1976 soybeans crushed in Japan 
yielded about 18.1'/r oil. In 1977 the yield was 
18.5'/r and this increased yield "saved'' the crushers 
from importing an additional61,000 MT of soybeans 
and contributed to increased SBM imports by 50,000 
MT. 
Since Japan primarily imports soybeans, the rest 
of this discussion will concentrate on soybean imports. 
The flow of soybeans into Japan is depicted in Figure 
5. The dark lines show the primary flow of soybeans 
which is evidenced by the fact that 11 of the largest 
trading companies imported 1 00'/r of their soy beam 
from the U. S. in 1974-75 (Table 37). This rein-
troduces the question as to why the soybean crushers 
do not buy direct from the international grain com-
panics. The answer to this question is essentially 
the :mmc as that given by the feed manufacturers. 
As was the case with feed grains, one reason 
g·iven by an oilseed crusher for purchasing soybeans 
TABLE 36.-Soybean, Soybean Oil, Soybean Meal, Rapeseed, and Palm Oil 
Imports, Japan, 1955-1977. 
Soybean Soybean 
Soybean Oil Meal Rapeseed Palm Oil 
Year Imports Imports* Imports* Imports Imports 
-----------------
-----
1 000 Metric Tons 
1955 808 -7 14 28 32 
1960 1128 
-21 1 55 13 
1965 1847 -5 46 108 16 
1970 3244 -9 72 345 40 
1972 3396 -3 52 614 59 
1973 3635 -3 275 693 100 
1974 3244 18 108 679 115 
1975 3334 14 -30 669 108 
1976 3554 10 193 726 153 
1977 3602 -1 317 776 147 
1978t 4200 -2 385 795 125 
*These figures represent net imports (i.e., imports - exports). 
tThese figures ore estimates by the Agncultural Attache (Japan) as of October 1978. 
Sources: (67, 80). 
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U) 
U) 
:11 so and Hat to Industry. T~e beans used for t1i so 
have tradit10nally come from PRC and represent 
aoorox1mately 2~0.000 MT/year. Hm~ever, recently 
soybeans from Jnd1ana, Ohio, tlich1gan, Iowa, 
Illino1s, and '1innesota ~ave been used for Hiso 
oroducts. 
Soybean Importet· 
Ot~er food uses of soybeans 1 n 
such foods as Kinako, Gam 
1lodok1, and Soy Sauce. Th1s 
accounts for an additional 
135,1JI]'l f1T of soybean consump-
tlOn in Japan 
Soybean oil oroducts are then sold to 
both commerc1al as well as household 
customers for product10n and consump-
tion 10 many varied ways. 
"2 grade soybeans are cleaned and sorted and 
sold in 60 kilo sacks to the Tofu mdustry. 
The maJority of these beans are from the U.S. 
and the Tofu industry uses about 300,000 MT 
annua llv. 
Pr1mary Flow of Soybeans 
FIG. 5.-The flow of soybeans and soybean products in Japan. 
TABLE 37.-Japanese Soybean Imports from the United States by Importer and by Crus'hing Firm, Oct. 1974-Sept. 1975 (Shipment Basis). 
Importer 
Sumitomo 
User Mitsui Mitsubishl C. ltoh Marubeni Nlssho lwai Sholl Yuasa Nlchimen Toshoku Kanematsu Tomen Total 
1000 Metric Tons 
Honen 150.5 53.0 16.7 57.7 10.1 288.0 
Nisshin 101.8 145.0 12.5 10.7 44.2 314.2 
Ajinomoto 51.8 45.9 254.0 22.2 36.6 410.5 
Showa Sangyo 15.5 181.4 34.7 34.7 132.3 398.6 
Yoshihara 62.6 57.2 40.4 49.2 209.4 
Nikko 246.4 246.4 
Renol 185.4 185.4 
N1kka 114.6 114.6 
Yotsuyu 38.0 38.0 
Fuji 30.8 1.0 31.8 
Kato 11.7 5.5 6.9 3.7 27.8 
JSP 118.5 93.8 76.4 34.2 21.2 344.1 
Others 1.5 1.1 1.0 3.6 
Sub-total 513.9 433.5 467.3 281.1 275.7 177.0 132.3 114.6 99.8 82.2 35.0 2,612.4 
Food Use 11.8 85.2 1.1 60.4 15.6 25.5 10.1 2.3 2.7 214.7 
Total 525.7 518.7 468.4 341.5 291.3 177.0 157.8 124.7 102.1 82.2 37.7 2,827.1 
Soun:e: (45). 
TABLE 38.-Soybeans: Unit Values and Freight Rates at Various Marketing Levels from U. S. Farmers to 
Japanese Importers, Marketing Years 1969-70 to 1974-75. 
Item 69-70 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 74-75 
--------~-
Dollars/ Metric Ton 
(1) Un1t value received by U. S. farmers* 86.35 104.72 111.33 160.57 208.70 244.71 
(2) Implicit U. S. inland freight +10.93 +6.43 +7.91 +11.31 +21.50 +22.09 
(3) Total U. S. export unit value of soybeans 97.28 111.15 119.24 171.88 230.20 266.80 
{4) U. S. export unit value to Japan 97.29 119.71 110.71 189.64 241.35 270.10 
(5) Ocean freight to Japan 10.98 9.26 4.99 11.59 25.02 12.67 
(6) Japanese import unit valuet 106.65 123.40 136.19 170.26 259.96 300.57 
(7) Unexplained difference -1.62 -5.57 +20.49 -30.97 -6.41 +17.80 
(8) Japanese import unit value 
lagged 2 months 107.52 125.11 !37.90 184.30 259.22 297.76 
(9) Unexplained d1fference -0.75 -3.86 +22.20 -16.93 -17.15 +14.99 
--------
*The unit value is the weighted season-average price. 
tin Japanese yen, 1969-70, 38,366; 1970-71, 44,389; 1971-72, 43,513; 1972·73, 48,362; 1973-74, 72,222; 1974-75, 88,890. 
Note: Lines 3, 7, and 9 have been developed from the in format ion in the table as follows: 
Source: (7). 
Lme (3) = (1) + (2) 
Line (7) = (6) - [(4) + (5)1 
Line (9) = (8) - [(4) + (5)] 
from the trading companies was the lower prices 
offered hy the J apancse traders. The trading com-
panics consistently argued that the lower prices were 
the result of the tough competition in the Japan esc 
market. This argument is supported in a study by 
Collins ( 7) which showed that the "unexplained dif-
ferencc"14 was an average -$1.05 from 1970 through 
1975 (Table 38). If the Japanese unit values arc 
lagged 2 months, the averaged unexplained differencr 
from 1970 through 1975 is -$0.25. Also, as was 
the case with corn, the Japanese import prices showed 
an unexplained difference $0.98/year lower than the 
unexplained difference in Dutch imports. This in-
formation is vrry supportive of the argument that the 
"'Unexplained difference" is obtained by subtracting the Japan-
ese import unit values from the U. S. export unit value to Japan plus 
ocean freight. 
import market for soybeans as well as fred grains is 
extrrmrly competitive in Japan. 
U. S. POSITION IN THE 
JAPANESE SOYBEAN MARKET 
Japanese dependence upon the U.S. for essential 
agricultural products is nowhere better illustrated 
than in its dependence upon the U. S. for soybeans 
(Table 39). The annual U. S. market 1'1harc of thr 
Japanese 1'1oyhean market has consistently been above 
901/r ; in 1977 it was 95j{ and was estimated to be 
more than 97.5% in 1978 (78). This increasing de-
pendence upon the U. S. has come about during a 
decade in which Japan has been artively promoting 
and stressing supplier diversification. 
The U. S. has two primary rompctitors in this 
market--China ( PRC) and Brazil. Historically, the 
TABLE 39.-Japanese Soybean Imports by Country of Origin, 1960-1977. 
China 
Year (PRC) Brazil Others U.S.A. Total U.S.A. 
----·---
1000 Metric Tons percent 
1960 0 11 26* 1,091 1,128 97 
1963 227 0 3 1,314 1,544 85 
1965 376 0 6 1,465 1,847 79 
1968 417 0 2 2,001 2,420 83 
1970 291 0 1 2,952 3,244 91 
1971 283 0 2 2,927 3,212 91 
1972 254 15 3,126 3,396 92 
1973 226 188 11 3,210 3,635 88 
1974 232 82 6 2,924 3,244 90 
1975 240 43 10 3,041 3,334 91 
1976 133 126 8 3,287 3,554 92 
1977 98 58 18 3,428 3,602 95 
*Kenya exported 20,000 MT to Japan. 
Source: (38). 
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PRC has been the chid competitor and since 1962 
has had an official agreement with Japan to supply 
annually designated quantitirs of soybcam. These 
soybeans have largely been used in the food (Natto 
and Miso) industry and have been preferred for that 
usc over other sovbeans. However there have been 
several developm~nts that have ca~sed a decline in 
China's market share. First, and probably most im-
portant, is the fact that the PRC is not really in a posi-
tion to export soybean:;; because the soybeans arc 
needed by the Chinese. Although this docs not mean 
that the PRC will stop exporting soybeans, it prob-
ably doe.~ mean that the recent decline in their market 
~hare will continue. 
Furthermore, the Japanese arc not now so will-
ing to pay the Chinese the high premium that Chinese 
~oyhcans have commanded in the past. The reason 
for this is that U. S. beans, particularly the Amsoy 
and Sorsoy varieties of beans grown in Illinois, Iowa, 
and Minnesota, have proven to he good substitute~ 
for the Chinese beans in Miso. As is the case with 
many foods, consumer taste preference for Miso is 
~uch that consistency in taste is preferred. There-
fore, as Japanese consumers get used to Miso from 
U. S. beans, they will probably develop a preference 
for that taste. Most of the soybeans used for Miso 
have been supplied by a Mitsui-owned elevator in 
Farmer City, Ill., and were shipped with the identity 
preserved. 
On the topic of food soybeans, an expert on the 
Japanese food soybean market ( 84) has expressed 
regret over what he termed a "lack of comprehension" 
on the part of the U. S. and the potentially misleading 
articles that have appeared in the U. S. recently. 
The general nature of the articles has heen that the 
U. S. should do more in the way of research on new 
varieties to capture the Japanese food soybean mar-
ket. This concept demonstrates a misunderstanding 
of the situation since the U. S. already controls ap·· 
proximately 85% of the food market and has had a 
largf' portion of that market for some time. Also, 
there is every indication that the preference for Chi-
nese beans has weakened considerably ( 68, 74, 84). 
Finally, regardless of economics, taste, or other con-
siderations normally made in the purchase of soy-
beans, if China offers to sell Japan some quantity of 
soybeans, Japan will in all likelihood purchase all that 
China has to sell, if only for political reasons. Japan 
docs not want to offend China and it has a diversifi-
cation of supplier policy to maintain. 
The other major U. S. competitor in this market, 
Brazil, is relatively new. Brazil first started to sdl 
soybean>: regularly to Japan in 1972. In spite of all 
the acclaim that Brazilian beans have received, they 
will not move into the Japanese market in sizable 
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quantit]('~ unless the Japan esc government forces 
thf'm on the crushers and this does not seem likely at 
prc~cnt. There arc four reasons for this. First, 
freight rates from Brazil to Japan arc significantly 
higher than from the U. S. to Japan and this results 
in Brazilian beans being higher priced and thus not 
competitive in the Japanese market. Second, soy-
bean crushers prefer U. S. soybeans because Brazil-
ian beans have a red cast to them which the Japan-
esc arc not accustomed to and do not like. Further-
more, as a result of longer shipping time spent at hot 
equatorial temperatures, there is more heat damage 
to the Brazilian beans. Finally, traders contend 
there is more uncertainty connected with the sched-
uled arrival of purchases of Brazilian beans due to 
problems with the weather, the poor inland transpor-
tation system, and the Brazilian govcrnmrnt. This 
is particularly a problem in the Japanese market he-
cause, as noted earlier, the Japanese have minimal 
storage facilities and planned shipments must arrive 
on schedule. 
The fact that Brazilian beans are not competitive 
in the Japanese market docs not imply that Brazilian 
production of soybeans does not affect this market. 
Brazilian soybeans affect it more indirectly than di-
rectly through the effect Brazilian beans have upon 
world supply-demand for soybeans and the world 
price. 
On the topics of dependability, quality, ability 
to meet contracts, and other non-price decision cri-
teria related to the purchase of soybeans, there is no 
argument that the U. S. is excellent. 
With respect to the applicability of the govern-
ment's diversification policy to soybeans, Japan is 
really faced with a world market in which to a large 
extent the U.S. is the major supplier of soybeans and 
the governmmt admits this to he a "fact of life." 
JAPANESE PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSEAS 
INVESTMENT PROJECTS CONCERNING 
SOYBEANS 
Although no large seale agricultural production-
for-export projects have been started to ·produce ex-
dusivcly soybeans, at least 12 Japanese companies 
have invested in overseas projects which affect the 
soybean market (Table 40). These investments have 
been primarily in Malaysia and the Philippines in 
palm oil refining and copra crushing facilities, re-
spectively. Two investments were made in Cana-
dian rapeseed crushing facilities and one in a Bra-
zilian soybean crushing plant. The effects of these 
investments upon the soybean market arc indirect via 
a reduced demand for soybean oil, hut are potentially 
significant since the Japanese investors have made 
commitments to purcha<>e large quantities of the oils 
produced (76). 
(A) 
o-
TABLE 40.-Japan's Overseas Projects Involving Fats and Oils, April 1976. 
Name of Project 
Malaysia International 
Palm Oil Industries 
felda Oil Products 
Palm Oil Product, Malaysia 
Malaysia Vegetable Oil Refinery 
Hume Edible Oil, Ltd.* 
Ben Hwa New Ind., Ltd.t 
Palmco, Inc. 
Legaspe Oil Co., Inc. 
Southern Island Oil Mill Corp, 
llligan Coconuts Ind., Inc. 
Mindanao Coconuts 
Oil Manufacturing Corp.§ 
Capital 
Malaysian 
$7.0 mil 
M. $14.0 mil. 
M. $4.6 mil. 
M. $4.0 mil. 
M. $1.0 mil. 
Pesos 31 mil. 
Pesos 1 2.5 mil. 
Pesos 20.0 mil. 
Pesos 1 0.0 mil. 
Sharehalding 
Pelnas 
Nihon Yushi 
Marubeni 
Felda 
Mitsui 
Asahi Denka 
Tolenganu 
Developers 
General 
C. ltoh 
Fuji Seiyu 
International 
Maritime Corp 
General 
Mitsubishi 
Kao Soap 
Kaneko 
Nisshin Oil 
Mitsubishi 
Kopel Inc. 
Araya Financial 
Clique 
Mitsubishi 
Mr. lim 
Aboitis 
San Miguel 
General 
Fuji Seiyu 
C. ltoh 
Ludon 
Jardin Davis 
Bogo 
Medelin Mil. 
Nichimen 
General 
lnterco 
Marubeni 
Percent 
51 
25 
24 
66 
24 
10 
33 
32 
18 
17 
40 
20 
10 
10 
10 
10 
80 
20 
60 
30 
10 
35 
20 
10 
22 
30 
20 
10 
10 
30 
25 
25 
Factory 
Port Klang 
Panda Malang 
Johore 
Fenggann 
Johore 
Portland US 
1. Davao 
2. legaspe 
3. Cagayandeolo 
Legaspe, 
Mindanao 
Macati, 
Mindanao 
II ligan, 
Mindanao 
Plans 
Palm oil refming, 
manufacturing of 
various kinds of 
edible oils and 
distribution 
Palm oil refining 
and distribution 
Palm 011 refining 
Palm oil refining 
and distribution 
Palm oil refining 
and distribution 
:j: 
Copra crushing 
Copra crushing 
and distribution 
Copra crushing 
and distribution 
Capacity 
4,000 MT/month 
3,000 MT/month 
3,000 MT/month 
5,000 MT/month 
6,000 MT/month 
1. 300 MT/day 
2. 350 MT/day 
3. 300 MT/day 
400 MT/day 
90,000 MT/year 
250 MT/day 
*Sumitomo Shoji obtained rights of palm oil sales to markets in U. S. and Japan in December 197 5 from Hume Edible Oil, Ltd., no investment. Hume Edible Oil, Ltd., is a subsidiary of 
Hume Industry Malaysia [HIM) which invests in palm oil refining in Malaysia. HIM's capacity is 6,000 MT a month. 
tsumitorno Shoji obtained 20% of Ben Hwa New Industries' stocks in November 1975. Location of head offices and factory in Benhoa, Singapore. Refining palm oil, palm kernel oil, 
and coconut oil. Capacity: 1 ,500 MT/month. 
:j:Mitsubishi Shoji has right of sales of 200,000 MT coconut oil and 1 00,000 MT copra meal in international markets. In 197 4 Mitsubishi Shoji obtained 84 % of American Jerome 
Family's stockhaldings. 
§Even though this corporation is registered, this is not established yet. Date of materialization unknown. 
ration)-25% shareholders-is the largest copra exporter in the P. I. and has 11 offices all over the islands. 
by the end of 197 6. 
Location of factory is also unsettled. lnterco (International Copra Export Corpo-
lnterco was planning to build a copra crushing factory of 300 MT/day capac1ty 
w 
"'-1 
Name of Proiect 
Comauta Vegetable 011, Ltd. 
Umted 01lseed Product, Ltd. 
Alberta Foods Product 
Canbra Foods Ltd** 
Canad1an Seed Processortt 
lndustnal E Commeno 
Braz1le1la, S. A 
TABLE 40 (continued).-Japan's Overseas Projects Involving fats and Oils, April 1976. 
Capital 
us $96 000 
Canada 
$2 5 m1l. 
Canada 
$3 0 ffill. 
Cruzeiro 
17 7 
Sharehold1ng 
P T Kamauta 
M1tsub1sh1 
Kao Soap 
K1sshm 01l 
BntJsh 
Columb1a 
Packers 
Umted Gram 
Growers 
M1tsub1sh1 
N1sshm 01l 
Alberta Wheat 
Pool 
C ltoh 
AJmomoto 
Showa Sangyo 
FUJI Se.yu 
S1a De lndustnal 
Gelms Abras 
E Terras:t::t: 
c ltoh 
Apnomoto 
General 
Percent Factory Plans 
49 Amlan, Copra crushmg 
17 Celebes 
17 
17 
lloydmmster, Rapeseed crush1ng 
Alberta 
33 3 
33 3 
23 3 
100 
Fort Saskatchewan Rapeseed crushmg 
60 
15 
15 
8 
2 
Lethbndge 
Canoas, R10 Soybean crushmg, 
Grande do Sui refmmg, and others 
52 
17 
14 
17 
CapaCity 
100 MT/day 
600 MT/day 
600 MT/day 
820 MT/da) 
* *N1ssho lwa1 obtamed 8% of Can bra Foods, Ltd stocks, cap1tal of wh1ch 1s $3 2 mJI and capac1ty of I ,000 MT a day N1ssho Jwa1 s plan IS to 1m port I 0% of crude o1l produced by C F 
ttM1tsu1 Bussan last year reached an agreement w1th Canad1an Seed Processor to attam the F~rst Preference of Sales C S P 1s a subs1d1ary of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
:j::j:S1a De lndustnal Gela1s Abras E Terras was ongmally a construct1on company f!ntered mto the 01l busmess m 1951. 
Source (451. 
GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IN THE 
SOYBEAN MARKET 
Crushing Industry Expansion Policy 
and Administrative Guidance 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fish-
eries ( MAFF) does not control crushing plant expan-
siom; by licensing, but rather utilizes administrative 
guidance. As was the case in the formula feed in-
dustry prior to 1973, there is no government policy 
on soybean crushing plant expansions. However, 
large capacity increases from 1965 through 1974, in 
expectation of large future demand coupled with the 
recession and large losses by the crushers in 1975, re-
sulted in an industry-wide over-capacity situation.n 
At this point the government made it clear that it 
would not approve any new facilities unless they were 
replacing old plant capacity that was to he torn down. 
Since 1973-74, this government administrative guid-
ance has been followed, but there are distinctly two 
different viewpoints of the administrative guidance-
a government one and an industry one. 
The government claims that its administrative 
guidance regarding expansion by the crushing indus-
try was needed because of the obvious over-expansion. 
.\!so, it claims that it is not necessary to have a li-
censing system because of the indirect enforcement. 
The indirect enforcement is primarily in two forms. 
First, the companies follow the guidelines because 
they do not want to be criticized hy others for not do-
ing so. Secondly, if a crusher decides to build a new 
plant without the government's approval, it is likely 
that the company will not he able to borrow the 
needed capital from a bank. Typically, as a result 
of the close business-government relations, a bank 
would sec a non-approved project as a bad risk and 
vice versa. One government official did mention, 
though, that if a soybean processing company re-
quested approval for a plant expansion without re-
placing an old one at this time (December 1978), it 
would probably be approved by the MAFF since most 
of the plant capacity at present is being utilized. 
To the contrary, some industry sources argue 
that the MAFF administrative guidance on plant ex-
pansion is really not relevant to company decision 
makers for a number of reasons: 
• 
• 
• 
The government is lenient in calculating ca-
pacity of scrapped plants which were only on 
the books but not in use. 
Plants can manipulate capacity figures of 
existing facilities. 
It is true that the companies cannot obtain 
loans from government designated hanks 
15ln contrast to the formula feed industry, the capacity figures for 
the soybean crushing industry are based upon 24 hours of operation. 
38 
• 
which typically have a slightly lower interest 
rate. However, it is possible to obtain capi-
tal from commercial banks (and Sogo Shosha 
banks) as long as the project is sound and 
the company's credit is good. 
It is possible to increase present facilities as 
long as no new plants are built. 
It appears that some industry spokesmen fed 
that the government was partially responsible for the 
large losses in 1975 because the industry was follow-
ing government wishes at that time which com-
pounded the problems (and losses). It also needs to 
he pointed out that other sources confirmed that the 
government has very little capacity information on 
the companies, which makes it difficult for the gov-
ernment to administer this type of guidance. Final-
ly, some members of the industry argue that a basic 
change has occurred since the years following World 
War II in that as industry growth and financial 
strength arc increasing, government influence is de-
clining. 
The true situation exists between these two view-
points. It appears that the administrative guidance 
on expamion has largely been followed because it was 
good sound advice. However, if the crushing indus-
try had desired to expand contrary to MAFF wishes, 
it appears that the government would have had much 
more difficulty enforcing these guidelines than it 
would in the formula feed industry. 
Soybean Supply-Demand Conference16 
The Soybean Supply-Demand Conference is a 
conference of government officials, soybean crushers, 
oil proce~sors, and formula feed manufacturers. The 
purpose is to determine the demand for SBM and 
SBO in the coming year and thus the amount of soy-
beans that will be imported to meet the lesser of the 
two demands. The demand estimates are generally 
low because the industry people at the conference 
tend to be conservative. Also, since the soybean 
trade is free, companies may import soybeans to meet 
the demand. Therefore the Soybean Supply-De-
mand Conference really has very little effect on the 
marketplace or the operation of the companies. 
Soybean Supply Stabilization Association 
As a result of the tripling of soybean prices in 
1973 and the U. S. soybean embargo, the Japanese 
government established the Soybean Supply Stabili-
zation Association ( SSSA) as an incorporated entity 
December 26, 1974. The purpose of this organiza-
tion was to stabilize the price and supply of soybeans 
'"The information contained in this section was primarily obtained 
during an interview with an industry spokesman who is in charge of 
purchasing ingredients for one of the large Japanese soybean proces-
sors. 
and in so doing to stabilize the economic life of the 
Japanese people. 
The program became functional in 1975 when 
the SSSA purchased 20,000 MT of soybeans for tra-
ditional foods. In 1976 the government revised the 
policy to stockpile soybeans not only for traditional 
foods but also for crushing, and authorized the SSSA 
to stockpile up to 50,000 MT in 1976. However, no 
new soybeans were purchased and stockpiled in 1976. 
In 1977, SSSA's plan was to have stockpiled a total of 
70,000 MT. The SSSA purchased 49,560 MT of 
soybeans in 1977 and as of December 1977 had 
69,560 MT of soybeans stockpiled. These beans were 
bought with borrowed money on which the MAFF 
through the SSSA pays the interest charges. Fur-
thermore, in 1977 the SSSA was charged by the 
MAFF to research the effect the stockpiling of soy-
beans would have on the quality of the beans. 
According to the SSSA (58), when the price of 
soybeans becomes abnormally high, the stocks of soy-
l>cans will he released. The price of the released 
beans will depend upon the purchase price, world 
price, exchange rates, and the general economic situ-
ation. . \II soybeans stockpiled were stored in silos 
belonging to the crushing industry which arc paid a 
storage fee and each company is assigned a certain 
quantity (Table 41). The companies arc then in-
spected periodically to make certain that they arc not 
using the stockpikd beans. The original SSSA plan 
was to gradually increase the volume of stockpiled 
beans up to a total of 300,000 MT by 1981. This 
seems very unlikely at present. Besides insufficient 
financial resources, the crushing companies all claim 
that 70,000 MT is the limit that they will store. A 
lack of sufficient storage would certainly he a prob-
lem if the SSSA should attempt to increase the qmm-
tity stockpiled. 
A breakdown of the SSSA budget (Table 42) 
gives some insight into the approximate costs of this 
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TABLE 41.-Location of SSSA Stockpiled Soybeans 
by Company, Japan, 1978. 
MT of 
Soybeans 
Name of Company Location Stored 
Ajinomoto and 
Toyo Seiyu Chiba 10,600 
Nisshim Seiyu Yokohama 11.700 
Showa Sangyo Kosh1ma 3,365 
Kobe 5,895 
Nih on Koyu Mizushima 6,500 
Hohnen Seiyu and Nihon Diazu Seiya 3,000 
Yoshiwara Seiyu Zennoh Silo 3,000 
Hohnen Seiyu Shimizu 5,600 
Yoshiwara Seiyu Kobe 5,500 
Rinoru Oils and Fats Nagoya 5,500 
Ajinomoto Yokohama 3,500 
Kato Seiyu Okayama 2,500 
Nikko Yushi Wakamatsu 1,500 
Fiji Seiyu Kobe 1,000 
Yokkaichi Yushi Honshu 400 
Total 69,560 
Source, 158). 
TABLE 42.-Japanese Soybean Supply Stabiliza-
tion Association Budget for Fiscal Year 1977. 
Operating Expenses Million Yen $1,000 
Bank Interest 353.0 1,471 
Research Work 11.0 46 
Storage Cost 781.2 3,254 
Storage Checking 2.2 9 
Insurance 5.4 23 
Administrative Expenses 57.6 240 
Total 1210.4 5,043 
Source: (58). 
stockpiling program. The stockpiled soybeans re-
present a 6-day supply of soybeans. It would appear 
that the ability of this soybean stockpiling program to 
stabilize the price of and supply of soybeans in the 
face of world shortages is insignificant. 
The Japanese Wheat Market 
Domestic wheat production in Japan has been 
on a downward trend, which has been the case with 
most other major crops except rice. There arc a 
number of reasons for this decrease. Probably the 
most important reason is that the production of wheat 
i<> less profitable than rice. Using Japanese govern-
ment cost estimates, the net revenues per acre from 
rice and wheat for 1976 were $1777 and $504, respec-
tively. As a result, imports of wheat have been in-
creasing to keep pace with the growing demand. 
USES OF WHEAT 
The demand for wheat arises primarily from a 
demand for wheat processed for human food con-
sumption. The usc of wheat as an animal feed is 
largely as a milling by-product (Table 43). 
Since there are a number of varieties of wheat, 
it is important to explain that all the domestically pro-
duced wheat in Japan is analogous to red winter 
wheat. The domestic wheat is of generally poorer 
quality than imported varieties as a result of a lower 
density, higher ash content, and thicker husks. Thr 
thicker husks arc more difficult to remove, resulting 
in a lower milling yield. This wheat is med exclu-
~ivcly for making J apancsc noodles. The 1985 gov-
ernment production projections were developed with 
the goal of domestic wheat supplying 60% of thr 
wheat required by the Japanese noodle industry. 
Food Use 
The consumption levels of wheat are currently 
the center of much discussion and debate in Japan in 
connection with the decreasing rice consumption. 
The daily per capita caloric consumption in Japan 
categorized by foodstuffs is shown in Table 44. As 
discussed in a previous section, rice has been and still 
is the most important crop and foodstuff in Japan. 
It is also one of the few foods for which Japan is 
100'/r self-sufficient. It is, therefore, the govern-
ment's and in particular the Food Agency's wish that 
rice production be encouraged (as it is) and that all 
the rice produced be consumed. However, sinrc 
1960 rice consumption has declined by 303.6 calories 
per person per day or 27%. 
This decrease in rice comumption has occurred 
during a period of dramatic dietary diversification 
and growth of food consumption in Japan. Con-
~umption of meat, oils and fats, dairy products, fruit, 
and ~ugar has increased 959, 427, 475, 330, and 
207%, respectively, since 1955. During this time 
consumption of all grains decreased by 19'/r, but con-
sumption of wheat increased by 72.3 calories or 30%. 
However, the government gives the impression 
through official communications that it feels the in-
crease in wheat consumption is largely responsible for 
the decrease in the amount of rice consumed (even 
though this argument leaves 303.6- 72.3 = 241.3 
calories unexplained). The government is presently 
using this argument to justify its present limitation of 
increased wheat imports to the rate of population 
growth. 
At present, future total wheat consumption is 
expected to increase at the same pace as population 
growth (approximately 1% ) and per capita wheat 
consumption is expected to level off. Since the gov-
ernment control~ the wheat market, it is possible for 
the government to limit any growth in per capita con-
~umption. The government, however, claims that it 
recognizes that a person's preference for one food ovrr 
another is a fundamental right; thus, it docs not in-
tend to force a particular diet upon the Japanese 
people. Instead, the Food Agency (which controls 
all wheat imports) is carefully watching the people's 
preferences so imports can be adjusted to meet only 
basic demands. 
TABLE 43.-Wheat Consumption by Use, Japan, 1960-1976. 
Sale Percent Beginning Total Food of 
Year Stocks Supply Food Feed Total Total 
1 000 Metnc Tons 
1960 840 4,212 2,760 488 3,248 85 
1965 794 5,033 3,242 900 4,142 78 
1970 796 5,629 3,739 1,267 5,006 75 
1972 581 5,984 3,973 1,279 5,252 76 
1974 613 6,216 4,166 1,213 5,379 77 
1975 837 6,669 4,500 1,185 5,685 79 
1976 984 6,540 4,251 1,180 5,431 78 
1977 4,375 1,300 5,675 77 
Source: {22). 
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Year 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Year 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
TABLE 44.-Daily per Capita Calorie Consumption, Japan, 1955-1977. 
Total 
Consumption 
2153 0 
2289.7 
2411.0 
2478.1 
2480.5 
2514.6 
2521.5 
2488.6 
2466.1 
2482.6 
2489.6 
Fruit 
17.2 
28.9 
38.8 
53.4 
52.4 
61.8 
60.3 
56.4 
58.1 
55.0 
56.9 
Meat 
12.7 
27.5 
53.7 
83.1 
92.8 
100.9 
108.1 
109.0 
111.6 
117.4 
126.9 
Rice 
986.6 
1105.5 
1075.7 
914.3 
892.7 
879.9 
872.8 
862.8 
844.4 
829.3 
801.9 
Wheat 
Eggs 
14.0 
26.9 
49.4 
63.5 
63.3 
62.1 
61.5 
59.9 
59.8 
60.9 
61.7 
236.8 
250.6 
281.9 
298.5 
300.0 
299.7 
300.1 
302.1 
305.3 
308.4 
309.1 
Total 
Grains 
Potatoes 
and 
Tuber 
Crops 
Starch 
Foods Beans Vegetables 
Colones/Person/Day -~~---------------------------1406.7 
1438.5 
1397.5 
1287.7 
1219.9 
1202.9 
1197.0 
1186.8 
1174.6 
1163.7 
1136.7 
Milk 
and 
Dairy 
Products 
137.2 
81.5 
53.6 
38.8 
40.0 
40.6 
39.1 
37.8 
38.7 
39 8 
41.8 
Fish 
Calories/Person/Day 
19.4 63.6 
35.9 86.6 
60.7 
81.0 
81.8 
83.6 
85.1 
83.7 
85.9 
88.1 
92.2 
89 9 
91.3 
95.3 
95.3 
98.3 
100.3 
103 1 
105 2 
100.8 
32.7 
59.9 
76.4 
74.8 
71.9 
73 3 
71.9 
69.1 
69.5 
81.3 
85.2 
Sugar 
132.9 
157.2 
196.3 
282.7 
280.2 
294.0 
294.9 
276.7 
262.6 
265.2 
275.4 
94.5 
104.4 
97.5 
104.4 
105.4 
103.7 
103.0 
99.7 
99.1 
94.2 
92.7 
Oils 
and 
Fats 
67.5 
105.0 
161.0 
228.9 
237.8 
258.1 
269.7 
277.2 
276.6 
283.0 
288.8 
52.5 
84.1 
89.4 
93.4 
95.5 
94.1 
87.9 
89.4 
86.7 
87.5 
90.6 
Other 
Food 
102.1 
53.2 
46.9 
45.1 
44.2 
44.2 
44.7 
42.6 
39.8 
41.3 
39.9 
------------------------
Source: (25). 
Fiscal 
Year 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
TABLE 45.-Total Wheat Flour Production by Use, Japan, 1955-1977. 
Bread 
667.6 
771.5 
996.9 
1,034.7 
1,097.1 
1,080.5 
1,142.1 
1,154.1 
1,167.4 
1,246.0 
1,306.4 
1,306.5 
1,410.5 
1,406.4 
1,420.0 
*Included with other for 1955-1968. 
Sources: (22, 82). 
Noodles 
874.2 
1,022.5 
1,166.8 
1 ,291.7 
1,269.8 
1,335.5 
1 ,298.7 
1,304.0 
1,332.9 
1,377.0 
1,446.8 
1,415.8 
1,448.5 
1,446.6 
1,330.0 
Cakes 
277.2 
316.3 
402.7 
451.4 
463.1 
480.4 
482.3 
464.2 
467.0 
457.4 
488.5 
485.4 
559.1 
531.0 
560.0 
41 
Industrial 
Products 
1000 Metnc Tons 
83.4 
98 0 
108.3 
90.0 
91.9 
115.5 
104.3 
84.0 
113.5 
119.1 
126.8 
119 7 
122.5 
----~~--------------~~-
Household* 
130.7 
137.2 
134.0 
117.0 
150.6 
141.2 
175.9 
170.6 
Other 
261.7 
177.1 
313.0 
344.8 
373.3 
368.7 
220.7 
238.0 
277.4 
272.1 
241.3 
230.9 
282.1 
277.0 
650.0 
Total 
Production 
2,080 7 
2,370 9 
2,977.5 
3,234.0 
3,294.2 
3,357.1 
3,389.9 
3,401.7 
3,462.8 
3,583.0 
3,752.6 
3,706.7 
3,995.9 
3,954.1 
3,960.0 
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HARD WHEATS 
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American Northern Spring \. // J ___ --=-- ...,...----------, 
\ / ,...- - - - - - - ~ Canadian Western No. 1 1 / -- - L_--------~ 
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Canadian Western Red No. 2 \ / / A-
Australian Prime Hard 
DURUM 
Canadian Hard Amber Ourum 
American Hal'd Amber Durum 
SEMI-HARD 
American Hard Winter (Ordinary) 
American Hard Winter (Semi-Hard) 
South Austra I ian Hard (II. 5. Protei 
Argentina Duro, Semi-Duro 
ORDINARY 
Australian Soft Wheat 
American Soft Wheat 
Domestic >lheat 
SOFT 
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OTHER USES 
The flour milling industry counters thi-; hy re-
questing more wheat than the government is willing 
to supply. In thc opinion of many of the traders and 
a~sociation staff, the government is kccping the supply 
of wheat very tight. Opinions are mixed as to how 
much additional wheat the Japanese people would 
consume if the governme-nt relaxed import constraints 
or reduced the resale price to world levels. 
As was discussed earlier, wheat is imported pri-
marily for human consumption. The wheat im-
ported as food wheat is milled at a flour extraction 
rate of 78% vs. the feed-wheat flour extraction rate 
of 45:/c. Flour from feed wheat is also used for hu-
man consumption, with the only difference the extrac-
tion rate. The uses of the flour produced from the 
wheat are given in Table 45. 
The growth in production of all types of proces-
sed wheat flour products ha~ been almost 100% since 
1955. It should he recognized that within each of 
the broad classes of products, there are many differ-
ent products. Furthermore, different varieties of 
wheat arc used in the production of the different 
products. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
There is a significant difference between rural 
and urban consumption patterns. Urban people 
consume about the same amounts of bread and 
noodles; however, bread consumption IS mcrcasing. 
Rural people consume more noodles; therefore, as 
morc people migrate to urban areas and as the popu-
larity of hread increases, it is likely that there will he 
changes in the rdati\'e proportion of wheats used in 
\'arious products. 
Feed Wheat 
Approximately 22% of the wheat consumed in 
Japan is considered feed wheat. The feed wheat 
market is a somewhat complicated market. Of the 
1.3 million MT of feed wheat in 1977, approximately 
130,000 MT were used directly in mixed animal feeds. 
The other 1 million MT plus were milled at an ex-
traction rate of 45% flour, which leaves 55% wheat 
bran that is used in animal feeds. 
The wheat used for animal feed directly has been 
primarily Australian standard white and "off grade'' 
varieties (Table 46), although some of this wheat 
came from Canada, France, and Argentina. 
Two types of mills are designated by the govern-
ment to mill feed wheat at the special extraction rate.; 
The first system was started in February 1958 and is· 
called the "Senkan" system and the mills are called 
Scnkan mills. The Senkan mills are small operations, 
and can mill only feed wheat at general flour mills 
TABLE 46.-Types of Imported Wheat Sold for Mixed Feed in Japan, 1955-1977. 
Australian Dark 
Calendar Manitoba Manitoba Hard Wheat Standard Australia Northern High 
Year Total No. S No. 6 (Ordinary) White Off-grade French Spring Argentina Protein 
1 ,000 Metnc Tons 
1955 58 7 16 7 28 
1956 17 8 3 6 
1957 50 5 43 2 
1958 58 11 46 
1959 67 2 6 41 18 
1960 74 1 17 66 
1961 59 3 56 
1962 38 38 
1963 27 27 
1964 23 6 5 11 
1965 6 6 
1966 10 8 
1967 13 4 3 6 
1968 9 8 
1969 24 2 7 15 
1970 136 10 124 2 
1971 113 5 JOB 
1972 127 127 
1973 119 29 52 37 
1974 31 2 24 5 
1975 5 5 
1976* 58 
1977* 132 
------·--· 
*The breakdown by wheat type was not available for 197 6 and 1977. 
Sources: {22, 34). 
43 
Gl 
... 
Gl 
c 0 g &. ~ ~ 
Cl 
.... 
Gl 
..c 
-
.5 
"U 
Gl 
... 
::;) 
-Cl Gl 
..c 
~ 
"U 
~ 0 1'-
a. : 
.E 
... 
0 
00 
"'"' 
"'"' 
"'"' 
M<'> 
M M 
"'"' 
... "' 
ci 0 
zz 
c c 
.!l.!l 
~ .e .E ] ·c: ·c: 
6~~ 
u 
C') CXl CXl 
C') 0 0 
... "' "' 
CXl 0 "' CXl M N 
"' "' "' 
M 
ro 
M 
... 
0 
... 
"' M 
0 
"' 
"' 
"' -o 
M 
"' 
1() 
... 
"' 
"' M 
"' 
M <'< 
0 
"' 
"' 
" 
-o 
" 
"' 
" 
"' ... 
"'"' 1() -o 
... "' 
-o -o 
"" "' M M 
0 
"' 
0 
-o 
0 
"' 
;; 
0 
o. 
C') 
"' 
"' 
C') 
"' 
"' 
44 
(mill" which also mill food wheat) which is called the 
"Zosan" system. This system was started in 1959. 
In order to assure adequate production of bran and 
to make the financial expense worthwhile, operation of 
this system is kept under tight government control, 
including administrative guidance in marketing ( 5). 
The different types of wheat used in these programs 
are given in Table 47. 
The bran produced via the Senkan and Zosan 
systems was originally used almost entirely for dairy 
feeds, hut it is now used in the production of other 
animal feeds as well. At present 43 o/r is used in 
dairy feeds, 227c, in beef, 15/'c in poultry and 20% 
in hog feeds. 
The flour produced by this program 1s food 
grade and of uniform quality. Some of the flour is 
sold in this pure form directly to processors, hut most 
of it is used for mixing with other flours to obtain 
the desired product characteristics. 
THE WHEAT PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
After World War II, rapid restoration of the do-
mestic flour milling industry resulted in 3,000 small 
mills being brought into operation. Most of these 
mills had outmoded and inefficient equipment and 
produced a lower quality flour ( 5). As Japan re-
covered more fully, new efficient plants were con-
structed which produced a better quality flour at low 
cost. This led to a growing inability on the part of 
the smaller mills to remain competitive. In 194 7, 
there were 4,490 flour mills; this number had de-
creased to 236 in 1978. 
There arc a number of additional reasons for the 
changes in the structure of the flour milling industry. 
Prior to 1946, almost all wheat milled by Japanese 
flour mills was produced domestically. After 1946. 
an increasing amount of the wheat was imported until 
today domestic wheat only accounts for 47c of con-
sumption. Prior to 1946, most of the flour mills were 
located in the interior of Japan where the wheat sup-
ply was located. However, since that time most of 
the new mills have been located in port areas in order 
to take advantage of transportation economies, etc. 
associated with the imported wheat. This acceler-
ated the closing of many of the smaller mills. The 
present structure of the flour milling industry as well 
as the structure in 1968 are illustrated in Table 48. 
Those mills with a daily capacity greater than 
200 MT represent 20% of all mills, hut they produce 
more than 70% of the flour and operate at an opera-
tional ratio of 63.7%, higher than any other capacity 
group. Also, those mills with less than 50 MT ca-
pacity I day are characterized by sporadic operations 
as is evident from the operational ratio. In this case, 
milling capacity is defined as normal output when 
TABLE 48.-The Number of Flour Mills,* Capacity, and Production by Mill Capacity, Japan, 1968-1978. 
Milling No. Milling Actual 
Capacity of Mills, Milling Capacity, Actual Production, 
per Day No. of Percent Capacity,t 
Operational 
Percent Production, t Percent Ratio,:f: (MT) Year Mills of Total 1000 MT of Total 1000 MT of Total Percent 
Less than 20 1978 83 35.2 117 1.2 13 0.2 11.1 
1968 204 50.9 330 3.7 28 0.7 8.5 
20- 50 1978 11 4.7 102 1.1 15 0.3 15.7 
1968 48 12.0 416 4.6 53 1.3 12.7 
50-100 1978 38 16.1 839 8.8 342 6.2 40.8 
1968 71 17.7 1,492 16.6 363 8.7 24.3 
100-150 1978 37 15.7 1,305 13.8 635 11.5 48.7 
1968 26 6.5 920 10,3 363 8.7 39.5 
150-200 1978 20 8.5 1,020 10.8 615 11.2 60.3 
1968 14 3.5 693 7.7 314 7.6 45.3 
Greater than 200 1978 47 19.9 6,104 64.3 3,887 70.6 63.7 
1968 38 9.5 5,112 57.0 3,030 73.0 59.3 
Total 1978 236 100.0 9,487 100.0 5,507 100.0 58.1 
1968 401 100.0 8,963 100.0 4,151 100.0 46.3 
----- ---~----·------- ·------~---------------------- --·-----
*This table excludes Senhan mills, which process only feed wheat. 
tMtlling Capacity and Actual Production are defmed as rated capo c1ty and actual output for a 24-hour day and 25 days per month. 
:j:The operational ratio is calculated by dividing the production of flour by the milling capacity. 
Sources: (26, 46). 
operating 24 hours per day, 25 days per month. 
Therefore, those mills with less than 50 MT capacity 
arc operating less than 3 days per month or 2.5 hours 
per day. 
As is the case with the formula feed industry and 
the soybean processing industry, the flour milling in-
dustry is highly concentrated. The four largest com-
panics own 15 7c of the flour mills and produce 62.7% 
of this flour in Japan (Table 49). There arcanum-
ber of reasons for this concentration. The companies 
which arc large today were more aggressive and pro-
gressive than companies which did not grow as large 
in the past. These companies were able to create 
and secure stable markets for their products and tore-
duce costs through marketing and plant expansions 
at coastal facilities. These companies also developed 
better management personnel and acquired access to 
capital markets which helped to provide the funds 
necessary for expansion. The four largest flour mil-
lers are listed in Table 50, along with some pertinent 
statistics concerning each company. It is not sur-
prising that three of the four belong to a Sogo Shosha. 
TABLE 49.-Production of Flour and Production Capacity by Company Size, 1973-1977. 
------- - -- ·-·---------------- -·-·-
-~ ~-~~ 
--- ----------- ------
Daily Percent of 
Production Total Daily Actual Percent Percent of 
Companies Capacity, Production Production, of Actual Number of Total Number 
Year by Size MT Capacity 1000 MT Production Companies of Companies 
1973 Largest Four* 15,893 51.9 2,358 62.8 4 1.9 
Others 14,755 48.1 1,395 37.2 205 98.1 
Total 30,648 100.0 3,753 100.0 209 100.0 
1974 Largest Four* 16,246 52.6 2,349 63.4 4 2.0 
Others 14,632 47.4 1,358 36.6 199 98.0 
Total 30,878 100.0 3,707 100.0 203 100.0 
1975 Lafgest Four* 16,300 52.4 2,556 64.0 4 2.0 
Others 14,792 47.6 1,440 36.0 199 98.0 
Total 31,092 100.0 3,996 100.0 203 100.0 
1976 Largest Four* 16,7 69 53.0 2,478 62.7 4 2.1 
Others 14,878 47.0 1,476 37.3 189 97.9 
Total 31,647 100.0 3,954 100.0 193 100.0 
1977 largest Four* 16,508 52.4 2,489 62.7 4 2.1 
Others 14,999 47.6 1,481 37.3 187 97.9 
Total 31,507 100.0 3,970 100.0 191 100.0 
----------
*The largest four flour milling companies are: N1sshin Seifun, Nippon Se1fun, Showa Sangio, and Nitta Seifun. 
Source: (37). 
45 
TABLE 50.-lnformation on the Four Largest Wheat Processing Companies as 
of March 31, 1978. 
Nisshin Nippon Showa Nitto 
Seifun Seifun Sanglo Seifun 
Relative ranking 2 3 4 
Production of 
wheat flour (MT) 1,217,401 819,251 386,843 163,693 
Number of flour mills 16 12 4 3 
Silo storage capacity (MT) 221,536 128,156 219,387 35,236 
Member Sogo Shosha Fuyo Mitsui * Mitsubishi 
Year established 1907 1896 1936 1898 
Total assets (million yen) 93,435 50,399 80,586 * 
Number of employees 2,983 1,526 1,735 315 
Total annual sales 
(million yen) 221,000 105,000 135,000 20,623 
Wheat flour as 
percent of toto I soles 61 91 24 84 
*Indicates that the information was not available from the sources listed below. 
Sources: (27, 37, 62). 
The past 5 years have seen relatively little change 
in the concentration of the flour milling industry. 
This is probably due to the government wheat alloca-
tion system which the industry claims is constraining 
consumption and which is operated in a manner that 
maintains the status quo. This allocation system is 
explained in greater detail later in this section. 
WHEAT IMPORTS AND 
U. S. MARKET POSITION 
Imports of wheat and wheat equivalent products 
have increased more than 150% since 1955 (Table 
51). This has been the result of U. S. PL-480 ship-
ments in the 1950's, dietary diversification which was 
possible because of higher incomes, declining domes-
tic production, and increasing populations. 
The importation of wheat is controlled entirely 
by the Japanese Food Agency.17 Registered Japan-
esc trading firms merely handle the administrative de-
tails of securing the wheat; i.e., they obtain price 
quotes from suppliers, arrange for actual shipment, 
etc.1 ' The flow of wheat in Japan is illustrated in 
Figure 7. As is the case with other commodities, the 
larger trading firms dominate the importation of 
wheat; however, since the importation is controlled 
hy the Food Agency, this is really an irrelevant point. 
Japan primarily purchases wheat from three 
countries, the U. S., Canada, and Australia (Tables 
11The importation of wheat and associated government control 
is discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
"'The only exception to the wheot import control by the Food 
Agency is that if wheat is being imported in order to be processed 
for export, it is then not under the control of the government. 
TABLE 51.-Total Japanese Imports of Wheat and Wheat Flour in Wheat 
Equivalent, by Quantity and Value, 1955-1977. 
Wheal Wheat and Wheat Flour in Wheat Equivalent 
Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Year (1000 MT) ($1000) (1000 MTJ ($1000) 
1955 2,288 * 2,333 * 
1960 2,678 176,870 2,783 183,730 
1962 2,562 180,940 2,665 187,690 
1964 3,592 262,020 3,646 265,330 
1966 3,917 278,770 3,917 278,830 
1968 4,073 289,410 4,073 289,430 
1970 4,885 318,390 4,685 318,440 
1971 4,872 347,113 4,872 347,151 
1972 5,149 361.513 5,150 361,554 
1973 5,386 658,961 5,386 659,008 
1974 5,377 1,206,920 5,377 1,206,954 
1975 5,654 1,117,094 5,654 1,117,131 
1976 5,827 1.053,921 5,827 1,053,958 
1977 5,676 748,340 5,676 749,377 
*Values far 1955 were not reported. 
Source: (67). 
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.f6, + 7, and 52). These countries produce the ma-
jority of the world's exportable wheat. As far as 
competition between the countries is concerned, Can-
ada and Australia export different types of wheat 
which do not compete in the same end-use markets . 
. \ustralia primarily exports soft wheats and Canada 
exports hard wheats. However, the U. S. exports 
both hard and soft wheats and thus U. S. wheat is in 
competition with both Canadian wheat and Austra-
lian wheat. 
Over the last 20 years, the U. S. share of the 
Japanese wheat market has steadily increased (Fig-
ure 8). Wheat Associates personnel believe that in 
the future the U. S. will maintain its market share at 
55-601/c. The annual variations in the U. S. mar-
ket share arc largely due to fluctuations in wheat pro-
duction in Australia and Canada. Once again, the 
(
Ul[: It 1> not requ11·ed (s1nce 1076) for 
fat·mel'> to se 11 to the government. However, 
ince the yovernrnent resale price is lower· 
than purchase price (this has been the case 
ince 1955), the farmers have continued to 
ell all the wheat to the government. 
A!'nves a l Impor·t Elevator 
(Gov~rnment Design) 
( Jheat tor L1vestoc1t Feed) (40/45 Extraction 
J., 
All wheat is purchased by and in1tially under 
the conttol of the Food Agency. Howevet', 
feed wheat, after importation, is sold under· 
the provisions of the Feed Supply and Stabi-
lization Law and is administered by the 
Ll VCSTOCK BUREAU 
I ( Place ot Sale is the Same ~- -- - -
U. S. ha:o. been delegated the role of residual supplier. 
At present Japan has import agreements with 
both Canada and Australia. These agreements call 
for Japan to import approximately 1.4 million MT 
from Canada and 1.0 million MT from Australia. 
The agreements basically set out annual target 
amounts of wheat to be purchased, do not involve top 
Food Agency officials, and are to secure a stable sup-
ply of wheat. Since the Abe-Butz Agreement of 
1975 ran out in 1978, the U.S. has not had an agree-
ment with Japan on wheat. 
As a result of the turmoil in the wheat markets 
in 1972, Japan entered into the agreements mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. However, recently there 
has been more emphasis on a world or multilateral 
trade agreement between wheat exporting countries 
and wheat importing countries. This sort of agree-
) (riOTE: Irnpotts a r·e under· the com- ) 
\t'lete control of the Food Agency, 
vJhed t Wl th IILH'-) 
mal Extr·acti on 
Rates 
\
Imported wheat 1 s sold from port~ 
__ - --- side warehouses and domestic wheat 
from its area o1 production. 
( As for transfer· or not durin~ the }- -\It should also be noted that the par) sale of wheat to the flour mill, the -- - - _ _ _ _ s1de war~houses for vlheat are govern-
sar1e holds tru . - -- - m~nt des1gnated warehouses and very 
e 1 l1kely may be owned by the flour 
miller. Therefore, this sale of 
wheat from the government to the mi 11 er 
may or may not 1 i nvo 1 ve actua 1 trans fet· 
of the wheat. 'IV 
Flour 11ill - - - -([1ay be the Same :n11 )- -- - r----. 
(Wheat Bran 
First fJholesaler 
Second tiho 1 esa 1 el' 
Noodles, Pastries, etc. 
FIG. 7.-The flow of wheat in Japan. 
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ment has been negotiated under the auspices of the 
U.N.C.T.A.D. These negotiations have dealt with 
stock level schemes in both producing and consuming 
countries as well as price levels. If a multilateral 
agreement should he reached, bilateral agreements 
would not he necessary. 
GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IN THE 
JAPANESE WHEAT MARKET 
Government Purc'hase of Imported Wheat 
The Japanese government through its Food 
Agency purchases and controls all imported wheat 
for domestic consumption. The quantity of wheat 
(or quota) that the government decides to purchase 
and import each year is determined by a process of 
developing an annual supply-demand program for 
the coming year. This program is developed by 
wheat types and varieties. In the course of deter-
mining the quantities of each wheat variety to be im-
ported, various factors arc taken into consideration. 
These factors include estimates of demand hy wheat 
type (these estimates are determined by the historical 
uses of the wheat), availability of wheat by type in 
various supplier countries, the supply and demand 
conditions for rice, warehousing conditions, and bi-
lateral agreements with exporting countries. 
The Food Agency docs not purchase wheat di-
rectly from exporters in forrign countries, but instead 
purchases arc made from government designated 
wheat importers who in turn have purchased wheat of 
the desired quality, type, and description from the ex-
porters. These designated wheat importers also take 
rare of all the freight, marine insurance, and other 
details so that the price the Food Agency pays is CIF, 
Japan, plus unloading charges. 
Whrn imported wheat is to be purchased, the 
Food Agency informs registered importers of the con-
ditions set forth for the purchase at the beginning of 
each term of the purchase. The conditions includr 
items such as source of wheat, producing year, variety 
or class, grades, terms governing purchase of wheat 
TABLE 52.-lmports of Japanese Wheat by Type of Wheat and Sources, 1973-1977.* 
Food 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Metr1c Tons 
··---------
U.S.A. 
Western White 1,226,344 1 ,029,184 964,310 1,063,380 1 '161 ,318 
SRW 0 0 0 0 0 
Hard Winter, 13% 306,384 447,468 405,830 459,338 465,834 
Hard Winter, 11.5% 512,226 451,966 404,784 391,546 456,550 
Hard Winter, ordinary 45,900 0 0 0 0 
(Dark) Northern Spring, 14% 411,842 778,968 635,684 600,051 642,920 
Hard Amber Dvrum #2 30,550 29,500 31,450 52,100 50,000 
U. S. Total 2,533,246 2,737,086 2,442,058 2,566,415 2,776,622 
Canada 
1CW, 13.5%/12.5% 267,467 601,642 313,300 0 0 
1CW/2CS, 13.5%/12.5% 0 211,942 1,029,278 0 0 
1CW, 13% 0 0 0 0 0 
lCW, 13.5% 1 ,427,462 573,926 0 334,626 246,668 
1CW/2CW, 13.5% 0 0 0 981,175 1,047,772 
1CW, 14% 0 0 0 0 0 
2CW, 13.5% 0 300 0 0 0 
Durum #2 3,600 20,500 0 0 0 
Utility #1 (Pictic) 10 0 0 0 0 
Uti11ty #1 (Glen lea) 10 0 0 0 0 
Canada Total 1,698,549 1,408,310 1.342,578 1,315,801 1,294,440 
Australia 
FAQ/ASW, West/Victoria 0 294,951 254,084 0 0 
FAQ, West 72,142 0 0 0 0 
FAQ, Victoria 11,500 0 50,000 0 0 
Austrialia· Victoria Soft 0 0 0 0 0 
PH, 13%/14% 0 65,742 0 0 0 
FAQ, NSW 0 0 0 0 0 
ASW 0 0 0 212,426 249,768 
Austral1a Total 83,642 360,693 304,084 212,426 249,768 
Food Total 4,315,437 4,506,039 4,088,720 4,094,642 4,320,830 
• Purchase quantity on tender basis (Japanese fiscal year, Aprii·March). 
Source: (83). 
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at reduced prkes, penalties, insurance, and default 
of shipping period. 
This notification is given not later than 2 days 
before the accepted date of the sales application which 
is usually every Wednesday between 2:00 and 2:30 
p.m. The importers then submit to the Food Agency 
a sales application for imported wheat based on the 
Food Agency specifications. The Food Agency se-
lects the seller whose offering price meets the target 
purchase price range and is among the lowest tender 
prices. The Food Agency is not required by law to 
take the lowest tender and uses some discretion in the 
selection. The Food Agency then enters into a sales 
contract with the seller or importer within 1 0 days fol-
lowing the tender. This contract explicitly stipulates 
all terms of sale. 
In contrast to the Japanese imports of feed grains 
and soybeans, the average "unexplained difference" 
for 1 month lagged shipments of imported Japanese 
wheat is a positive $2.53 and is $3.31 higher than the 
unexplained difference for shipments of wheat to the 
Netherlands (Table 53). The govemment control-
led system of importation of wheat in Japan would 
seem to he less efficient than the basically free mar-
ket import system for feed grains and soybeans. 
Setting a Target Purchase Price 
The law concerning imports of wheat specifics 
that the Food Agency ::;hall set an estimated target 
purchase price for wheat in advance of any purchaseR. 
This target price must include all expenditures by the 
importer in the fulfillment of their contract to deliver 
the wheat to specified Japanese ports. The target price 
covers the total F.O.B. price, freight rate, marine in-
:mrance, interest, shortages, harbor charges, and im-
porter's commission. 
The freight rate is hased upon a single unloading 
of an 18,000 MT ship and deviations from these stan-
dards arc accounted for. The importer's commission 
is a fixed commission estimated as the expenditure of 
the importer which is required for importing wheat 
( 5). 
Registration and Qualifications of Importers 
The Food Agency registers wheat importers each 
year under regulations initially established in 195 7 in 
order to exclude inexperienced, unreliable, and un-
faithful importers from the list of authorized contrac-
tors. After being screened, importers are registered 
with the Food Agency as eligible importers and im-
porters must re-register each year during the period 
March 1 through 15. The applicants must then meet 
the following qualifications ( 5) : 
• 
• 
• 
• 
They should he grain importers by trade . 
They should he joint stock companies with 
paid-up capital of more than 100 million yen 
and the importers must possess a guarantee 
from a financial organization that they will 
he able to obtain sufficient fund<; necessary 
to import grain. 
The importer shall have a main or branch 
office in Tokyo manned by no less than six 
J apaneRe officers and staff members who arc 
experienced in the grain import business and 
have actually engaged in such business. 
The importers must have Japanese officer<; 
or staff memhers with import experience sta-
TABLE 53.-Wheat: Unit Values and Freight Rates at Various Marketing levels from U.S. Farmers to Dutch 
and Japanese Importers, Market Years 1969-70 to 1974-75. 
----- ----------- ---
-------- - - - -
Item 69-10 70-71 71-72 72-73 73-74 14-15 
Dollars per Metric Ton 
(1} Unit value received by U. S. farmers* 45.93 48.87 49.23 64.67 145.14 150.28 
(2} Implicit U. S. inland freight +11.61 + 11.75 +12.34 +8.20 +6.38 +26.11 
(3) Total U. S. export unit value of wheat 57.54 60.62 61.58 72.87 151.52 176.39 
(4) U. S. export unit value to Japan 57.13 59.38 61.28 82.10 162.40 186.82 
(5) Ocean freight to Japan 10.31 10.85 4.93 10.34 25.30 14.34 
(6) Japanese import unit valuet 65.16 69.92 67.61 90.58 172.48 218.54 
(7) Unexpla1ned difference -2.28 -0.31 +1.40 -1.86 -15.22 +17.38 
(8) Japanese import unit value lagged 1 month 66.09 70.36 67.48 94.92 186.97 214.53 
[9) Unexplained difference -1.35 +0.13 +1.27 +2.48 -0.73 +13.37 
---- ----------
*Unit value is the weighted season average price. 
tin Japanese yen/metric ton: 1969-70, 23.442; 1970-71, 25, 154; 1971·72, 21 ,734; 1972·73, 25,955; 1973-74, 48,706; 1974-75, 
64,577. 
Note: Lines 3, 7, and 9 have been developed from the information in the tobias as follows: 
Source: (7). 
Line [3) = (1) + (2) 
Line [7} = [6) - [(4) + {5)] 
line [9) = [8) - [[4) + [5)] 
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tioned in the principal countries (U. S., .\us-
tralia, Canada) exporting grain to Japan for 
a specified tcrm of service. 
• The importer or person in his employment 
shall have no past record of being punished 
for violations of the Foodstuff Control Law, 
the Price Control Ordinance, or laws gov-
erning import and export control. 
Importer Share System 
In order to prevent excessive competition among 
importers purchasing foreign wheat and in order to 
insure reasonable and smooth import operations, an 
importer share system was instituted. A share is 
allocated to each importer, and each importer's maxi-
mum sales to the Food Agency are calculated by mul-
tiplying that share times the total quantity to he im-
ported. 
The specifics of the present share system were 
formulated in 1960 and it is called a merit system. 
If an importer sells wheat to the Food Agency at a 
cheaper rate than expected, his share is increased. 
When this situation occurs, the importer's share is in-
creased by a prrcentage which is calculated from a 
formula which usc<; the target price, other tender 
prices, and quantity involved. 
Wheat Stock Levels 
In order to insure a stable supply of wheat, the 
Food Agency attempts to maintain a "comfortable" 
supply of wheat in stock, while making arrangements 
for a stable supply in the exporting countries. The 
domestic stocks of wheat necessary for smooth opera-
tions arc considered to be a 1.7-month supply; how-
ever, the Food Agency has decided as a matter of pol-
icy to maintain stocks at a 2.3-month supply level. 
The government has had difficulty accomplishing 
these levels because of a shortage of storage space. 
In fact, the actual stock levels maintained in 1973, 
1974, and 1975 were only 1.1, 1.6, and 1.8 months' 
supply, respectively. Since 1976 the Food Agency 
has stored considerably more grain at inland ware-
houses and has promoted the construction of port-
side elevators, with the result that stocks of nearly a 
2.3-month requirement have been maintained. 
As a stock policy, the government is considering 
the possibility of increasing wheat stocks to a 3.0-
month supply by 1980. This decision must consider 
TOTAL CAPACITY 4,015,000 MT 
(Apnl 1, lq77) 
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FIG. 9.-Japanese grain silo capacity by region and sector. 
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the international wheat ~ituation, warehouse capacity, 
and new construction of port-side elevators ( 6). Fur-
thermore, storage space for wheat must compete for 
the limited space with other commodities, most no-
tably feed grains and soybean<~. Figure 9 illu<~trates 
the location and amounts of storage hy commodity. 
Warehouse owners prefer to store commodities 
which are the most profitable and which have the 
highest turnover. Since wheat more often docs not 
meet these requisites, it sometimes limits the desir-
ability of storing increasing amounts of wheat. 
Since the Food Agency sells wheat hy types to 
the miller according to their request"!, the Food Agen-
cy is in the position of not just storing a 2.3-month 
supply of many different varieties of wheat. There-
fore, from the Food Agency's point of view, the fewer 
types of wheat to he stored, the hctter (6). 
Improvement Trade System 
The one exception to government control and 
purchase of imported wheat is that which is processed 
for export. The wheat used for this purpose can be 
importrd free of government control at the world 
price under the Improvement Trade System. The 
term "improvement tradr'' means a trade system un-
der which raw materials arc imported for domcstie 
processing into products for export. The purpo~e of 
this ~ystem is to promote export<~. 
The Japanese government has made transactiom 
that arc part of the improvement trade system con-
tingent upon several factors ( 5) : 
• The trade must not imprde normal export 
and import trade. Also, the processing com-
pany must belong to an eligible industry. 
• Export prices shall be appropriate and com-
panies involved must refrain from dumping. 
• The efficiency of exported goods as defined 
hy the following equation should exceed 
1 05% for wheat flour or 11 orr for other 
products. 
Export Value 
x 1 00 = Efficiency of 
CIF of Imported Goods Exported Goods 
(Raw Material for Improvement Trade) 
• It must he possible to control processing and 
to prevent diversion of imported raw ma-
terials to domestic consumption. In the 
case of prior quotas, the total amount of pro-
cessed products should he exported within 1 
year from the time the quota was allocated. 
Other minor exceptions to government control 
and purchase of imported wheat include wheat which 
is: 1 ) consumed as food on a ship or plane, 2) 100 kg 
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in weight, or 3) carried hy passengers not to exceed 
100 kg (6). 
Sale of Wheat Purchased by the Food Agency 
The government sells domestic and imported 
wheat to flour millers and soysauce maker<;. The 
sales to millers are made in fixed quantities hased up-
on past purchases, requests, milling capacity, and 
flour production history through a fairly rigid alloca-
tion system. The imported wheat is sold at the port-
side warehou<;es of entry, while domestic wheat i<; sold 
in the area in which it is produced. The sale of feed 
wheat is conducted by the Livestock Bureau under 
provisions of another law, the Feed Supply and De-
mand Stabilization Law. 
When formulating the annual supply and de-
mand program for the next year, the quantities of 
wheat to he imported arc designated hy country of 
origin or specific wheat type. However, the supply 
and demand program does specify wheat demand hy 
soft, semi-hard, and hard wheats, which in effect de-
termines the supplier. 
The sale of wheat to flour millers is made quar-
terly in accordance with the annual program, but 
with some room for adjustment. At this time the 
quantity of wheat hy country and specific typr is 
fixed hy taking into consideration the actual demand 
for different wheat products. The quantity sold also 
fluctuates due to changes in stocks from the wholesale 
to the retail level and political considerations. If the 
fixed quantities arc rather limited, quantities hy 
country and type are determined without considering 
the mers' requests hecause it is often not practical to 
dra~tirally change quantitie'J by country and type in 
the short term ( 6). 
At present the government allocatiom to the 
flour millers arc not meeting demand, with the result 
that: 1) the millers have essentially no wheat in stock 
(the government recommend<; that the miller main-
tain a 1-month supply), 2) the larger mills are buy-
ing flour to meet thcir clients' needs, and 3) some 
<;mall commercial noodle shops are huying flour from 
grocery "!tares to meet their nreds. There was aho 
a "black market" in the flour market during 1978. 
The flour millers tend to complain about the sizc 
of the allotment, even though the industry has hecomc 
quite profitahle and secure undrr the government 
control. The flour millers have a good margin, a 
ready demand for their product, and an adequate 
source of raw material. The Food Agency would 
also agree that if the flour millers received more 
wheat, the price of flour would decline to a lcvcl 
where the smaller mills could not compete. The re-
<;ulting flour price would not be stable, which is con-
tradictory to the govrrnment's long-time objective of 
stable food prices. 
TABLE 54.-Japanese Government Purchase and Sale Prices of Imported Wheat. 
Government Government 
Purchase Resale 
Fiscal Price Price 
Year (A) {B) 
1960 26119 36627 
1961 27410 36430 
1962 28073 36339 
1963 27706 36120 
1964 28979 35135 
1965 27252 35988 
1966 28781 35688 
1967 29287 35516 
1968 27732 35456 
1969 26613 35019 
1970 27385 35425 
1971 26094 35545 
1972 25372 34511 
1973 43150 38012 
1974 72461 45602 
1975 61940 47887 
1976 68642 65050 
Source: (22). 
The allocation system may he subject to abme 
under certain conditions. As an example, due to a 
tight international market for hard wheat and an in-
creasing demand for certain hard wheat varieties the 
'- ' Food Agency is trying to discourage consumption of 
hard wheat products by not importing enough hard 
wheat to meet the millcrs' requests ( 6). The Food 
Agency's defense to this type of action is based on the 
as~umption that it does not abuse the system in order 
to decrease consumption of wheat. Furthermore, the 
Food Agency claims that a person'~ food preference 
is a fundamental right and the government is not try-
ing to force the Japanese people to change these pre-
ferences. Instead, the Food Agency claims it is care-
fully watching people's preferences and importing 
only that amount of wheat needed in Japan. 
Government Resale Prices of Wheat 
The price at which the government sells the 
wheat to flour millers has been a topic of controversy 
for many years from both inside and outside Japan. 
According to provisions of the Food Control Law and 
by Cabinet Ordinance, the resale price of wheat is set 
so as not to exceed "the ceiling price of wheat within 
a family's cost of living." The prices of imported 
wheat, domestic wheat, and milled rice as well as 
other economic factors arc comidered in establishing 
the resale price of wheat. 
During the period from 1952 through 1972, the 
resale price of wheat declined slightly (Table 54). 
After 1972, world wheat prices almost doubled in 1973 
Government Difference 
Storage and Between Difference 
Handling Purchase and Between Sale 
Costs Sale Price and Cost Price 
{C) (D)= (B)- (A) (E)= {B)- (A) -(C) 
yen per ton 
1826 10508 8682 
2034 9020 6986 
1858 8266 6408 
1767 8414 6647 
1846 6156 4310 
1889 8736 6847 
1916 6907 4991 
1801 6229 4428 
1844 7724 5880 
1896 8406 6510 
2077 8040 5963 
2219 9451 7232 
2389 9139 6750 
3115 -5138 -8253 
4502 -26859 -31361 
5289 -14053 -19312 
5759 -3592 -9357 
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and again in 1974. These price increases were not 
totally accompanied by an equivalent increase in the 
rc<>alc price. During this same period the consumer 
price index was rising rapidly due to higher energy 
and other raw material costs. Thus, the Japanese 
government did not want to aggravate this situation 
by also increasing the price of food products, such a<: 
wheat. Therefore, as opposed to the previous 20 
years in which the government made a sizable profit 
from importing wheat, from 1973 through 1976, the 
Food Agency lost money on wheat imports. 
However, the Food Agency raised the resale 
price of wheat in December 1973, January 1976, and 
July 1976. Even though world wheat prices de-
creased substantially since 1976, the resale price of 
wheat haP not been reduced. As of November 1978, 
the Food Agency was making an average 38.7% prof-
it (Table 55) on imported wheat or an average 
$125.50/MT profit. Wheat exporting countries con-
tend that this high profit is being used to subsidize an 
overly generous domestic rice program and would 
like to see the resale price reduced. The Japanese 
contend that the wheat resale price should be in-
creased so that the gap between the rice price and 
wheat price remains approximately the ~arne. At pre-
sent the price of wheat is less than the price of rice. 
One other point of contention among U. S. ex-
porters is the discrimination by the Food Agency 
among wheat types. As of November 1978, the only 
wheat types upon which the Food Agency made a 
profit greater than the average profit were American 
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wheats. One primary reason for this t) pe of di'l-
criminatory pricing practice io;; the Food .\gency's ex-
prc:-.scd effort to reduce hard wheat consumption ( 6). 
This is because the international price of hard varie-
ties has increased faster than those of the semi-hard 
and soft varieties. Additionally, some- political fac-
tions in Japan arc afraid that the consumer may 
c,;witch from a Japanese baked bread made of a soft 
dome~tic wheat to a more e-xpensive hard wheat 
bread. 
As previously mentioned, the Food Control Law 
provides that the government sale price of wheat: 
1 ) shall be determined so a<; not to exceed a ceiling 
price, 2) '\hall be set at a price level that will stabi-
lize consumer food expenditures ac,; well as take into 
account the price of rice and other e-conomic factors, 
and 3) 'lhall be publicly announced when revised. 
The ceiling price is calculated in the following 
manner.1q 
'1 P. - (P" . -) - C + R 
lo 
where: 
P, - ceiling price 
P" - retail price of wheat flour during some 
previous period 
C-
R 
the ratio of disposable income of the 
period for which the ceiling price is being 
determined to some previous period 
processing and distribution costs/unit 
proceeds from sale of by-products/unit 
In addition to the above formula a cabinet or-
' dinance guarantees that the increasing rate in the 
retail price of wheat flour will always he less than the 
imreasc in disposable income. In the ratio 1/1 0 , per-
iod 1 i~ c~tahlishcd by the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries as a 1-month period at least 1 
month before the resale price i~; to lJe revised. The 
base period is to be a 12-month period 5 years before 
period 1. The minister may elect to shorten this timr 
to less than 5 years. 
~"The ceiling pr1ce of rice is calculated Jn a similar manner. 
Summary and Conclusions 
. ~gricultu:al exports have come to represent an 
act~vity essential to the economic well-being of the 
Umted States and in particular the U. S. farmers. 
As the importance of this trade continues to increase 
the U. S. needs to become more aware and know~ 
lcdgcable of the markets which its products are serv-
ing. The single largest foreign customer of U. S. 
agricultur~ is Japan, which has purchased 16% of all 
U. S. agncultural exports since 1975. Feed grains 
~nd soybeans repres7nt more than 50o/c of Japanese 
Imports of U. S. agncultural commodities. The im-
portance of ~he .u. S. agricultural sales to Japan is 
even greater m hght of the continuing and increasing 
U. S. trade deficit with Japan. 
The purpose of this report was to build one small 
bridge acros.c; the. informational, cultural, and percep-
tua~ gap tha~ exists between the U. S. and Japan on 
agncultural Issues concerning the feed grain, wheat, 
and soybean markets in Japan. In order to do this 
a descriptive analysis of the Japanese feed grain: 
~heat, and soybean markets wa<> completed. This 
1~volved: 1) ~he description of aspects of Japanese so-
ciety and agnculture affecting those markets ( includ-
ing the income-energy gap the role of rice and do-I~lestic production of feed g;ains, wheat, soybeans, and 
hvestock products) ; 2) a description of the many gov-
ernmental policies and programs affecting the feed 
grain, wheat, and &oybean markets; and 3) a descrip-
tion of the primary industricr.; that directly comume 
the ft.·ed grains, wheat, and soybeans. 
The Japanese food and agricultural economy is 
very different from that of the U. S. and these differ-
ences significantly affect the feed grain, wheat, and 
r.;oybean markets. Listed below are the primary con-
clusions drawn from the general de-;cription of those 
aspects of Japan's food and agricultural system affect-
ing the feed grain, wheat, and soybean markets. 
• TheJ apanese food and agricultural system is 
a very complex system that has resulted from 
the combination of two different cultures se-
verely restricted land resources and a de~o-, 
cratic but extremely inefficient agricultural 
structure. The extremely small scale of pro-
duction and agricultural structure in Japan 
is the root of many of the problems facing 
Japanese agriculture. The likelihood of a 
continuing trend toward large scale live-
stock production is high and will result in 
increased efficiencies. However, the likeli-
hood of a significantly increased scale of pro-
duction of paddy and upland crops is low. 
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• Despite the government's btated intention to 
diversify Japanese agriculture, its action<> 
have encouraged rice production at the ex-
pen<>e of diversification. The price of rice 
i'l supported at a level <>uch that rice produc-
tion is 2 ~ times more profitable than soy-
bean production. The Japanese farmers 
have made a rational economic decision in 
deciding to produce rice. 
• Domestic production of feed grains, wheat, 
~nd soybeans will not significantly affect the 
Import quantities of those products and 
will probably continue to represent declinin(T 
proportions of consumption which at presen~ 
are 1.4, 0.4, and 2.6%, respectively. 
• In the future a larger percentage of the meat 
consumed in Japan will he produced in Ja-
pan, thus eliminating the possibility that feed 
grain and soybean import<> might be cut ac; 
a result of increased imports of livestock prod-
urtc;. The Japanese arc committed to import-
ing raw materials for further proces'ling to as 
great an extent as possible and to limit im-
ports of livestock products with a variety of 
trade harriers. 
• The Japanese government is committed to a 
trade policy of diversification of agricultural 
supply sources which will continue. The 
effect of this policy is minimal due to the fact 
that the U. S. has exportable supplies of feed 
grains, wheat, and soybeans that arc not 
available in other surplus-producing coun-
tries in the needed quantities. As long as 
this situation continues the diversification 
' policy will have little effect. Likewise it can 
be concluded that the trade agre~mcnts 
signed by the Japanese with other countries 
have had little effect on the trade of those 
commodities. 
The description of the feed grain market in-
volved both the private and public sectors. From 
that description the following conclusions were 
drawn. 
• Feed grain use in animal feedstuffs repre-
sents almost 90% of the consumption of feed 
grains, up from 60% in 1960, but this trend 
is expected to level off. 
• The average formula feed plant utilization 
in .1977 wa'l 8.67 hours, 25 days/month, 
whtch represents a gross under-utilization of 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
investment which translates into higher for-
mula feed prices to farmers. 
The formula feed industry is becoming a 
more and more concentrated industry with 
the 11 largest companies controlling 80% of 
the business. The price of formula feeds is 
set solely by the largest producer, Zennoh. 
Feed grains are not imported directly from 
international grain companies by the formula 
feed companies. Instead, the formula feed 
companies purchase their feed grain needs 
through Japanese trading companies which 
in turn import the grain. This is primarily 
the result of inter-company relationships he-
tween the trading companies and the formula 
feed companies. However, the large num-
ber of Japanese trading companies involved 
in importing feed grains had made the J a p-
an esc market a very competitive one. This 
relationship between the trading companies 
and the formula feed companies docs not 
have any negative impacts on U. S. feed 
grain exports. 
The U. S. position in the Japanese feed grain 
market wiii probably he maintained at more 
than 60%. This is dependent upon produc-
tion in other exporting countries, since the 
U. S. plays the role of residual supplier. 
However, on the basis of all non-price cri-
teria for choosing suppliers, the U. S. is 
Japan's best supplier of feed grains. ThC' 
criteria include dependability, product qual-
ity, transportation facilities, ability to hcdgC', 
historical trading relationships, etc. 
Private as well as governmental efforts to 
develop production-for-export projects de-
signed to increase world supplies of feed 
grains, stabilize prices, and diversify suppliers 
have largely been failures. These projects 
certainly do not represent a threat to the 
U. S. market share in the next 10 years and 
probably for a longer time than that. 
Sales of surplus rice in Japan to the formula 
feed industry have significantly affected the 
use of feed grains. However, it is unlikely 
that there will continue to be sizable quanti-
ties of surplus rice after this second very 
costly rice disposal operation is completed in 
1982. 
The ability of either government or industry 
funds to significantly offset feed grain price 
increases similar to those in 1973 is minimal. 
The funds which have been set up by the 
formula feed industry and the government 
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arc costly measures, the principal effect of 
which is probably psychological. 
• The Mixed Feed Supply Stabilization Or-
ganization ( MFSSO) has stockpiled 195,000 
MT of corn and 110,000 MT of sorghum. 
The Food Agency, in conjunction with the 
MFSSO, has stockpiled 300,000 MT of bar-
ley. However, due to funding cuts, the 
MFSSO has not been able to attain its origi-
nal objective to stockpile a 1-month supply 
of feed graim. 
The soybean market description resulted in a 
number of important conclusions being idcntifiC'd. 
• Soybean usc is very diversified, but the his-
torical trend has been for a large proportion 
of the soybeans to go into non-food soybean 
uses. This trend is expected to case in the 
future. 
• Historically the Japanese have imported soy-
beans to meet the soybean oil demand and 
imported small quantities of soybean meal 
to meet thC' excess demand for that product. 
One reason for the increasing imports of soy-
bean meal in recent years is the increasing 
availability and use of more competitive sub-
stitutes for soybean oil, with the relatively 
reduced demand for soybean oil. If this 
trend continues, Japan will import greater 
quantities of soybean meal. 
• The soybean processing (crushing) industry 
is highly concentrated, with the top 12 com-
panics crushing 70j{ of the soybeans. Fur-
thermore, the soybean industry, after tough 
financial times (losses of $250 million) in 
197 5 due to institutional speculation, is on 
much firmer ground and is almost 100% 
hedged in its operations. 
• The soybean processing companies import 
their soybean requirements through thC' 
Japanese trading companies. This is due to 
inter-company relationships hut does not 
have any adverse effect on the market. 
• The U. S. soybean market share in Japan 
was 97% in 1978, the highest ever. The 
U. S. is virtually certain to maintain its mar-
ket share above 90%. Chinese imports 
will represent a declining percentage of the 
market and Brazilian beans will not enter the 
market in significant quantities barring gov-
ernment intervention. 
• Private Japanese companies have become in-
volved in at least 17 fats and oils joint ven-
ture projects. The majority of these are in 
the palm and copra oil refining industries in 
Malaysia and the Philippine'!, respectively. 
These projects mean increased competition 
for soy bran oil in the Japanese market, as the 
Japanese companies involved have made 
commitments to purchase large quantities of 
the oils produced by the joint venture pro-
jects. 
• Soybean supply stabilization efforts via a 
soybean stockpiling program by the govern-
ment are insignificant because of the small 
quantities involved. 
The wheat market description resulted in the fol-
lowing conclusions. 
• Government efforts to increase domestic 
wheat production have not shown a positive 
response since the farmer alternative of pro-
ducing rice is much more profitable. 
• The consumption of wheat has significantly 
increased in Japan over the past 25 years. 
However, the per capita consumption is ex-
pected to level off in view of continued rice 
surpluses and government pressure to limit 
imports. 
• The flour milling capacity in Japan is basic-
ally controlled by 4 companies which have 
35 flour mills and produce 62.7/'r of the na-
tion's flour. The trend toward fewer interior 
flour mills is expected to continue. 
• Wheat imports from the U. S. arc expected 
to continue to increase, with the U. S. share 
of the market being maintained at the 55% 
to 60/'r level. 
• The importation, domestic marketing, pric-
ing, storage, and allocations of wheat to mil-
lers are all controlled by the Japanese Food 
Agency. This agency is attempting to limit 
wheat consumption while encouraging rice 
consumption. 
• Profitmaking by the Food Agency on its 
wheat exports is expected to continue. 
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Appendix 
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, 
there is relatively little written in English on the J a-
pan esc food and agricultural system, and in particul-
lar the feed grain and soybean markets. In the pur-
suit of information on these topics, trips were made 
to New York, Washington, D. C., University of 
Michigan, and Japan. In each of these places, the 
respective libraries were explored for information on 
Japanese agriculturc. Although some material was 
found in thc libraries, the real sources of the details, 
facts, reports, testimony, and most important-un-
derstanding-came from discussions and interviews 
with people from all sectors of the economy on hoth 
sides of the Pacific. People concerned with and 
knowledgeable about various aspects of Japan's gov-
ernment, agriculture, marketing, and industrial struc-
ture gave of their time, energy, and knowledge in an 
effort to help the authors gain a greater understand-
ing of the complicated Japanese food economy. The 
names and addresses of theqe people are: 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF INTERVIEWEES 
AND SUPPLIERS OF INFORMATION 
Government 
United States 
Dudley Williams 
Agricultural Attache 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
John Beshoar 
Assistant Agricultural Attache 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
Richard Blabey 
Assistant Agricultural Attache 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
Yoshiyuki Tawara 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
Mr. Moriyama 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
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Sadao Suzuki 
Office of Agricultural Attache 
American Embassy 
1-10-5 Akasaka 
Minato-Ku Tokyo, Japan 
Bryant Wadsworth 
F.A.S. Livestock Analysis Section 
6615 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Art Hausman 
F.A.S. Livestock Analysis Section 
6628 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Don Novotny 
F.A.S. Feedgrains Analysis Section 
6050 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Gary Groves 
F.A.S. Livestock Analysis Section 
6629 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Jon Falch 
F.A.S. Livestock Analysis Section 
6629 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Alan Holtz 
F.A.S. Oilseed Analysis Section 
5535 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Allan Hemphill 
F.A.S. Poultry Analysis Section 
South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Tom Hamby 
F.A.S. Oilseed Analysis Section 
5535 South Building 
U.S.D.A. 
14th and Independence Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Bruce Greenshields 
E.S.C.S.-Foreign 
324 GHI Building 
500 12th Street, S.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Bill Coyle 
E.S.C.S.-Foreign 
324 GHI Building 
500 12th Street, S.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Reid Friend 
E.S.C.S.-Foreign 
324 GHI Building 
500 12th Street, S.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20250 
Japan 
Mr. Uno 
Agricultural Attache 
Japanese Embassy 
Washington, D. C. 
Mr. Kumazawa 
Ag ricultura I Attache 
Japanese Embassy 
Washington, D. C. 
Personnel 
Policy Division, Food Agency 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2-1, 1-Chome Kasumigaseki 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Personnel 
Upland Crops Development Division 
Agricultural Production Bureau 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2-1, 1-Chome Kasumigaseki 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Personnel 
Supply and Demand Section 
Grocery, Oil and Fats Division 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2-1, 1-Chome Kasumigaseki 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Personnel 
Commercial Feed Division 
Livestock Industry Bureau 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2-1, 1-Chome Kasumigaseki 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Trade Associations and 
Quasi-Government Organizations 
United States 
Gene Vickers 
Western Wheat Association 
1030 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20005 
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Rick Callies 
Marketing Specialist 
Western Wheat Association 
1030 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20005 
Ronald R. Maas 
Director 
Wheat Associates, U.S.A. 
Tameike Tokyu Building 8th Floor 
1-14, Akasaka 1-Chome 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Paul Sane 
Associate Director 
Wheat Associates, U.S.A. 
Tameike Tokyu Building 8th Floor 
1-14, Akasaka 1 -Chome 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Ken Hobbie 
U. S. Feed Grains Council 
1 030 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20005 
Kent M. Brady 
Asian Director 
U. S. Feed Grains Council 
P. 0. Box 97, Room 3104 
Kasumigaseki Building 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Seiji Terada 
Program Coordinator 
U. S. Feed Grains Council 
P. 0. Box 97, Room 3104 
Kasumigaseki Building 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Hiroyasu Ohyama 
Agricultural Advisor 
U. S. Feed Grains Council 
P. 0. Box 97, Room 3104 
Kasumigaseki Building 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100, Japan 
Dr. Kling 
American Soybean Association 
1101 Connecticut Avenue 
Washington, D. C. 
Gil Griffis 
Asian Director 
American Soybean Association 
4th Floor Akasaka Yomo Building 
12-21, 3-Chome, Akasaka 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo 107, Japan 
Jack Yamashita 
Assistant Director 
American Soybean Association 
4th Floor Akasaka Yomo Building 
12-21, 3-Chome, Akasaka 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo l 07, Japan 
Japan 
Kunia Koyama 
Mixed Feed Supply Stabilization Assn. 
Mori Building No. 15 
10-8, 2-Chome, Toranomon 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo 105, Japan 
Shigeru Kida 
Managing Director 
Japan Feed Manufacturers Assn. 
2-1, 2-Chome, Azabudai 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Akiyoshi Uchiumi 
Assistant Manager 
Japan Feed Manufacturers Assn. 
2-l, 2-Chome, Azabudai 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Shiyojiro Aoki 
Japan Feed Manufacturers Assn. 
2-1, 2-Chome, Azabudai 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Katsu Yamanaka 
Director, Japan Feed Council 
2-1, 2-Chome, Azabudai 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Kan Kibuta 
Executive Secretary 
Japan Feed Council 
2-1, 2-Chome, Azabudai 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Shiro Ebisaiva 
Director, Agriculture and Fisheries Section 
Japan Trade Center 
1221 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10020 
Industry and Commercial Sector 
United States 
Konrad Biedermann 
Director of Planning 
Continental Grain Company 
277 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Rich Carter 
Continental Grain Company 
277 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Mr. Enloe 
Director Continental Grain Office 
Kyodo News Building 
2-2-5 Toranomon 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Japan 
Seiho Tsuchida 
Produce and Provisions Department 
K. Nichimen Co., Inc. 
1185 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036 
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Hipeki Mogi 
Associate Manager, Produce Department 
Kanematsu-Gosho (USA), Inc. 
One World Trade Center, Suite 4811 
New York, NY l 0048 
Teruhiho Yamashita 
Executive Vice President 
UnicoJapan (USA), Inc. (Zennoh) 
One World Trade Center, Suite 5301 
New York, NY 1 0048 
Eishi Uyeno 
Vice President 
Mitsui & Company (USA), Inc. 
200 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Kenya Ohshima 
General Manager 
Feed Department 
Feed and Meat Division 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
2-l, Ohtemachi 1-Chome, 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Mitsuo Hirota 
Feed Department 
Feed and Meat Division 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
2-l, Ohtemachi 1-Chome, 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Masatoshi ltayama 
Feed Department 
Feed and Meat Division 
Mitsui & Co., ltd. 
2-l, Ohtemachi 1-Chome, 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Yasayuki Suzuki 
General Manager 
Soybean and Rapeseed Section 
Oilseeds, Oils & Fats Dept. 
Grain Division 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
2-1, Ohtemachi 1-Chome, 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Akio Tsuboi 
General Manager 
Wheat & Barley Section 
Wheat & Rice Dept. 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
2-1, Ohtemachi 1-Chome, 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
S. Ohnuma 
Manager 
Feedstuff Importing Section 
Feed and Livestock Department 
Zennoh (National Federation of 
Agricultural Co-operative As~;ns.) 
Nokyo Building 
8-3, 1-Chome Ohtemachi 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
S. Hagiwara 
Assistant Manager 
Feedstuff Importing Section 
Feed and Livestock Department 
Zennoh (National Federation of 
Agricultural Co-operative Assns.) 
Nokyo Building 
8-3, 1-Chome Ohtemachi 
Chiyodo-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Genichi Uemura 
Executive Manager 
Showa Sangio Co., Ltd. 
Kashima Plant 
Kamisu, Kashima-gun 
lbarahi Prefecture 
Japan 
Ken Ohara 
Assistant Plant Manager 
Showa Sangio Co., Ltd. 
Kashima Plant 
Kamisu, Kashima-gun 
lbarahi Prefecture 
Japan 
Dr. Hiroshi Nakamura 
Director 
Hohnen Oil Co., Ltd. 
2-3, 1-Chome Ohtemachi 
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
lsao Ishikawa 
President 
Cokusen Co., Ltd. 
766 Kozono, Ayase City 
Kanagawa Prefecture 
Japan 
Academic 
United States 
Dr. Bob Jones 
Dept. of Agricultural Economics 
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Purdue University 
West Lafayette, IN 47907 
Kozo Konishi 
Previous Employee of Japanese MAFF Food 
Agency 
Dept. of Agricultural Economics 
Purdue University 
West Lafayette, IN 47907 
Dr. Mike Cook 
Dept. of Agricultural Economics 
Texas A & M University 
College Station, TX 77843 
Dr. Walter G. Heid, Jr. 
CEO, ESCS, U.S.D.A. 
U. S. Grain Marketing Research Center 
1515 College Avenue 
Manhattan, KS 66502 
Japan 
Dr. Keizo Mochida, Chief 
International Affairs Section 
National Research Institute of 
Agricultural Economics 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2-2 Nishigahara 
Kita-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 
Dr. Kenzo Hemmi 
Dean of Faculty 
Faculty of Agriculture 
University of Tokyo 
Yayoii-1, Bunkyo-Ku 
Tokyo 113, Japan 
Dr. Yuzuru Kate 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
Faculty of Agriculture 
University of Tokyo 
Yayoii-1, Bunkyo-Ku 
Tokyo 113,Japan 
BETTER LIVING IS THE PRODUCT 
of research at the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center. 
All Ohioans benefit from this product. 
Ohio's farm families benefit from the results of agricultural re-
search translated into increased earnings and improved living condi-
tions. So do the families of the thousands of workers employed in the 
firms making up the state's agribusiness complex. 
But the greatest benefits of agricultural research flow to the mil-
lions of Ohio consumers. They enjoy the end products of agricultural 
science-the world's most wholesome and nutritious food, attractive 
lawns, beautiful ornamental plants, and hundreds of consumer prod-
ucts containing ingredients originating on the farm, in the greenhouse 
and nursery, or in the forest. 
The Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, as the Center was called 
for 83 years, was established at The Ohio State University, Columbus, 
in 1882. Ten years later, the Station was moved to its present loca-
tion in Wayne County. In 1965, the Ohio General Assembly passed 
legislation changing the name to Ohio Agricultural Research and De-
velopment Center-a name which more accurately reflects the nature 
and scope of the Center's research program today. 
Research at OARDC deals with the improvement of all agricul-
tural production and marketing practices. It is concerned with the de-
velopment of an agricultural product from germination of a seed or 
development of an embryo through to the consumer's dinner table. It 
is directed at improved human nutrition, family and child development, 
home management, and all other aspects of family life. It is geared 
to enhancing and preserving the quality of our environment. 
Individuals and groups are welcome to visit the OARDC, to enjoy 
the attractive buildings, grounds, and arboretum, and to observe first 
hand research aimed at the goal of Better Living for All Ohioans! 
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Ohio's major soil types and climatic 
conditions are represented at the Re-
search Center's 12 looat10ns. 
Research is conducted by 15 depart-
ments on more than 7000 acres at Center 
headquarters in Wooster, eight branches, 
Pomerene Forest Laboratory, North Appa-
lachian Experimental Watershed, and 
The Ohio State University. 
Center Headquarters, Wooster, Wayne 
County: 1953 acres 
Eastern Ohio Resource Development Cen-
ter, Cdldwell, Noble County: 2053 
acres 
Jackson Branch, Jackson, Jackson Coun-
ty: 502 acres 
Mahoning County Farm, Canfield: 275 
acres 
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Muck Crops Branch, W1llard, Huron Coun-
ty: 15 acres 
North Appalachian Experimental Water-
shed, Coshocton, Coshocton County: 
1 047 acres (Cooperative with Science 
and Education Administration/ Agri-
cultural Research, U. S. Dept. of Agri-
culture) 
Northwestern Branch, Hoytville, Wood 
County: 247 acres 
Pomerene Forest Laboratory, Coshocton 
County: 227 acres 
Southern Branch, Ripley, Brown County: 
275 acres 
Vegetable Crops Branch, Fremont, San-
dusky County: 1 05 acres 
Western Branch, So~~ton, Clark 
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